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Abstract 
This research aims to detect and measure earnings management using a newly modified 
version of the standard Jones model (Jones, 1991). The standard model is extended to 
include a measure of discretionary accruals as an additional regressor instead of using 
the residuals. The variable used to measure discretionary accruals is a composite 
variable that consists of two components, one that represents the incentive and the other 
represents the tool of manipulation. The model is applied to detect earnings 
management in loss reversal companies for listed companies in Jordan and examine the 
market reaction to the loss reversal. The model is also applied on loss reversal 
companies for listed companies in the UK and the US.  
In chapter three, the new model is applied on listed companies in Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). The ASE is structured into two markets: the first market and the 
second market. Companies are motivated to be listed or remain listed in the first market 
since it only lists profitable companies. Companies reporting losses more frequently are 
listed in the second market. Results provide evidence of earnings management for 
companies listed in the first market. Companies that report a loss in a previous period 
manipulate in the following period to report profits. As a result of loss reversal, they 
preserve their place in the first market and avoid dropping back to the second market. 
This research conducts statistical simulation tests to compare the extended Jones model 
with the standard model. Results show that the extended model detects earnings 
management better than the standard one. This new model also separates discretionary 
accruals from measurement error (i.e. residuals) and makes it possible to accurately 
measure the whole amount of manipulation. 
Chapter four examines the investor reaction to the manipulation taking place in the first 
market. Results show that the market is pricing the discretionary accruals (the 
manipulation) as a component of net income, although they result only from earnings 
management. 
In chapter five, the model is applied on loss reversal firms listed in the UK and in the 
US. Results show that the companies manipulate to reverse losses and the manipulation 
depends on to the presence of R&D activities and the changing level in these activities. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Preface:  
Reported earnings play an important role in valuing companies. It is the signal markets 
intercept and decode to formulate an opinion and translate it into a decision. Earnings 
are the mirror of the company and the image of the manager. 
Managers acknowledge the importance of the income figure, and hold back no effort to 
maintain a positive figure and avoid a negative one. They also understand that there is 
some flexibility to construct the earnings number. They use this inherited flexibility in 
the earnings figure to bend it to any direction to achieve specific targets. 
The accrual system allows for some flexibility for estimating some expenses and 
revenues. Without it, companies will display an earnings figure that varies from period 
to another. However, the accrual system provides basis for measuring performance 
more accurately through the revenue recognition principle and the matching principle.  
Expenses are usually recognised and recorded first waiting for revenues to occur. 
Therefore, instead of reporting all expenses in one period and recording all revenues in 
the subsequent period, the accrual system allows for recognising revenues in the period 
it is earned and matches it with related expenses. Through proper matching, the 
performance of the firm is measured more accurately. On the other hand, managers can 
use the accrual system to manipulate the numbers, and in a way, design the earnings 
figure to fulfil certain objectives.   
Accounting choices also influences the earnings. Managers can change the method of 
stock valuation (e.g. LIFO to FIFO) to increase (decrease) cost of goods sold to match it 
with the sales revenue and as a result the operating profit will change accordingly. 
According to generally accepted accounting principles and methods, any change in the 
accounting methods must be justified and disclosed. Such changes will have no effect 
on the market because they are transparent and even anticipated.  
On the other hand, accrual manipulation is not transparent and in many instances is 
undetected, which can mislead the market. Although the market knows that the 
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accounting earnings figure can be manipulated, but they cannot tell whether it is 
manipulation or the company is performing well.  
To understand exactly how accrual manipulation takes place, consider the following 
example. A company prepares its financial statements at the end of December; the 
company estimates the allowance for bad debts to be 10% of its total debtors balances, 
and 20% of its sales occurred during the second half of December. The manager can 
report the earnings for the year ended taking no action, assuming the final results are 
already profits. However, if the manager faces an incentive to decrease reported 
earnings then he/she can take two actions. First, delay the shipment of sales that occur 
in the second half of December and ship the goods in early January. Second, re-estimate 
the bad debt allowance to be 20% instead of 10%. The result of this manipulation is a 
decrease in sales revenue by 20% and an increase in bad debt expense by 10%, thereby 
managing earnings downward.  
In a different case, the manager might face an incentive to increase reported earnings. 
Assuming that the company’s average sales in January are 15% of total sales every year, 
the manager can recognise January sales in December by early shipment of goods. The 
manager can also re-estimate bad debt allowance to be 5% instead of 10%. The result 
will be an increase in sales revenue by 15% for the current year and a decrease in bad 
debt expenses by 5%; overall it’s a gross increase of 20% to the reported earnings. This 
manipulation is simply shifting revenues and expenses between two periods, and even if 
the auditor detects it, the transactions can be easily justified by displaying the sales 
invoices. 
In the two cases demonstrated above, the manager did not violate any regulations or any 
accounting standards. Hence, in its abstract form earnings management is not 
fraudulent. But taking into consideration the manager’s intensions, it is not ethical. The 
manager manipulated earnings as a reaction to a specific incentive or stimuli. 
Regardless the incentive or whether it is related to the well-being of the manager or the 
company itself, the reported earnings does not reflect the true performance of the firm. 
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1.2 The aim and objectives of this research: 
The general aim of this research is to modify an extensively used model in literature in 
order to detect and measure earnings management more accurately. Moreover, showing 
how the new model overcomes the weaknesses and problems documented in previous 
approaches. 
The objectives of this research are firstly to provide general review of the earnings 
management literature to explain the main methods and models applied to detect and 
measure earnings management. Additionally, identify the main gaps and weaknesses in 
previous studies. Also, highlight the main problems with the cross-sectional Jones 
model. Another objective is overcoming the weaknesses of previous models by 
introducing a new modified model that detects and measures earnings management 
more accurately. Furthermore, demonstrating how the model detects earnings 
management by applying it on real data taken from listed companies in Jordan, the UK 
and the US. 
1.3 Contributions of the research: 
The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
I. I develop a new model that detects and measures earnings management more 
accurately. The new model is an extension of the cross-sectional version of the 
Jones model. This new model uses a variable that detects manipulation and 
measures the amount of the manipulation for companies that share a common 
motivation. 
 
II. I conduct a full review of previous research in earnings management literature. 
This review examines the main methods that are applied to detect earnings 
management. The review clusters the studies that use similar methods into three 
groups: studies that estimate discretionary accruals, studies that detect earnings 
management through earnings distribution, studies that estimate the managed 
component of a single accrual. 
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III. I provide evidence of earnings management for listed companies in Amman 
Stock Exchange. Industrial companies listed in the first market manipulate in 
order to avoid relegation. Moreover, I show that the market does not detect this 
manipulation and overreacts to the discretionary accruals. 
 
IV. I provide evidence of earnings management for loss reversal companies that 
undertake R&D activities in the UK and in the US. The amount of manipulation 
varies according to the changing level of the R&D activities. 
 
1.4 Review of earnings management literature: 
Detecting earnings management is not an easy task. So the question stands on how a 
researcher can study this behaviour and reject the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management? Many approaches are used in previous studies, and the starting point is to 
understand the incentives and motives driving this behaviour. Taking this incentive into 
consideration puts earnings management in context and makes it easier to detect and 
measure. Therefore, instead of looking for a needle in a hay stack, researchers narrow 
down the search based on the incentive.  
There are three main approaches applied in literature to detect and measure earning 
management. The most applied approach is estimating discretionary accruals after 
controlling for nondiscretionary accruals. Another popular method is examining the 
earnings distribution shape and looking for any discontinuities around specific 
benchmarks. A third approach, although less applied than the other two, is examining 
single accruals to separate the managed component from the unmanaged component. 
To estimate the discretionary accruals, previous studies develop models to control for 
the nondiscretionary accruals. If there is no earnings management, then total accruals 
will equal nondiscretionary accruals. On the other hand, if there is a difference between 
them, then the unexplained amount is attributed to discretionary accruals (Healy, 1985; 
DeAngelo, 1986). 
Jones (1991) develops a model to control for nondiscretionary accruals more accurately 
than previous studies. The model contains two variables (sales revenue and fixed assets) 
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that control most of the nondiscretionary accruals. When total accruals are regressed on 
these two variables any resulting residuals are attributable to discretionary accruals. 
This model is the most applied model in earnings management studies. The model 
developed by Jones (1991) is applied on two periods: the estimation period and the 
event period. In the estimation period, the model is used to estimate the coefficients on 
the two nondiscretionary accruals variables using time series data. The estimated 
coefficients are then plotted in the event year to compute total accruals. If there is no 
earnings management, then there will be no difference between the observed total 
accruals and the computed total accruals. However, any difference between the two 
amounts is earnings management.  
Following studies applied the Jones model on cross sectional data in order to overcome 
the lack of accounting time series data (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 
1996; Becker et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005; Caramanis & Lennox, 2008). The model 
is applied on the whole sample of firm-years observations. In other words, the cross-
sectional Jones model does not have an estimation period and an event period. 
Therefore, the residuals of the model are the measure of discretionary accruals. 
The distribution approach detects earnings management by examining the earnings 
distribution. The presence of a discontinuity in the distribution around a specific 
benchmark is considered earnings management (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler &Dichev, 
1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Leuz et al., 2003; Jacob &Jorgensen, 2007). This approach 
gains its importance from setting the main incentives or benchmarks for earnings 
management. 
Some studies apply an approach to specify the managed component of specific single 
accruals (McNichols &Wilson, 1988; Knag &Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Beaver &Engel, 
1996). The importance of this method comes from differentiating between the 
unmanaged and managed components of specific accruals.  
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1.5 A modification to the Jones model: 
When applying the Jones model on cross-sectional data, the residuals are used as the 
measure for discretionary accruals. However, the residuals from a statistical perspective 
are assumed to be normally distributed around the regression line. Therefore, some 
residuals are above the line and some residuals are below the line, and they average to 
zero. Based on that, the residuals show that some firms are managing earnings upward, 
while at the same time other firms are managing earnings downward, and on average 
there is no earnings management. 
In previous studies, the Jones model is modified to increase the control over the 
nondiscretionary accruals. For example, Dechow et al. (1995) modify the model by 
removing the change in debtors from change in sales in the event period. By doing so, 
the paper argues that the model will only control for the nondiscretionary accruals by 
removing any managed components. Kothari et al. (2005) adds an additional variable to 
control for firm performance effects, making the model less noisy. On the other hand, 
Teoh et al. (1998) modify the model based on time length and management control. 
The underlying argument of the modifications is if the Jones model measures the 
nondiscretionary accruals more accurately, then the noise to the model will represent 
only the discretionary accruals. However, the Jones model is not the best fit for the 
nondiscretionary accruals. In other words, the model does not give a R
2
 score that 
equals 1. Therefore, the residuals are picking up unobserved nondiscretionary accruals 
and measurement errors in addition to discretionary accruals. 
To overcome this problem, the modification to the Jones model should not be based on 
better control for nondiscretionary accruals but on measuring the discretionary accruals 
themselves. Hence, the argument of this research is assuming that the change in sales 
revenue and fixed assets are controlling for most of the nondiscretionary accruals, and 
adding an additional variable that represents discretionary accruals. The residuals in this 
case will only represent measurement error or white noise. Thus, the model will be 
based on the fact that total accruals are decomposed into nondiscretionary and 
discretionary: 
Total accruals= nondiscretionary accruals + discretionary accruals 
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And will be tested empirically using the following general model: 
 
The error term in this model will only represent white noise. The measure of 
discretionary accruals is composed of two variables. The first one represents the 
incentive (or benchmark) that motivates managers to manipulate earnings. The second 
variable represents the tool of manipulation. Thus, the measure of discretionary accruals 
in this model explains the “why” and the “how”. 
1.6 Sample, data and results: 
The model is first applied on firms listed in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The 
institutional framework of the ASE makes it an interesting case because the incentive to 
manipulate is visible. The ASE is divided into two markets: the first market and the 
second market. 
Firms that report continuous profits are listed in the first market. However, if a company 
reports losses for three consecutive years, then it will be removed from the first market 
to the second market. This will affect the reputation of the company and the manager. 
To be listed in the second market means that the company is less profitable, and 
therefore more risky. This will also affect the companies access to additional funds 
whether from the market or from lenders. 
The sample consists of all industrial or manufacturing companies listed in the first 
market. Financial and service companies are dropped from the sample because of their 
special accounting systems. As a matter of fact, the majority of previous studies in 
earnings management are applied on manufacturing firms due to the availability of 
accrual accounts, which makes the detection of any manipulation less difficult. Based 
on that, companies listed in the first market are motivated to manipulate their earnings 
in order to remain listed. The assumption is companies listed in the first market will 
manipulate directly after a loss year. They will not manipulate after two consecutive 
years of losses because it will be more costly to do so.  
The tool of manipulation depends on the available accounting technology. Since the 
sample consists of industrial companies listed in the first market, the accrual accounts 
are expected to be used to manipulate earnings (e.g. debtors, stock). For the industrial 
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companies listed in the first market, change in debtors is the variable used along with 
the incentive to measure discretionary accruals. Change in debtors can capture both 
revenue and expense manipulation. Companies can increase sales revenue through early 
recognition of sales. For example, a portion of sales at the beginning of the following 
year can be recognized during the current year by shipping the goods early to buyers. 
This process is called channel stuffing. Moreover, the company can re-estimate the 
percentage of bad debts to decrease expenses. It is possible to achieve these two actions 
simultaneously.  
The results obtained from applying the model on the sample support the earnings 
management hypothesis. The model detects earnings management for industrial 
companies listed in the first market. Companies that report a loss are manipulating their 
earnings through early recognition of sales and/or decreasing the bad debt expense.  
The manipulating companies are examined in the loss year to test for big baths. 
Companies usually take a big bath by accelerating some expenses and writing-off stock 
to increase the probability of reporting profits in the following year. In other words, the 
company anticipating a loss will maximise the loss making it easier to report profits in 
the next period. However, companies might realise that they will report losses at the end 
of the fiscal year and it could be too late for them to either manipulate their earnings or 
take a big bath. Results show no indication of big bath in the loss year. This means that 
companies decided to take action in the period following the loss and manage earnings 
upwards through early recognition of sales. This action will most likely affect the level 
of sales in the year following the manipulation. Results show that change in sales is 
significantly negative in the period following the manipulation year, which is an 
indication of accrual reversal. 
In order to compare the model of this research with the standard Jones Model, a 
statistical simulation is designed. The basis of the comparison is demonstrating how the 
residuals are not the proper measure for discretionary accruals. Previous studies conduct 
simulations demonstrating the behaviour of the residuals after adding a fixed amount 
that represents earnings management. 
The standard Jones model is applied on the ASE sample after dropping off the 
companies with the incentive to manipulate. The coefficients of the model are set so that 
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the standard Jones model will give a R
2
 equal to 1. After that, a fixed amount (e.g. 5% 
of total assets) is inserted on the data. Using the residuals from the standard Jones 
model did not pick up all the manipulation. However, when adding a variable as an 
additional regressor to represent the discretionary accruals, the coefficient equals the 
amount added. In other words, the variable is picking up all the manipulation. Thus, the 
simulation test demonstrates how the modified model measures earnings management 
more accurately than the residuals.  
Companies listed in the first market in the Amman Stock Exchange manipulate their 
earnings in the period following a loss year in order to remain listed. But the question is 
if the manipulation is successful to preserve the companies’ status in the first market, is 
it misleading the investors. Previous studies examined the components of earnings and 
how the market prices each part. The underlying issue the studies are testing is the 
information content of total accruals. Accruals, if not managed, should carry relevant 
information about the real performance of the company. However, the manipulation will 
add noise and distort the actual performance of the company (Dechow, 1994; 
Subramanyam, 1996; Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; DeFond &Park, 2001; Pincus et al., 2007) 
Net income (earnings) is decomposed into its basic components: operating cash flows 
and accruals. The latter is decomposed into nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals, 
or in other words, the unmanaged and managed components (Dechow, 1994; 
Subramanyam, 1996). The assumption tested here is if the market sees through the 
manipulation then they will only price the operating cash flows and the 
nondiscretionary accruals. On the other hand, if the market is actually misled by the 
manipulation, then they will price discretionary accruals as a component of earnings. 
To test this, the market value of shares is regressed on the components of earnings in 
three separate univariate regressions. Moreover, the different forms of earnings (e.g. 
nondiscretionary income) are regressed in four separate multivariate regressions. The 
reason behind these tests is to examine the coefficients and the R
2
 of each model and 
determine which component is priced the highest (Subramanyam, 1996). 
Model selection tests are applied using the likelihood ratio test (Vuong, 1989). The test 
shows which model of the competing models is the best in explaining the dependent 
variable (i.e. market value of shares). Results show that the market is pricing 
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discretionary accruals. They are the same discretionary accruals detected using the 
extended Jones model in the previous chapter and they only represent earnings 
management. Moreover, the results also show that any form of earnings explains more 
of the market share value when it includes discretionary accruals. For example, net 
income is explaining more than nondiscretionary income (operating cash flows plus 
nondiscretionary accruals). The results also show that the market not only prices the 
discretionary accruals but attaches a higher value to them than the other two 
components. This means that the manipulation is not only preserving the status of the 
company in the first market but also sending an optimistic message to the investors 
about its current and future performance. However, and once again, the discretionary 
accruals are the result of only earnings management.  
In order to test the modified model of this research in different settings, the model is 
applied to detect earnings management for loss reversal firms. The incentive in this case 
is reversing losses reported in previous period and reporting profits in the current 
period. 
The status quo for companies is to report profits, but if they report losses, then it is 
considered as a deviation. The market usually places severe penalties on loss making 
firms by pricing the company negatively. However, if the reason for losses are due to 
investing in projects with potential future benefits (e.g. R&D activities), then the 
company will be positively valued regardless the losses. 
Previous studies in this area examined the reasons for losses and how the market 
interacts with loss firms. All the studies document an increase in the frequency of firms 
reporting losses in the past three decades. They mostly attribute this to more 
conservative accounting standards and as a result, an increase in loss recognition. 
Moreover, the literature shows that if the reason for the loss is to increase the value of 
the firm in the future, then the market will value the activity rather than the loss itself 
(Collins et al., 1999; Givoly &Hayn, 2000; Joos & Plesko, 2005; Klein &Marquardt, 
2006; Darrough &Ye, 2007; Franzen &Radhakrishnan, 2009). 
In this context, the focus is on R&D firms since the literature shows that the market 
prices R&D as assets with potential future benefits despite that the firm reports losses. 
R&D activities are viewed by the investors as potential future benefits that will 
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eventually increase the value of the firm. In other words, the company that undertakes 
R&D projects will continue to report losses, but at some point the market expects that 
the company will reverse its losses by harvesting the benefits of previous R&D 
activities. 
The model is applied on two samples from the UK and from the US. The two samples 
also represent two different accounting regimes and provide comparability for loss 
firms’ between two settings. The sample includes only manufacturing firms because of 
the intensive accrual accounts evident in their financial reports. Results show that loss 
firms that undertake R&D activities in the UK reverse losses through earnings 
management, and the tool of manipulation is stock (inventory). Stock is a proper tool 
for expense manipulation. Since all firms in the sample are manufacturing companies, 
then they can reduce the cost of manufactured goods through re-allocating overhead 
costs to increase ending period stock. Moreover, results show evidence of earnings 
management for loss reversal firms in the US that undertake R&D. The manipulation is 
captured through change in debtors; this suggests that firms are recognising early sales 
to increase earnings. 
The results also show that for loss firms that undertake R&D activities at a changing 
state are reversing losses through earnings management. Firms that have a variable level 
of R&D cannot cover their current level of R&D from benefits they receive from 
previous activities. Therefore, they have a higher incentive to manipulate compared to 
firms that invest in R&D at an unchangeable rate. It is expected that Firms investing in 
R&D at a steady state can cover their current level of R&D with the benefits they 
receive from previous investments. 
Overall, these results show that firms with R&D activities are more motivated than 
other firms to reverse their losses through earnings management. These firms take 
advantage of the market for pricing their R&D operations favourably. Hence, they show 
profits from time to time in order to send a signal to the market that some R&D is 
starting to pay-in the expected benefits, although the profits are a result of earnings 
management. 
To summarise, this research modifies the Jones model by adding an additional regressor 
to measure discretionary accruals and having the residuals only represent white noise. 
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The model is applied on three different samples operating in different institutional 
frameworks. Moreover, the statistical simulation tests show that the modified model of 
this research detects earnings management more accurately than the standard version. 
1.7 Chapters outline: 
This research is organised into six chapters as the following: 
Chapter two: provides a review to the earnings management literature to examine the 
previous methods and models applied to detect earnings management. The review 
highlights the weaknesses in the previous models in order to identify the gaps. The 
studies reviewed are decomposed into three sections based on the methods applied to 
detect and measure earnings management. This chapter is also relevant to the literature 
review for chapters four and five. Moreover, a modification to the Jones model is 
developed in the second part of this chapter. The weakness of the Jones model when 
applied on cross-sectional data is emphasized and the justification to modify and extend 
the model is explained. 
Chapter three: in this chapter the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is described in detail. 
The development and the structure of the market are described and examined, and 
pointing out the incentive behind earnings management for listed companies. 
Additionally, the chapter presents the results for applying the extended Jones model on 
a sample of listed companies in the ASE. The second part of this chapter provides 
statistical simulations to compare the modified model of this research with the standard 
Jones model. The simulation tests point out the strengths of the modified model and 
how it is better at detecting and measuring earnings management. 
Chapter four: this chapter is considered an extension to the results documented in 
chapter three. The chapter starts by reviewing the literature relating to pricing accruals 
and its affect on the share price. It focuses on examining how the market prices the 
basic components of earnings. The main focus here is to examine whether the market 
prices discretionary accruals. The chapter also provides statistical tests for non-nested 
model selection. This is to demonstrate which component of earnings is the most priced. 
Chapter five: this chapter focuses on detecting earnings management for loss reversal 
companies. It starts by reviewing the relevant literature on loss firms. The model is 
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applied on two new samples from the UK and the US. The focus is to apply the model 
on different firms with different incentives to manipulate earnings.  
Chapter six: this chapter summarises the main findings of this research, it also 
highlights the main contributions. The chapter also shows the limitations of this 
research ending with suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 2: Literature review and model development 
 
14 
 
Chapter Two 
Literature review on earnings management studies and model development 
2.1 Introduction: 
Detecting earnings management is not an easy task. So the question stands on how a 
researcher can study this behaviour and reject the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management?  
Many approaches are used in previous studies, and the starting point for all of them was 
to understand the incentives and motives driving this behaviour. Taking this incentive 
into consideration puts earnings management in context and makes it logical, so instead 
of looking for a needle in a hay stack, researchers narrow down the search based on the 
incentive. Past research looked for earnings management on the sector level (i.e. whole 
industry) rather than on the individual firm level. The incentive must apply to the 
industry as a whole, and the detection process begins with examining the reaction of the 
industry to this stimulus, and if any anomalies are found it will be attributed to earnings 
management. This procedure makes absolute sense, but looking for upward earnings 
management while assuming that a large number of other firms are manipulating 
downwards makes the detection process even more difficult. Therefore, researchers 
must look only into incentives that drive firms to manipulate in the same direction. 
Researchers study the level of accruals for detecting earnings management. They 
differentiate between two levels, the normal level which relates to nondiscretionary 
accruals, and the abnormal level which relates to discretionary accruals. The normal 
level of accruals (nondiscretionary) is not affected by management’s judgment, but 
rather, they are affected by the economic circumstances and environment surrounding 
the company. The discretionary accruals change according to management’s decisions 
and personal judgment. Thus, earnings management is detected and measured by 
examining the discretionary accruals. 
In this chapter, the literature of earnings management is reviewed. Studies are grouped 
into three groups based on the approach used. The second part of this chapter explains 
the model development used in this research. 
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2.2 An overview of previous studies in earnings management: 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) earnings management is the use of judgement in 
financial reporting and structuring transactions to mislead stakeholders about underlying 
performance about the company and/or to influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on accounting numbers. 
The exercise of judgement is an essential part of the accounting system, since some 
expenses and revenues must be recorded based on the best judgement of the decision 
maker. This process gives rise to what are known as accruals, which are the outcomes of 
the matching principle and the revenue recognition principle. In each period companies 
must report their results for the ended fiscal year, therefore any revenues and expenses 
relating to that year must be recorded, regardless whether they are received or paid in 
cash. Therefore, managers can shift revenues and expenses from a period to another, 
increasing or decreasing reported earnings.   
Minimizing the manager’s control over some accounts, hence reducing the judgement 
exercised in financial reporting makes the earnings figure less informative, because 
some expenses and revenues that relate to the period will not be recorded. The cash flow 
figure on the other hand, is much less controlled by managers, but can investors rely on 
it for decision making? According to Dechow (1994) realized cash flows suffer from 
matching and timing problems, making it lose its informative attribute, and since 
accruals reduce matching and timing problems, they reflect more accurately the firm’s 
performance. But Dechow (1994) also points out that excess accrual manipulation can 
make it less informative, hence realized cash flow becomes less preferable.  
There are two main approaches in the literature detecting earnings management. Most 
studies in earnings management depend on one of these two approaches. The first 
approach is the accrual approach (or discretionary accruals approach); previous studies 
using this approach estimates discretionary accruals by applying time-series models or 
cross sectional models and examining the residuals. The second approach is the 
earnings distribution approach (or the threshold approach) where earnings management 
is detected by examining the discontinuity in the earnings distribution around a specific 
benchmark or threshold. There is also a third approach that examines single accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings, but this approach is less popular among researchers.  
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2.2.1 Studies using estimates of discretionary accruals: 
There are two approaches used to estimate discretionary accruals in literature, the first 
group of studies applies a time-series approach, the second group applies a cross-
sectional approach. The latter is now dominating the earnings management literature. 
 Time-series approach: 
Healy (1985): 
This paper tests the association between manager’s accruals and accounting procedure 
decisions and their income reporting incentives under bonus plans. The study shows that 
managers are not always selecting income increasing decisions. In some cases when 
earnings targets are not met regardless the accounting decision, managers select income 
decreasing choices to increase the probability of meeting targets next year, this process 
is called “big bath” which is achieved through reducing current revenues or accelerating 
write offs.  
Two classes are presented; accrual tests and changes in accounting procedures tests. 
Healy (1986) defines accruals as the difference between reported earnings and operating 
cash flows. The sign of accruals are compared with the predicted sign for a particular 
company and year, given the managers bonus incentives. The accounting earnings are 
decomposed into cash flows from operations and total accruals (TA). Furthermore, total 
accruals (TA) are decomposed into non-discretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary 
accruals (DA). Healy (1985) measures accruals management by examining the average 
of (TA) prior to a particular period (event year) compared to the (TA) in the event year: 
    
 
The non-discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows mandated by accounting 
standard-setting bodies, the discretionary accruals on the other hand are adjustments to 
cash flows selected by managers. Managers choose discretionary accruals from an 
opportunity set of generally accepted procedures defined by accounting standard-setting 
bodies. Discretionary accruals enable managers to transfer (shift) earnings between 
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periods because accruals modify the timing of reported earnings. Healy assumes that 
discretionary accruals sum to zero at the end of managers employment horizon.  
Healy (1985) also shows that accruals are not always available to manipulate, because 
they are limited by the available accounting technology. This can be generalized to the 
industry level, since most earnings management studies are applied on industrial sectors 
more than on financial sectors. Therefore manager’s ability to manipulate is constrained 
or limited from firm to firm and from an industry to another. 
DeAngelo (1986): 
This paper examines earnings manipulations in cases of management buyouts. The 
study argues that since courts and investment bankers rely on the firm’s historical 
earnings as a measure of fair value to evaluate buyouts compensation rather than market 
price, then it serves as an incentive for managers to understate earnings to reduce the 
buyout compensation. Although managers do offer a reasonable premium above the 
market price, but it is still inadequate because the market price does not fully reflect 
management’s inside information.  
DeAngelo (1986) provides a number of opportunities through which managers can 
manipulate earnings; accelerating expenses, estimating some expenses upwards, taking 
direct write-offs and deferring profitable projects. The paper also shows that managers 
have some limitations to manipulate. For example, managers do not have the ability to 
delay profitable projects because they could be taken by competitors. Furthermore, 
shareholders can hire financial experts to detect manipulations and convince other 
bodies of its importance, thus is also another constraint on managers ability to manage 
earnings.  
DeAngelo (1986) ignores these limitations and argues that although there are several 
forces that constrain or limits manager’s ability, it will never eliminate their incentive to 
do so. In other words, the incentives are always higher than the limitations and 
managers will always find new ways to manipulate. However, the paper states that 
managers facing theses limitations will look for less obvious accounting techniques.  
DeAngelo (1986) tests accruals by observing feasible set of accounting choices 
available to managers that would have caused decreases in the reported earnings. The 
 Chapter 2: Literature review and model development 
 
18 
 
study uses a similar approach to Healy (1985), which is a proxy variable to observe 
earnings in the absence of manipulation. But unlike Healy (1985) this study assumes 
that if nondiscretionary accruals are large relative to total accruals, then the latter 
becomes a poor measure for the extent of earnings management.  
DeAngelo (1986) expects that total accruals are normally negative because depreciation 
expense is a major component of accruals and in any period deprecation is probably 
nondiscretionary. The paper compares total accruals in the event year with the total 
accruals in the previous year, and any abnormal changes are considered systematic 
earnings management. This approach assumes that changes in nondiscretionary accruals 
are zero. So, if there is any change in total accruals between year (t) and year (t-1), then 
that reflects a significant average change in discretionary accruals. Based on that, 
nondiscretionary accruals are modelled as the following:  
1tt TANDA  
Similar to Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) defines accruals as the difference between 
net income and operating cash flows. The tests are rested on the assumption that change 
in nondiscretionary accruals are approximately zero. Therefore, a significant average 
decrease in total accruals reflects a significant average decrease in discretionary 
accruals. The tests for accruals changes employ a firm specific benchmark accrual 
rather than a cross-sectional one, because the managers who propose a buyout probably 
differ on important dimensions from the managers who find it advantageous to remain 
publicly held.  
DeAngelo (1986) did not find any evidence for systematic reduction in total accruals; 
the reason is there are only subsets of managers that have sufficient accounting 
discretion to understate earnings by significant amounts. 
Jones (1991): 
This paper uses a total accruals approach to estimate the discretionary component of the 
total accruals to measure earnings management. The reason behind using the total 
accruals approach is that managers are more likely to use several accruals to reduce 
reported earnings.  
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Jones (1991) develops a firm-specific expectations model to estimate normal (non-
discretionary) accruals using the longest time series of available data to control for the 
effects of economic conditions on the level of accruals: 
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Where: 
TA: total accruals, change in non-cash working capital before income taxes payables 
less depreciation expense 
ΔREV: change in revenue scaled by total assets at t-1 
PPE: property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets at t-1 
A t-1: Total assets at t-1, which is used to scale all variables to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
The estimated coefficients α, β and γ from the estimation period are used in the event 
year (the year where earnings management is expected to take place) to compute total 
accruals in that year (TA
*
), the discretionary accruals are therefore:     
ttt TATADA  
Jones (1991) conducts a cross-sectional analysis after that to test whether the estimated 
discretionary accruals (DAt) tend to be income decreasing during import relief 
investigations period. The discretionary accruals are assumed to be zero in the 
estimation period. 
The problem with this model is the limited number of time series observations used to 
estimate the coefficients. Another weakness Jones (1991) acknowledges is change in 
revenue during the estimation period may contain a managed component. The paper 
also acknowledges that there are conflicting incentives in the same period whether to 
increase or decrease earnings. However, the paper argues that income decreasing 
incentives are greater within the same period. Another related problem, which the paper 
states clearly, is the free-rider problem. That is, the grant relief is granted to all 
producers within an industry. Therefore, some producers may not manage their earnings 
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downward at all, other producers might even manage upwards to fulfil compensation 
plans and/or debt covenants restrictions.  
To overcome these issues, Jones (1991) is based on a sample that includes only 
petitioners, who have a greater incentive to maximise the probability of obtaining the 
import relief. Thus, petitioners have greater incentives to manage earnings during 
import relief investigations.  
Nonetheless, there are limitations the paper could not overcome. The International 
Trade Commission (ITC) does not adjust the reported accounting numbers, and not all 
managers are aware of this practice, those who believe the numbers are adjusted may 
not use accounting choices to manage earnings. Furthermore, some companies may be 
doing badly already and need not to manipulate earnings. Other companies may rely on 
cost allocation methods rather than accrual manipulation to reduce earnings. All these 
limitations affect the power of the test to detect earnings management. 
The results Jones (1991) obtained are consistent with the earnings management 
hypothesis during the investigation period. The study is extended even after the 
investigation period (i.e. in t+1, t+2 and t+3), to detect the reversal of any income 
decreasing accruals made in the period under investigation. However, the results show 
no evidence of that occurring. Following the breakthrough Jones (1991) accomplished, 
many authors use this model to detect earnings management. 
Dechow et al. (1995): 
This paper argues that the Jones model produce low power tests and detecting earnings 
management is still difficult. The paper focuses mainly on finding the most powerful 
test used in literature to detect earnings management.  
According to the findings, neither test is superior since all of them produce low power 
of economically plausible magnitudes, although all models appear to be reasonably well 
specified.  
Dechow et al. (1995) also introduces a modified version of the Jones model. The change 
in sales revenue variable is modified by deducting the change in debtors because 
managers have no (or little) control to manipulate cash sales relative to credit sales. The 
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modification to the Jones model produces a slightly more powerful test. The process is 
the same as Jones (1991) for the estimation period in estimating the coefficients, but in 
the event period the change in revenue is adjusted for change in receivables (debtors): 
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where ΔREC is the change in receivables (debtors). 
In other words, the modified Jones model assumes that all credit sales (debtors) in the 
event period result from earnings management. Thus, earnings management is the 
difference between the estimated total accruals and the observed total accruals at time t 
(the event year). 
The modified version of the Jones model did not fix the problem with the required time 
series observations needed to accurately estimate the coefficients, and by using time 
series data, the possibility of the model to be miss-specified is higher due to non-
stationary. Another problem with time-series approach is the implicit assumption that, 
prior to the event year, there is no earnings management, and that nondiscretionary 
accruals are stable or unchangeable. Therefore, a cross-sectional version of the Jones 
and modified Jones models are becoming the dominant approach in the earnings 
management literature. The cross sectional approach generates larger samples, and 
increases the precision of estimates because of higher number of observations. (DeFond 
& Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000) 
 Cross-sectional approach: 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994): 
This paper is the first study to develop and implement the cross-sectional version of the 
Jones model. The results indicate that in the year prior to debt covenant violation 
abnormal (discretionary) accruals are significantly positive, which supports by itself the 
traditional view that debt agreements usually motivate mangers to manipulate reported 
earnings.  
DeFond & Jiambalvo (1994) major contribution is testing the Jones model based on 
cross-sectional data, although the Jones model is applied using time-series data as well, 
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both tests generate similar results and support the hypothesis of upward earnings 
management. Additionally, another contribution of this paper is using two different 
measures of accruals that are widely used in literature. The paper applies time series and 
cross-sectional tests using firstly total accruals, which equals the difference between net 
income and operating cash flows. Secondly, using working capital accruals computed as 
the sum of changes in debtors, stock and other current assets less the sum of changes in 
creditors, tax payables and other current liabilities.  
The estimates of the two measures of accruals are similar under the times series and 
cross-sectional tests. The only difference is excluding property, plant and equipment 
from the Jones model when using the working capital accruals. The implication of 
DeFond & Jiambalvo (1994) for earnings management literature is providing evidence 
that, despite the different measures of total accruals or different methodologies to detect 
earnings management, the results obtained are similar. This provides more flexibility for 
researchers, especially in the presence of insufficient data, to examine earnings 
management. It also avoids the assumption of coefficient stability when using time 
series tests and as mentioned earlier, generating larger samples by applying cross-
sectional tests. Following this paper, cross-sectional tests are now widely used in the 
literature. 
Subramanyam (1996): 
This paper examines if the stock market priced discretionary accruals. Accruals earnings 
are superior to cash flows in terms of performance measurement, especially in short 
intervals because it mitigates timing and matching problems. However, the paper argues 
that this superiority is not because of, or despite, management’s discretionary accruals. 
The discretionary accruals are estimated by applying the Jones model on cross-sectional 
data. The results indicate that discretionary accruals are (on average) priced by the 
market. 
Subramanyam (1996) runs univariate regressions between returns and net income, 
nondiscretionary income and operating cash flow and shows that net income performs 
better than nondiscretionary income. Furthermore, net income performs better than cash 
flow from operations which is attributable to the discretionary component. The paper 
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documents that the discretionary component on income has incremental information 
content beyond the nondiscretionary component.  
An interesting point Subramanyam (1996) makes is, while opportunistic earnings 
management occur in specific situations, the evidence suggest that on average earnings 
management does not occur. This result is driven from the fact that the residuals from 
the Jones models, which represents discretionary accruals, average to zero, indicating 
that there is no earnings management. Therefore, an important issue that must be taken 
seriously when applying the cross sectional version of the Jones model is inserting a 
new variable to estimate discretionary accruals rather than the residual term.  
Studies in earnings management usually focus on the incentives behind such behaviour. 
In the presence of any kind of motivation, firms have equal opportunity and ability to 
choose the accounting adjustments to increase or decrease reported earnings, and this is 
far from true. While there is usually a general incentive that could motivate firms to 
manipulate earnings in the same direction, they do not necessarily have the same ability 
to do so.  
Becker et al. (1998): 
The paper examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. The 
paper argues that big six auditors provide better audit quality which places a restrain on 
the firms’ ability to manipulate. This assumption is based on evidence from previous 
studies documenting that big six auditors provide better audit quality because they are 
larger than their competitors.  
The focus in this study is on income-increasing earnings management because non-big 
six auditors will allow their clients to overstate their earnings more than the big-six. The 
likelihood of auditors being sued for allowing clients to overstate earnings is much 
higher than being sued for understating earnings. Therefore, big six auditors will put 
more effort in the audit process to maintain their image and reputation. The study 
focuses on detecting income increasing accruals because evidence from other studies 
suggests that managers are more likely to overstate than understate their earnings. 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. 
The results support the papers argument that companies with non-big auditor’s report 
higher discretionary accruals than companies with big-six auditors. This is consistent 
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with the hypothesis that external auditors constrain managers’ ability to manipulate 
earnings. Another interesting result this paper shows is that variation in discretionary 
accruals for companies with non-big six auditors is significantly larger which reflects 
the accounting flexibility that auditors allow.  
Francis et al. (1999): 
The paper examines high-accrual firms incentive to hire a big six auditor to provide 
assurance that reported earnings are credible. The interesting argument of this study is 
managers of firms that have greater scope for opportunistic earnings management, 
choose by their own will to hire a big six auditor to restrain their ability to manipulate. 
Thus, provide assurance to different stakeholders of the credibility of reported income.  
Francis et al. (1999) finds that firms with greater propensity to generate accruals are 
more likely to hire big 6 auditors, and as a result, have smaller amounts of discretionary 
accruals. The paper compares the discretionary accruals of big 6 audited firms with 
those from non-big 6 audited firms. Discretionary accruals are estimated using a cross-
sectional Jones model.  
Francis et al. (1999) could be the first and only (to the best knowledge of the researcher) 
that documents an incentive not to manipulate. A possible explanation is that these 
firms are already doing well and do not need to manipulate their earnings because all 
the incentives of the firm and the manager are fulfilled. The company needs to 
communicate to outsiders that the company is really doing well and reported income is 
an accurate measure of true performance. This is actually one of the criteria of choosing 
the sample in the study, only the companies that have value for sales greater than zero 
are included.  
The results can be used as evidence that the percentage of non-manipulators is much 
higher than manipulators, which could make the detection of discretionary accruals 
much easier. Previous studies implicitly and explicitly assumed that incentives to 
manipulate triggered most firms (if not all) in the same industry to manipulate. 
However, and based on the results of this paper, one must detect earnings management 
only in firms that has certain characteristics that would lead them to manipulate in the 
same direction, but taking into account that not all manipulators share equal ability or 
opportunity to manage their earnings.  
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Teoh et al. (1998): 
This paper proposes a modification to the Jones model; it decomposes accruals into four 
categories jointly by time period: current and long term; and manager control: 
discretionary and nondiscretionary.  
As in Jones (1991), Teoh et al. (1998) uses an estimation period, which only include the 
non-issuers firms, and an event period, which is the period of seasoned issues for the 
issuers firms only. Total current accruals are modelled as an intra-industry cross-
sectional regression according to manager control for each year in the estimation period: 
jtjtjt REVCA )(10  
Where CAjt is current accruals (or working capital accruals), ΔREVjt is the change in 
sales revenue for firm j in period t. All variables are deflated by total assets from (t-1). 
The nondiscretionary current accruals are modelled in the event period using the 
estimated coefficients from the estimation period to represent the portion of current 
accruals resulting from firm sales growth, and it is independent of management 
discretion: 
NDCAit = ά0 + ά1 (ΔREVit- ΔRECit) 
Where NDCAit is the nondiscretionary current accruals and ΔRECit is the change in 
debtors and it is subtracted from sales revenue because of possible manipulation of 
credit sales. This approach is similar to Dechow et al (1994) that all credit sales in the 
event period result from manipulation, the difference here is its estimated based on 
managerial control in the short term. Therefore, the discretionary current accruals 
(DCAit) are the managed portion of current accruals: 
ititit NDCACADCA  
The difference between the computed nondiscretionary current accruals and the 
observed current accruals (i.e. the residuals) represent earnings management. Similarly, 
long term accruals are modelled according to managers’ control, but using total accruals 
(TA) instead of working capital accruals and including property, plant and equipment 
because long term accruals are affected by long term assets: 
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All variables are scaled by total assets from previous period. The estimated coefficients 
are then used in the event period to compute the nondiscretionary total accruals (NDTA) 
in the event period: 
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The change in debtors is subtracted to allow for credit sales manipulation. This model 
assumes that manipulation is more evident in the short term accrual than in long term 
accruals. The discretionary total accruals (DTA) are computed as before: 
ititit NDTATADTA  
Peasnell et al. (2000): 
The paper develops and tests a new cross-sectional model, labelled the margin model. 
The study argues that since previous evidence suggests considerable imprecision in the 
estimation of discretionary accruals in time series models, cross-sectional models are 
used extensively in most papers. Furthermore, the paper states that cross-sectional 
versions of the standard Jones and modified Jones models dominate the literature 
because of the restrictive quality inherited in the time series approach, which is the need 
of long time series of data to allow effective estimation for the regression parameters.  
Working capital accruals (WCA) are used instead of the total accruals (TA) in the 
margin model. The model also excludes deprecation from the model due to its visibility 
as a technique for manipulation: 
iiii CRREVWCA 210  
Where: 
REV: total sales. 
CR: total sales less change in trade debtors 
And λ0, λ1, λ2 are the regression coefficients  
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Peasnell et al. (2000) evaluates three models (the Jones model, the modified Jones and 
the margin model) by applying them on cross-sectional data from a sample of firms 
from the UK. This paper tests empirically the specification and the power of the 
standard Jones and modified Jones and margin models. The standard Jones and 
modified Jones are formulated using working capital accruals to ensure comparability 
with the margin model. The cross-sectional approach basically estimates regression 
separately for each industry-year combination as the first stage, after which the resulting 
industry and time specific parameter estimates are combined with firm-specific data to 
generate estimated discretionary accruals, i.e. the resulting residuals represent earnings 
management. According to the paper, cross-sectional tests reduces time effects such as 
interest rates and other macroeconomic factors, and limits the influence of particular 
instances of unobservable earnings management, but it introduces noise into the 
parameter estimation to the extent firms differ structurally within the industry. The 
specification is tested by estimating the first stage regressions for each of the three 
models for each industry group in a specific year, then selecting 25 firms randomly 
from that year and constructing an indicator variable (PART) being 1 if the firm is 
selected, 0 if otherwise.  
The following step is randomising all observations in that year and computing the 
abnormal accruals for each model using the coefficient estimates obtained previously, 
then estimating the model for each measure of abnormal accruals and test whether the 
estimated coefficient on (PART) is significantly different from zero. The power of the 
models is tested similarly, except in the second step a pre-determined positive amount is 
assigned to reported accruals for firms where (PART) equals 1.  
The results show that although all three models are well specified, the margin model is 
better specified when cash performance is extreme. The Jones and modified Jones 
models are more powerful detecting revenue and bad debt manipulation, whereas the 
margin model is better detecting expenses manipulation. 
Kothari et al. (2005): 
This paper examines the specification and power of the Jones and modified-Jones 
models. The paper includes an additional variable to the Jones and the modified Jones 
models to control for the effect of the firms performance on discretionary accruals. 
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Performance matching is based on the return on assets (ROA) in period (t) to control for 
the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. The model also includes a 
constant to add further control for heteroskedasticity, and according to the results, it 
mitigates problems stemming from an omitted scale variable and it makes the 
discretionary measures more symmetric. 
Therefore, the model is as follows: 
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ROA in period (t-1) can be used also. The process is similar to the Jones model, where 
the residuals represent the discretionary accruals. Comparing this model to the Jones 
and modified Jones models shows that the model of this study has higher power. 
Geiger and North (2006): 
The paper examines the level of earnings management surrounding the appointment of a 
new CFO. The study is based on the involvement of CFOs and their influence in the 
financial reporting process. Therefore, the change in CFO personnel could lead to 
different financial results even if the business environment remains the same.  
Geiger & North (2006) estimates the normal level of accruals using the Jones model on 
cross-sectional data available from all firms except the sample firms. The estimated 
coefficients from the industry regression are then used to estimate the predicted accruals 
for the sample. The discretionary accruals are computed as the difference between the 
normal accruals and predicted accruals.  
Results indicate that discretionary accruals decreases significantly in firms after 
appointing a new CFO compared to non- hiring firms. This result is supported 
furthermore by finding a higher level of discretionary accruals in the year prior to the 
new CFO appointment. Additionally, to provide further evidence that the reduction in 
discretionary accruals is mainly caused by the appointment of a new CFO, the paper 
runs a multivariate test to control for factors associated with level of discretionary 
accruals. Another interesting result is the variation in discretionary accruals for firms 
appointing CFOs from within the firm and hiring them from outside the firm; significant 
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reduction in discretionary accruals are found in firms hiring an external CFO, similar 
results are obtained in firms hiring from their own external CPA.   
The study would have been even more beneficial if it observed the level of discretionary 
accruals after the appointment of the new CFO (e.g. in year t + 3); such evidence could 
assist to determine the time period discretionary accruals start to increase again, back to 
the level they were in the year prior to the change in CFO personnel.  
Charitou (2007): 
The paper examines earnings management behaviour in distressed firms; it focuses on 
examining whether bankruptcy-filing firms are more conservative in their financial 
reporting compared to non-bankrupt firms one year prior to bankruptcy-filing, taking 
into consideration the qualified audit opinion.  
Charitou (2007) differentiates between short-term and long-term accruals since 
managers have more control over the short-term accruals. The accruals are estimated 
using a cross-sectional Jones model as modified by Teoh et al. (1998a). The results 
indicate that managers of distress firms manage earnings downwards one year prior to 
the bankruptcy filing. Firms with large negative long term accruals one year prior to 
bankruptcy filing have a greater chance to survive. Moreover, the results show firms 
receiving unqualified audit opinions in all 5 years prior to the bankruptcy-filling event, 
manage earnings upwards in those same years and more (negative) earnings 
management is associated with more negative subsequent returns in the following years. 
Daniel et al. (2008): 
The paper tests the upward managed earnings in dividend paying firms. Based on 
evidence from previous literature, the paper argues that managers will do almost 
anything (e.g. laying off employees, selling assets, ext.) to avoid dividends cuts. This is 
considered as first-order priority, and hence an incentive for managers because 
dividends are of high importance to investors. Therefore, the study is based on 
managing earnings to meet dividend thresholds, taking into consideration the existence 
of debt covenants, since these agreements place restrictions on reported income which 
in turn is an important determinant of dividends.  
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The main hypothesis tested is managers will manage earnings upward to avoid dividend 
cuts when reported earnings fall below the expected dividend levels. To test this, the 
pre-managed earnings are observed to see whether it falls below the expected dividend 
payments. The pre-managed earnings are calculated as operating cash flow plus non-
discretionary accruals minus preferred dividends.  
Both nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals are estimated using a cross-sectional 
version of the Jones model. In order to detect earnings management, discretionary 
accruals are compared with the dividend threshold. After which, a variable is used 
which equals the maximum of zero or earnings shortfall (earnings short fall is expected 
dividends minus pre-managed earnings). This variable is labelled Deficit.  
The results show that firms are managing earnings upward to meet dividend thresholds, 
especially in firms where pre-managed earnings are below expected dividend levels. 
The results also show firms with less outstanding debt have less aggressive earnings 
management, confirming a relation between debt covenants and dividend thresholds. 
The study also finds less earnings management in other firms with different settings 
(e.g. after the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2003, high payout ratio, higher 
dividends for CEO, high pay-performance sensitivities) all these represent restraints on 
managers’ ability to manipulate earnings. The interesting part of this study is observing 
the pre-managed earnings; same method followed DeFond & Park (1997)
1
. This method 
is very helpful to observe reported earnings and its effects before and after 
manipulation. 
Caramanis and Lennox (2008): 
The paper examines the effect of audit effort on earnings management. The audit hours 
are used as a measure for audit effort. The main argument is the more audit hours are 
spent on a client the less earnings management, or earnings overestimation, is detected 
in that client. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the Jones model. The results 
show that discretionary accruals are positive when audit hours are lower. Additionally, 
the magnitude of income increasing abnormal accruals is greater when audit hours are 
lower. The earnings distribution is also examined to detect any discontinuity around 
                                                 
1
 DeFond and Park (1997) study is not examined in this literature review since it is related more to 
income smoothing rather than accrual manipulation. 
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zero. This study combines the abnormal accruals with a benchmark to test whether or 
not the company just meets or beats the zero benchmark.  
Results using this approach are consistent with the abnormal accruals approach, and 
show that low audit hours are associated with companies managing earnings upwards to 
avoid reporting losses. It should be noted that the results show a weak association 
between audit hours and income decreasing earnings management. This result is 
consistent with findings of past studies that auditors are more likely to detect overstated 
earnings. 
2.2.2 Studies using the distribution approach: 
The second approach in the earnings management literature is the earnings distribution 
approach, and has lately becoming a preferred method for some authors. The basic idea 
in this approach is simple, the earnings are distributed and their frequencies are 
observed, if the distribution is symmetrical then there is no earnings management, but if 
a discontinuity is evident around zero or a certain benchmark, then that’s a sign of 
earnings management. But the distribution of earnings alone is not sufficient; there must 
be certain thresholds to look for, and locating the discontinuity at these thresholds. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997): 
This paper is the most study cited for authors using this approach. The study begins 
initially by identifying certain thresholds that would stimulate incentives for managers 
to manipulate. The paper, and based on anecdotal evidence, suggests that there are 
strong incentives to avoid reporting earnings decreases and to maintain positive 
earnings and avoiding losses. To detect earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases, the paper examines cross-sectional distributions of earnings changes to find 
whether there are normal low frequencies of small earnings decreases and abnormal 
high frequencies of small earnings increases.  Furthermore, avoiding losses will be 
reflected in the form of abnormal low frequencies of small losses and abnormal high 
frequencies of small positive earnings. Under the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management, the standardized differences in earnings will be approximately normally 
distributed. 
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Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) argues that incentives to avoid earnings decreases become 
stronger with the length of the previous run of earnings increases. These stronger 
incentives lead to more pronounced effects of earnings management in the intervals 
close to zero. An important issue the paper acknowledges is that not all firms have the 
same opportunity to manipulate. Firms that face lower ex ante costs of earnings 
management are more likely to be the manipulators. Likewise, firms with high levels of 
current assets and current liabilities find it less costly to manipulate. The study 
documents this by finding the firms with lower levels of current assets and current 
liabilities in the intervals immediately to the left of zero and higher frequencies of firms 
to the right of zero.  
Results show that 8%-12% of firms with small pre-managed earning decreases exercise 
discretion to report earnings increases, and 30%-44% of firms with slightly negative 
pre-managed earnings exercise discretion to report positive earnings. Moreover, the 
paper finds that cash flows from operations and changes in working capital are the main 
tools to manage earnings 
Degeorge et al. (1999): 
The paper identifies three thresholds that are the most likely drivers for earnings 
management. Executives have both the incentive and ability to manage earnings as a 
response to implicit and explicit rewards for attaining specific levels of earnings. The 
study introduces a model that predicts how executives strategically manage earnings 
reported to external users, after which the study examines historical data to confirm 
such pattern. This model incorporates behavioural propensities and a stylized 
description of the interactions among executives, investors, directors and analysts in 
order to identify earnings manipulation patterns. However, the study did not include the 
component(s) of earnings or of supplementary disclosure that are adjusted, nor did it 
distinguish between direct earnings management and misreporting.  
The main three thresholds identified are: firstly to report profits, which arises from a 
psychologically importance of distinction between positive and negative numbers. The 
second and third thresholds rely on performance perspective, and it is to outdo last year 
performance and meeting analysts’ expectations. The study assumes that when earnings 
are near unacceptable range, the incentives to manage upwards will be significant. 
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Moreover, if earnings exceed limits of bonus plans they will be shifted forward making 
future limits easily achieved (saving for a better tomorrow). The thresholds are 
important for managers since concerned parties with the firm consider them important 
as well. The study also argues that managers will still manipulate even if the thresholds 
do not matter anymore, the most probable incentive will be personal satisfaction (e.g. 
achieving targets managers set for themselves). The cases in which the study looked for 
earnings manipulations are based on these thresholds. In the case where earnings fall 
just short of thresholds, earnings will be managed upward, whereas when earnings are 
far from thresholds (whether below or above) earnings will be reined, making 
thresholds more attainable in the future. Discontinuities in the earnings distribution are 
observed to indicate the threshold-based earnings management.  
Conditional distributions reveal that thresholds are hierarchically ordered; most 
importantly making profits, secondly reporting quarterly profits at least equal to profits 
reported four quarters ago and thirdly to meet analyst’s expectations. The results also 
show that outsiders and insiders alike use psychological bright lines such as zero, past 
earnings and analysts’ projected earnings as meaningful thresholds for assessing firm’s 
performance.  
Beatty et al. (2002): 
This paper examines the stream of earnings changes and the components of these 
changes for publicly vs. privately held banks. The focus on public vs. private is because 
shareholders of public banks are more likely than those of private banks to rely on 
simple earnings-based heuristics. The interesting feature of this study is the ability to 
observe and examine earnings management in public held companies as well as in 
private held companies. Furthermore, this study provides basis for comparison of 
earnings management in financial and non-financial firms using Burgstahler & Dichev 
(1997) approach. 
The results show that public banks report more small-increases and fewer small-
decreases in earnings than expected, but there is only weak evidence that private banks 
report fewer small decreases in earnings than expected. Similarly, the study shows that 
public banks report more small decreases and fewer small declines in earnings than 
private banks, even after controlling for differences in the operations, bank size, asset 
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growth, cash flows loan characteristics, and geographic region between public and 
private banks. The study also shows that public banks use loan loss provisions and 
realized security gains & losses for upward manipulation. The results also confirm that 
public banks enjoy longer strings of consecutive earnings increases than private banks 
because they will manage earnings to avoid reporting small decreases in earnings.  
Dechow et al. (2003): 
The paper examines whether small profit firms have high discretionary accruals relative 
to all other firms and small loss firms. The paper examines the discretionary accruals of 
firms’ laying on the right of zero to those laying on the left. Discretionary accruals are 
estimated using the modified Jones model.  
The results do not support earnings management hypothesis, where the small profit and 
small loss firms have similar levels of discretionary accruals and both groups have 
similar proportions of positive discretionary accruals firms, and the discontinuity does 
not disappear nor decline in the distribution of firms with only income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. However, the paper attributes these results to the probability of 
low power in the model or the boosting of discretionary accruals does not explain the 
“kink” in the earnings distribution. The paper also provides alternative explanations to 
the presence of the kink in distributions without testing them; one explanation is 
managers are taking real actions to ensure that they report a profit rather than a loss. 
Durtschi and Easton (2005):  
The paper questions the approach of discontinuity around zero and the resulting shapes 
that researchers rely on as evidence of earnings management, and provide evidence that 
the shapes of the frequency distribution of earnings are affected by either: deflation, 
sample selection criteria, characteristically differences in firms, or a combination of 
these effects. The paper shows evidence of no discontinuity around zero for the 
frequency distributions of net income, basic EPS and diluted EPS, which led the authors 
to cast serious doubt on the conclusions from previous studies. The study provides 
evidence that deflation of net income distorts its underlying distribution. Therefore, 
deflation might be causing the discontinuity around zero. Results also show that the 
proportions of observations with small losses that are deleted because of the 
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unavailability of the beginning of year prices on the Compustat files is greater than the 
proportion of observations with small profits that are deleted for the same reason.  
Durtschi & Easton (2005) questions the results obtained by Degeorge et al. (1999) as 
well by providing evidence that discontinuity may reflect a tendency for analysts to 
avoid coverage of firms with small losses, rather than being evidence of earnings 
management to meet analysts’ expectations. They also find that analysts’ forecast errors 
tend to be much greater when they are optimistic than when they are pessimistic. Hence, 
positive errors will tend to cluster around zero, while negative errors spread away from 
zero leading to a frequency distribution suggesting earnings management. The paper 
concludes by stating that these explanations, as well as others, must be ruled out for 
researchers to claim that the shapes of these distributions around zero are evidence of 
earnings management. This paper raises serious questions about the validity of the 
distribution approach and the results obtained by it. 
Leuz et al. (2003): 
The study provides comparative evidence on corporate earnings management across 31 
countries. It starts with a descriptive country analysis, where countries are grouped 
based on similar legal and institutional characteristics; outsider economies (US & UK), 
insider economies (e.g. Germany) and insider economies with weak legal enforcement 
(e.g. Italy and India).  
The results show that outsider economies display the lowest level of earnings 
management and the insider economies with weak enforcement the highest level of 
earnings management. Two proxies are used for earnings management; earnings 
smoothing and accrual manipulations. The study runs a multiple regression analysis to 
examine the relation in earnings management difference with private control benefits 
and investor protection. Regression results show that earnings management is 
negatively related to outsider rights and legal enforcement; the results also show that 
earnings management is positively associated with the level of private controls benefits 
enjoyed by insiders. 
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Jacob and Jorgensen (2007): 
The paper re-examines Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) study using a research design, 
which allows firms in aggregate, to serve as their own control. The results did validate 
the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Furthermore, the findings are not 
spuriously induced by scaling. The paper is designed based on histograms of earnings 
measured over alternative annual periods to investigate discontinuities in fiscal year 
earnings. The paper argues that incentives to manage earnings are strongest in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year, because managers at this time are likely to have a good sense 
about where they stand with regard to annual targets.  The paper also finds evidence of 
discontinuity at the zero benchmark in un-scaled net income and EPS, which differs 
from those found in Durtschi & Easton (2005). 
Kerstien and Rai (2007): 
This paper examines the change in the cumulative earnings distribution from the 
beginning to the end of the firm’s fourth fiscal year. The paper goes beyond examining 
earnings distributions by examining earnings changes distribution as well. This 
approach differs from the one used by Jacob & Jorgensen (2007), by focusing on year-
to-date rather than concentrating on aggregate measures over a moving window of four 
consecutive quarters.  
Kerstien & Rai (2007) selects a group of firms that are close to the zero-profit line of 
the cumulative earnings distribution (treatment group), and a control group that consists 
of firms next to the treatment group. This group will have similar probability of shifting 
a given length and direction during the fourth quarter. By implementing logistic 
regressions, results show that firms with the smallest cumulative losses after three 
quarters report the smallest annual profits at an abnormally higher rate than the control 
firms. Moreover, firms with the smallest cumulative profits report the smallest annual 
profits at an abnormally high rate to avoid annual losses. To put it in different words, 
the kink in the earnings distribution becomes more visible during the fourth quarter, 
since managers at this point can estimate more accurately the amount of manipulation 
needed to achieve specific targets. 
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Roychowdhury (2006): 
The paper provides a closer look on how manipulation takes place and clarifying the 
importance of the zero benchmark, differentiated between accrual manipulation and real 
activities manipulation. The paper presents evidence on the management of operational 
activities. The author defines real activities manipulation as “management actions that 
deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of 
meeting certain earnings thresholds”.  
Roychowdhury (2006) measures cash flow from operations, production costs, and 
discretionary expenses to capture the effect of real operations because they detect the 
real activities manipulation better than accruals manipulation around the zero 
benchmark. The results are consistent with earnings management to avoid losses, either 
by offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, or lowering cost of goods sold 
by engaging in overproduction or reducing discretionary expenses to improve margins, 
or by doing all three together. These results are strong evidence of how managers use 
available accounting technology to manage earnings.  
Previous studies are more concentrated on the detection process and give little attention 
of how the manipulation takes place; this by itself is considered the major contribution 
of this paper. The results also show that the presence of sophisticated shareholders 
restrict the managers ability to manipulate earnings upward, and the presence of debt, 
stock, debtors and growth opportunities are positively associated with real activities 
manipulations. The results of this paper, not only provide an in-depth understanding of 
the importance of the zero benchmark, but also provide a basis for the connection 
between the desire and the ability to manipulate.  
Leone and Van Horn (2005): 
The paper examines the incentives to manage earnings in not-for-profit hospitals; some 
of the incentives include credit evaluation, managerial assessment and donation 
decisions. The study did detect earnings management in these not-for profit-firms, but 
for different aims. The study argues that hospital manager’s place high importance on 
the earnings figure since they are evaluated based on it; also donors consider hospitals 
profitability when making donation decisions.  
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Discretionary accruals are estimated using the Jones model but after modifying it for the 
special accrual accounts used in not-for-profit hospitals. After which, the discretionary 
accruals are used in the distribution approach to examine the discontinuity around the 
zero benchmark. The study examines two major accounts that are material and require 
substantial judgment to determine proper balances. The first account is third party 
settlements (e.g. managed care organisations); the second account is allowance for 
doubtful accounts. After which, the pre-managed earnings are distributed and compared 
with operating profit to detect any discontinuity around the zero benchmark.  
Results indicate that hospital managers are manipulating earnings towards zero as well 
as manipulating earnings to avoid losses, but the study did not find evidence of avoiding 
negative earnings changes. The paper attributes this to the absence of equity markets, 
unlike for-profit firms that are motivated to avoid reporting earnings decreases. The 
implications of this study are many; one is documenting earnings management 
behaviour in different firm-settings that have different incentives, goals and objectives, 
another is specifying the special accrual accounts that each industry has and can use to 
manipulate reported income. Almost all studies examines and detects earnings 
management in corporate firms, that are publicly held, and their reported earnings 
echoes in the equity market, but there are other types of incentives that do not relate to 
financial markets that motivate managers to manipulate their earnings, as this study 
shows. 
To summarise the distribution approach, earnings manipulation is a result of general 
incentives. This approach assumes in the absence of no manipulation earnings the 
distribution will appear symmetrical (i.e. smooth), but manipulated earnings will show a 
discontinuity around zero. The zero point represents a general threshold (e.g. report a 
profit) mangers want to beat, or at the very minimum meet. 
The interesting thing about this method is not only it provides a detection method, but 
sets up general benchmarks for manipulation. This method assumes implicitly that 
earnings management happens all the time (e.g. reporting a positive number rather than 
a negative number). Other studies examine a specific event where the presence of 
earnings management is expected, and when that event is expired there will be no more 
earnings management. However, the problem with this technique is no one knows how 
the unmanaged earnings distribution would actually appear. One way to find out is 
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observing the distribution of earnings (Et) after subtracting the managed accruals (DA) 
from it (Gore et al., 2007) that is, the distribution of (ΔEt – DAt) will appear smoother 
than earnings distribution including the discretionary accruals. This approach shows 
firms that are just above the threshold with (Et) appear below the threshold with (Et – 
DAt). Other researchers (for example, Daniel et al., 2008) observed the distribution of 
earnings before manipulation as compared to the distribution of earnings after 
manipulation; they compute the pre-managed earnings as cash flow from operations 
plus nondiscretionary accruals (nondiscretionary accruals are obtained from the Jones 
model). 
2.2.3 Studies which specify the managed accrual(s) component: 
A third approach used in literature is the single accrual approach, but gained little 
attention from researchers in earnings management studies. Some of the researchers 
however, do specify the exact accrual(s) that is used to manipulate, but as a second step 
after applying the accrual approach or the earnings distribution approach.  
McNichols and Wilson (1988): 
This is the first study to use a single accrual approach; it considers the provision for bad 
debts, rather than a collection of accruals. The paper distinguishes the discretionary 
portion from the non-discretionary portion of this single accrual using generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) related to this account. However, the paper 
does acknowledge that this account is one of many other accounts that are used to 
manipulate reported earnings.  
McNichols & Wilson (1988) tests two hypotheses, the first one relates to income 
smoothing, where firms reporting unusually high earnings will choose income 
decreasing accruals and firms reporting unusually low earnings will choose income 
increasing accruals to minimize the variance in reported earnings. The paper set 
benchmarks to specify the unusually high or low earnings, and considers four 
benchmarks, namely, zero, industry average ROA, return on the firm’s average ROA, 
and ROA in the previous year, for each firm. The other hypothesis tested is that 
managers whose compensation plans have lower bounds have an incentive to maximise 
(minimise) discretionary expense (revenue) when the plans are out of money. The paper 
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does however emphasis that it does not replicate nor re-test Healy’s (1985) result but 
rather it is testing a more general hypotheses motivated by that work.  
The McNichols & Wilson (1988) model is based on the provision of bad debts. It 
decomposes the provision into an unmanaged component, which is set under the GAAP 
guidelines; and a managed component, which estimated by managers. Under the null 
hypothesis of no earnings management, the provision adheres only to GAAP guidelines. 
The provision depends on the allowance’s beginning balance, the current period’s write 
offs, and management’s expectation of future write-offs. But since the latter is difficult 
to measure, the model incorporates the future write offs as a proxy for management’s 
expectation (i.e. write offs at t + 1), therefore the model is: 
 Prov t = α0 + α1 BgBl t + α2 Write-off t + α3 Write-off t+1 + resprov t 
Where: 
Prov t: the provision for bad debts, deflated by period t sales 
BgBl t: the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts in period t, deflated by period t 
sales. 
Write-off t: write-offs for period t, deflated by period t sales. 
Write-off t+1: write-offs for period t +1, deflated by period t sales. 
resprov t: the projection error, which by design is orthogonal to the regressors. 
The projection error or residual (resprov t) contains two components: the discretionary 
part of the provision or the manipulated part and the future write-offs forecast error, and 
both parts are orthogonal to the regressors. When the projection errors are aggregated to 
test for earnings management, the write-offs forecast error component is assumed to 
average to zero. Thus, the underlying intuition of this model is since outsiders cannot 
separate the forecast error from the discretionary component, they cannot detect 
earnings management. 
Results support the earnings management hypothesis; firms manage their earnings by 
choosing income-decreasing accruals when income is extreme. The paper also 
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introduces a proxy for discretionary accruals that can be more powerful and less bias 
than proxies used in studies prior to this one.  
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995): 
The paper build a model based on more than one accrual account to capture a larger 
portion of managed accruals. The model is based on the assumption that each accrual 
account contains two components; unmanaged and managed parts. Based on that, sales 
revenue is expressed as: 
REV t = REV
*
t + DA
s
 t 
Where REVt is reported sales revenue, REV
*
t is the unmanaged sales revenue in period 
t, and DA
s
 t is the managed accrual added to sales, therefore the reported debtors will be 
overstated by DA
s
 t at the end of the period: 
AR t = AR
*
t + DA
s
 t 
Similarly, other accruals are decomposed into unmanaged and managed components, 
therefore all accruals are: 
AB t = (AR
*
t + INV
*
t + OCA
*
t – CL
*
t – DEP
*
t) + (DA
s 
t + DA
e 
t + DA
d 
t) 
                    = AB
*
t + DA t 
Where AB
*
t is the unmanaged accruals balances, INV
*
t, OCA
*
t and CL
*
t, denote 
unmanaged: stock, prepaid expenses and payables, respectively; DA t is the total 
managed accruals in period t; DA
e
t is the managed expenses; and DEP
*
t and DA
d
t is the 
unmanaged deprecation expenses and the managed portion of it, respectively. 
The model, therefore, and by using instrumental variables, is as the following: 
ABt = ф0 + ф1 [δ1REV
*
t] + ф2 [δ2EXP
*
t] + ф3 [δ3GPPE
*
t] + β PARTt + νt 
Where: 
δ1= AR
*
t-1/ REV
*
t-1; δ2 = APB
*
t-1/ EXP
*
t-1; δ3 = DEP
*
t-1/ GPPE
*
t-1; and APB
*
t-1 is sum 
account balances related to expenses (INV
*
t + OCA
*
t – CL
*
t), GPPE is the gross 
property, plant and equipment. The error term will be correlated with the regressors if 
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earnings are managed. This model is similar in spirit to the Jones model, but differs by 
including cost of goods sold and other expenses, also it uses account balances rather 
than changes in these balances and because using instrumental variables, it does not 
require the regressors to be uncontaminated. All variables are deflated by total assets in 
period t-1 for stationary purposes. 
Petroni (1992): 
The paper examines managers’ discretion of property-casualty insurers and its effects 
on claim loss reserves. The study also examines directly managerial incentives to 
manipulate claim loss reserve estimates. Results indicate that managers of financially 
weak insurers manipulate their claim loss reserve downwards, relative to financially 
strong insurers.  
Beaver and Engel (1996): 
The paper examines the effects of management choice on the allowance for loan losses 
in the banking sector. The focus is to determine whether the capital market assigns 
different prices to the discretionary and non-discretionary components of the allowance 
for loan losses.  
The results show that the market assigns different prices to each component; while the 
nondiscretionary component is priced negatively, the discretionary component has a 
positive incremental pricing coefficient. Moreover, the study finds that if the market 
fails to decompose the accrual account then the incremental pricing coefficient becomes 
zero.  
Beneish (1997): 
The paper examines more than one accrual account that managers can use for 
manipulation. The paper examines actual instances of earnings management and 
presents a model to detect it among firms with extreme financial performance and 
compares the model’s performance to that of accrual model. The model is based on 
variables intended to capture incentives that would motivate firms to violate GAAP, the 
likelihood of detection, and distortions in financial data caused by violation of GAAP.  
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The model presented in the paper provides a probability estimate of the likelihood of 
earnings management among firms for which abnormal accruals are misspecified. The 
paper uses a sample that contains two groups; GAAP violators and “aggressive 
accruers”. The model includes variables which proxy for motivations to manage 
earnings.  
The interesting point Beneish (1997) makes is that current models estimate 
discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and that some accrual models 
randomly decompose earnings into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. 
Therefore, the paper models the incentives that could lead to earnings management by 
using the available accruals rather than modelling discretionary accruals.  
Beaver and McNichols (1998): 
This paper examines the characteristics and valuation of one accrual account, namely, 
the reserve for claim losses in property casualty insurance companies. Managerial 
discretion rises from the substantial judgment required to estimate the loss reserve. The 
model used in this study accounts for serial correlation in errors. 
The results show that there is substantial serial correlation in loss reserve development, 
which is an indication that reported loss reserves do not fully reflect available 
information, which is also consistent with management exercising discretion over 
reported loss reserves.  
To summarize, and going through the literature of earnings management reveals a 
number of competing models and approaches to detect such behaviour, all models are of 
low power, and none of them is superior to another (Dechow et al., 1995).  
The Jones model (Jones, 1991) is used by most researchers, because it decomposes total 
accruals into nondiscretionary and discretionary, but some researchers criticise this 
model because it does not take into consideration growth firms. In other words, the 
Jones model will detect earnings manipulation when in fact there is none, because 
growing firms are usually characterised with high accruals (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Another problem with this model is the need for long time series observations to 
estimate the coefficients accurately, and such availability of accounting data is not 
always available. Additionally, one must assume that there is no earnings management 
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in the estimation period. Therefore, a cross sectional version of the Jones model is used 
intensively in literature. An important issue when applying this model on cross sectional 
data is the assumption that some firms are manipulating upwards while some firms are 
manipulating downwards, so on average there is no earnings management. The switch 
to the cross sectional methodology did not solve all the problems with the Jones model 
itself, it just made it convenient for researchers (e.g. increasing sample size), but 
maintaining the same assumptions of the model. The residuals will average to zero 
regardless the approach or method used to estimate the coefficients. 
The Jones model gains its popularity from its ability to decompose accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Studies before investigate the change in 
total accruals without a clear cut examination of its discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. For example, Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) examine the total 
accruals changes between the estimation period and the event period, without 
decomposing the total accruals. In addition, both models assume stability in the 
economic condition of the companies, whereas the Jones model takes into consideration 
the economic changes and growth. Therefore, the Healy model and the DeAngelo model 
are very good models in non growth environments, but since the economic conditions of 
companies is always changing the Jones model is better.  But the low power of the 
Jones model is still a concerning issue for many researchers.  
To improve the model in terms of its power, a number of following studies proposed a 
modification to the Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 1998a; Kothari et al., 
2005) but the power of the modified models is still low although higher than the original 
model.  
An important factor that must be considered by researchers is that the Jones model has 
only one objective and that is to detect earnings management without specifying the 
accounts (i.e. accounting tools) managers used. To state it differently, the Jones model 
only tells us that there is manipulation but it will provide nothing useful for regulators 
and standard setters on how exactly it is achieved, since they are the ones only to view 
earnings management as problematic. Academics on the other hand do not consider it as 
a serious issue because they believe that not all firms are manipulating and if some 
firms are actually manipulating, it should not concern investors (Dechow & Skinner, 
2000).  
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Another concerning matter in the Jones model is using the residuals to measure the 
discretionary accruals. While in time-series setting, it is considered reasonable to use the 
residuals, to measure the difference between normal and abnormal accruals in the 
estimation period and the event period, respectively. However, in cross-sectional 
settings it is not the same. The residuals, by theory, should average to zero. Therefore, 
the specification of the model is seriously questioned when it comes to the measurement 
of discretionary accruals. Anecdotal evidence tells us that firms in the same industry 
will share similar incentives. In other words, all firms will have the same incentive to 
manipulate in the same direction (i.e. herding reaction), and as a result, the residuals 
will not capture the manipulation because they will average to zero. 
The earnings distribution approach shows earnings after the manipulation have 
occurred, but it does not specify what instruments managers used. Nevertheless, it is 
still beneficial in specifying the benchmarks (incentives) that managers are trying to 
meet. A close look at this approach will reveal that earnings management is happening 
all the time and by most firms. The zero benchmark will still be an important incentive, 
at least from a psychological point of view; managers are very keen to report positive 
numbers rather than negative earnings, or as Degeorge et al. (1999, pp 6) states it: “there 
is something fundamental about positive and non-positive numbers in human thought 
processes”. There will always be an incentive or benchmark that drives earnings 
management, and to assume that earnings management must not concern investors is a 
naïve assumption. Manipulation distorts financial statements and damages their 
information sources reliability and relevancy characteristics, and could lead to an 
imprecise decision made by investors. 
At this point in earnings management research, the important issue any researcher must 
look into is how managers are using the accrual accounts to achieve their targets. 
Enough research has been done on the many incentives and motives behind the 
manipulation. In fact and loosely speaking, the reliance on incentives is the first thing to 
identify in order to narrow down the search or detection of earnings manipulation. The 
next step in this area is specifying exactly the accrual accounts that are used and the 
magnitude of manipulation that took place. Therefore, one must include specific 
accruals in the model (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; McNichols, 2000).  
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Another important issue is examining the barriers that limits or restrains managers’ 
ability to manipulate. This is a very important issue that most researchers overlook or do 
not take it into consideration when modelling earnings management. But limitations of 
earnings management are of high importance for standard setters and regulators and can 
be used as basis to eliminate or at least reduce managers’ ability to manage their 
reported earnings. The Auditor, as a restriction factor, is considered in some papers to 
prevent or limit managers ability to manipulate, but that alone is not enough and not 
necessarily always true (for example, see Arthur Anderson case with Enron).  
In a hypothetical situation, if firms can report their financial statements un-audited and 
by only complying with GAAP standards and there is no restrictions on managers by 
any regularity bodies. Additionally in this situation, the incentive is to increase reported 
income as a response to a certain event. The question is, which accrual account (tools) 
managers might use to seize this opportunity while simultaneously misleading 
investors? Therefore, the issue of earnings management must be studied and examined 
from an accounting point of view. This is achieved by using our accounting experience 
and familiarity with an industry in order to look for the potential accruals that can be 
used to manipulate earnings (Fields et al., 2001). For example, debtors, stock and 
creditors are good first places to examine as potential accrual tools used in earnings 
manipulation.  
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2.3 Model development: 
There are a various models and approaches to detect earnings management. The most 
used approach is estimating discretionary accruals, especially using the Jones model. 
The Jones model aims at controlling for the normal level of accruals that are affected by 
the changes in the firm’s economic condition, and anything that cannot be explained is 
considered abnormal. The model captures this abnormality in accruals using the residual 
term (error) from the model. Basically, Jones (1991) estimates total accruals for the 
event period using the estimated coefficients from the estimation period. After which, 
the paper compares the estimated total accruals with the calculated total accruals from 
the event period, and any resulting difference is attributed to managers’ discretion. 
Two problems relate to this model when applying it on time-series data. The first is the 
assumption of no earnings management in the estimation period and the residuals are 
randomly scattered (McNichols, 2000). During the estimation period the coefficients for 
the nondiscretionary accruals variables are assumed to capture normal levels of 
accruals, and the residual term represents only white noise. The above assumption 
indicates that companies with no motivation to manipulate in previous years will not 
manipulate in years following the event period. Jones (1991) included in sample only 
the companies that are assumed to manipulate downwards in the event period, but the 
model itself does not have a variable that represents an incentive. The second problem is 
the assumption of coefficient stability during the estimation period. The model does not 
take into account any macroeconomic factors such as interest rates fluctuations (DeFond 
& Jiambalvo, 1994; Peasnell et al., 2000) 
The residual term, as used exactly in the Jones (1991) study, is a reasonable proxy for 
discretionary accruals. The residuals in the event period will be zero if there is no 
earnings management. In other words, the estimated coefficient values from the 
estimation period when plotted in the event period should give a calculated amount of 
total accruals that is equal to accruals for the same period in the absence of 
manipulation. Thus, any differences (in absolute terms) between these two amounts in 
the event period is considered abnormal that can be mainly explained by managers 
discretion.  
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Applying the Jones model on cross-sectional data reduces time effects problems and 
produces larger samples resulting in a better estimation of the coefficients (DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996). The residual term in this case will average to 
zero, which is similar to the residual term in the estimation period when applying the 
Jones model on time-series data. The difference here is the lack of the two periods 
(estimation period and treatment period) in order to use the residuals to capture the 
differences and attribute it to discretionary accruals. The residuals in this case are 
probably capturing other things in the form of noise, in addition to earnings 
management. Moreover, the residuals from a statistical perspective, should average to 
zero. As a result, an additional variable must be included in the Jones model to capture 
discretionary accruals in cross-sectional settings. Hence, the underlying assumption of 
the cross-sectional version of the Jones model is that some firms are manipulating 
downwards and some firms are manipulating upwards and on average they sum to zero. 
This problem arises because the change in revenue and fixed assets are not controlling 
for all the nondiscretionary accruals, i.e. it’s not the perfect model and not the best fit, 
and as mentioned above, the residuals will be capturing earnings management in 
addition to the noise introduced by the lack of fit. 
The modifications on the Jones model by previous studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et 
al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005) aims to increase its power, but not at this particular issue. 
Applying the model on cross sectional data is designed to deal with the problem of 
unavailable long time-series observations. But the assumption is even more transparent 
in cross sectional settings; the residuals will average to zero. 
The distribution approach (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999) has an 
advantage of being relatively simpler to apply, and it is a graphical description of the 
earnings after the manipulation takes place. However, this approach gains its popularity 
from the benchmarks it sets as incentives for earnings management. A zero benchmark 
is an incentive managers want to meet and avoid reporting a loss. This is the most basic 
incentive that explains manipulation. The problem with this approach is its inability to 
differentiate between accruals manipulation and change in accounting choices, and it 
does not capture the magnitude and specific methods (instruments) to manage earnings 
(Healy &Wahlen, 1999). Therefore, it is beneficial only for descriptive purposes by 
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setting the benchmark, which represents the incentive and showing the discontinuity or 
“kink” around that benchmark as evidence of earnings management.  
To move ahead in earnings management literature, new methodologies must be 
employed rather than using the same methodology just because others have 
implemented it (Fields et al., 2001). 
The single accrual approach is not well covered in earnings management literature 
(McNichols, 2000; Healy et al., 1999) although the approach is first used around the 
same time as the publication of the Jones model came out (e.g. McNichols & Wilson, 
1988), but did not attract much attention from researchers. This approach relies on 
specifying one or more accrual accounts and decomposing them into managed and 
unmanaged components, a process that is not easy. The main reason this approach did 
not get enough popularity is the tests used to detect single accrual manipulation, but the 
underlying concept is still attractive and more beneficial than other approaches, because 
if tested properly it gives a useful insight on how exactly manipulation took place, 
rather than just speculating on how it was done.  The process used to decompose each 
accrual account is similar to the total accrual approach used by Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986) but on the account level rather than total accruals level.   
The above discussion  does not imply that the Jones model should not be used; it is still 
well specified when it comes to the nondiscretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; 
Peasnell et al., 2000; Kothari et al., 2005) but it still requires an additional variable(s) to 
control for the discretionary accruals rather than using the residual term. In this manner, 
the model will include variables that will control for both nondiscretionary and 
discretionary accruals, and having a residual term that represents only white noise. 
In this research, the Jones model is applied but with including an additional variable that 
controls for the discretionary accruals. The model controls for the nondiscretionary 
accruals using change in sales revenue and fixed assets; discretionary accruals are 
controlled by change in accrual accounts. The proposed model is as following: 
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Where ACCi is the change in accruals accounts and j= number of accruals manipulated 
to manage earnings. 
The model is the Jones model but with an additional variable to control for discretionary 
accruals. The main difference between the two models is that in the Jones model 
earnings management is captured by the residuals, while in the proposed model here, 
earnings management is captured by a specific accrual, and having the residuals 
representing the error term or simply the noise. 
The hypothesis of this research is that change in revenue and fixed assets will explain 
the normal level of accruals, but the change in the accrual account will explain the extra 
amount in total accruals that is not explained by the nondiscretionary accruals. All 
variables are lagged by total assets in period t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity.  
The model proposed here is not sufficient by itself; it still requires an additional variable 
that represents an incentive. Including such variable will focus this research on the firms 
that share the same incentive and will manage their earnings in the same direction to 
meet a specific benchmark; other firms that do not share the same incentive will not 
manage their earnings. 
Therefore the proposed model becomes:  
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is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the incentive applies and 0 otherwise. 
This model is a combination of the three approaches used in literature; it uses the total 
accruals method by using the Jones model (Jones, 1991) to control for changes in total 
accruals by decomposing accruals into nondiscretionary and discretionary; it uses a 
single accrual account (McNichols & Wilson 1988) which represents the discretionary 
component, and it includes a benchmark (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999) which represents the incentive. In other words, the model explicitly incorporates 
an incentive and a specific accrual account to show that firms sharing the same 
incentive will manipulate in the same direction using the same accrual.  
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The model is applied on cross sectional data; thereby there is no need for long time 
series observations, and by not using the residual term as a proxy for discretionary 
accruals, there is no assumption that some firms are manipulating upwards and some 
firms are manipulating downwards. This is the core difference from the standard Jones 
model, where discretionary accruals are measured by the residual term, but in the 
proposed model here, discretionary accruals are measured by the product of the dummy 
variable and accrual account  (D*ΣACC). 
Dechow et al. (1995) proposed a modification to the Jones model by subtracting change 
in debtors from change in sales in the event period. This modification to model is based 
on the assumption that all credits sales in the event period result from earnings 
management. When applying the modified Jones cross sectionally, the assumption 
becomes that all credit sales result from earnings management, which seems as a heroic 
assumption. However, the model in this research assumes that a portion of credits sales 
result from earnings management for companies that have the similar incentive, but not 
all credit sales. The change in sales revenues included in the model controls for the 
normal levels of both cash and credit sales. The abnormal level of credit sales (i.e. 
change in debtors) is included in the model for companies that are expected to 
manipulate. 
Some papers argue that the model must include a constant to increase the power of the 
model and provide additional control for heteroskedasticity (Kothari et al., 2005). 
However, the theoretical model includes a constant, but when tested empirically the 
whole model is scaled, including the constant, to reduce heteroskedasticity. Therefore, 
the model of this research will only contain the original constant and when tested 
empirically it will be scaled with total assets in (t-1). The scaling is assumed to reduce 
and control for heteroskedasticity, the power of the model is increased by adding an 
additional regressor to measure the discretionary accruals. 
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Chapter Three 
Tests of accrual management in listed Jordanian companies 
3.1 Introduction: 
This chapter provides an overview of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). Describing 
the ASE development and past trends since it was established. Moreover, the chapter 
describes the legal requirements for listing the companies in the market. Particularly, 
describing the relevant articles of securities law no.76, from which the incentive for 
managing earnings for listed companies is identified. Additionally, the chapter describes 
the main market segments and the market index, providing key statistics of ASE. 
In this chapter, the extended Jones model developed in the previous chapter is applied 
on a sample of companies listed in the first market. The main incentive of first market 
companies is to report profits because if they report losses for three consecutive years 
they will be delisted from the first market. Results show that companies are 
manipulating directly after the first loss. The accrual account capturing this 
manipulation is change in debtors. This suggests that companies are recognising sales 
early to overstate the sales revenue. Moreover, change in sales in the period following 
the manipulation year is abnormally low for manipulating companies. This is evidence 
of accrual reversal. Results show no indication of big bath in the year of losses. 
Finally, this chapter provides statistical simulations tests in order to compare the 
extended Jones model of this research with the standard Jones model. Results show that 
the cross sectional Jones model only detects manipulation if the artificial manipulation 
is inserted randomly across a sample of firms. The simulation tests shows that the 
extended Jones model as modified in this research captures the inserted manipulation in 
each scenario. 
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3.2 Institutional Framework: 
3.2.1 Amman Stock Exchange: Background and History 
In the early thirties, public companies in Jordan were already established and their 
shares were traded, even before establishing a financial market. Investors subscribed 
and traded the shares of Arab bank in 1930, which was the first public shareholding 
company in Jordan. Investors also subscribed in Jordan Tobacco & Cigarettes in 1931, 
Jordan Electric Power in 1938 and Jordan Cement Factories in 1951. 
Shares were traded in non-specialized and non-formal offices. Therefore, the 
government worked towards setting up a formal market to regulate the issuance and 
trading of shares to ensure safe and easy trading among investors based on a basic 
mechanism of defining a fair share price based on supply and demand. 
With the government support, various parties started to prepare the basis for a formal 
organised securities market. Between 1975 and 1976 the Central Bank and with the 
cooperation of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) conducted 
intensive studies to establish a financial market to cope with the growth of the national 
economy and increasing numbers of investors in public shareholding companies. As a 
result, in 1976 the temporary law no. 31 was issued and the Amman Financial Market 
(AFM) was established. In 1977, following a Cabinet resolution, the AFM 
administration committee was formed and immediately went into action. Operations and 
trading in AFM started on the 1
st
 of January 1978. 
The temporary law no. 31 of 1976 outlined the main objectives of AFM as the 
following: encouraging investment in securities, regulating the issuance and trading 
securities in a manner that would insure the ease, the safety and the speed of 
transactions and to safe guard the national financial interests as well as the investor’s. 
Other objectives included providing necessary data and statistics of all trading 
operations carried out within the AFM. Moreover, the market was entrusted with dual 
roles; the role of Securities and Exchange Commission and the role of a traditional 
stock exchange. 
The market went through major developments due to a comprehensive capital market 
reforming policy. This policy, which was adopted by the government, aimed at 
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improving the regulation of the market to meet international standards, it also aimed at 
expanding and diversifying the national economy. In 1997, the enactment of the 
temporary law no. 23 came into effect and was indeed a corner stone in the development 
of the market. This is considered as a qualitative leap and a turning point for the 
Jordanian capital market. The main objective of the newly established law is to 
restructure and further regulate the capital market and to complete its infrastructure to 
be consistent with international standards and securing transparency and safe trading. 
The new law is the foundation for three new institutions to replace AFM, namely: 
1- Amman Stock Exchange (ASE): established on March 11, 1999, and considered 
a private sector as a non-profit organisation with legal and financial 
independence. The exchange is governed by a seven member board of directors, 
with a chief executive officer that carries out daily responsibilities and reports 
directly to the board. ASE main responsibility is to run the market. In order to 
promote transparency, the ASE has two markets, the first market and the second 
market, in which shares are traded. This system is implemented so that investors 
can know the status of the company, in terms of profitability and risk, they wish 
to invest in. Companies that want to be listed in the first market are governed by 
strict requirements that must be met. These requirements include achieving pre-
tax profit for at least two out the three years before being listed; companies must 
also fulfil the free-float shares requirement and minimum number of 
shareholders in the company. The main feature of the first market is liquidity, 
where investors can easily sell their shares. 
2- Securities Depositing Centre (SDC): established in May 10, 1999 to ensure safe  
custody of the securities ownership, also registering and transferring ownership 
of the securities traded in ASE, and settling the payments among brokers. The 
SDC is also a non-profit legal entity with financial and administrative autonomy. 
3-  Jordan Securities Commission (JSC): its major task is supervising the issuance 
of and trading securities; it also regulates and supervises the disclosure of 
information related to securities, issuers, insider trading and major shareholders. 
It also carries out the responsibility of approving the internal laws and 
regulations of the SDC and the ASE, and adopting accounting and auditing 
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standards for all entities falling under its supervision. JSC has financial and 
administrative autonomy and reports directly to the Prime Minister office, its 
board of commissioners consists of five full time members. 
3.2.2 Securities Law no. 76
2
: 
In 2002, the new securities law no.76 was issued, which authorized setting up other 
stock exchanges and allowed forming an independent investor protection fund. The new 
law, which came into effect on July 2004, outlines new codes of conduct that are both 
professional and more ethical.  
Nowadays, securities are traded electronically in Amman Stock Exchange. There are 
now 235 companies listed in the exchange with a capitalization of more than a JD 40 
billion. The ASE is considered one of the largest stock markets in the region that 
permits foreign investments. In the exchange there is currently 863,044 shareholders, 
40.9% of which are Jordanian corporate and individual investors, 49.8% are foreign 
investors, and the remaining 8.2% is held by the Jordanian Investment Corporation (a 
branch of the Social Security Corporation). Most securities traded are equity shares, 
financial companies shares are the most traded (61.2%) following behind is services 
shares (23.2%) and industrial shares (15.6%). Table 3.1 shows key statistics of the ASE 
from the period 2001 to 2006: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Securities Law no. 76 for 2002 is available on the Amman Stock Exchange web site: 
http://www.ase.com.jo/pages.php?menu_id=121&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0  
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Table 3.1  
ASE key statistics
*
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of listed 
companies  
158 161 192 201 227 
Market capitalization 
(JD million)  
5029.0 7772.8 13033.8 26667.1 21078.2 
Value traded (JD 
million)  
950.3 1855.2 3793.2 16871.0 14209.9 
No. of traded shares 
(million)  
461.8 1008.6 1338.7 2582.6 4104.3 
ASE general 
weighted price Index 
(point)  
1700.2 2614.5 4245.6 8191.5 5518.1 
ASE general free 
float weighted price 
index (point)  
1090.9 1761.5 2729.1 4259.7 3013.7 
ASE general un-
weighted price index 
(point)  
691.7 1117.5 1535.9 2171.0 1608.1 
P/E ratio (times)  13.0 21.7 31.1 44.2 16.7 
P/BV (times)  1.2 1.9 2.7 3.2 2.9 
Dividend yield ratio 
(%)  
3.2 2.4 1.7 1.6 2.3 
Market capitalization 
/ GDP (%)  
80.4 116.8 184.7 326.6 233.9 
*
Source: ASE market Information available on: 
http://www.ase.com.jo/pages.php?menu_id=72&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0. 
               
 
Table 3.2 show the percentage of foreign shareholders and the amount of their net 
investments (in Jordanian Dinars JD) between the periods 1996-2006 in the industrial 
sector. As noticed from the table, there is a 39.67%  percentage change increase in 
number of foreign ownership of shares and a 11% increase in of foreign net investments 
since 1999 (establishment of ASE). Additionally, there is a 95.86% percentage change 
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increase in the foreign shareholders since 1996 and a 20.2% increase in their net 
investments. 
Table 3.2  
Percentage of foreign shareholders in the industrial sector 
1
 
Year Percentage of foreign shareholders Net investments (JD)
2
 
1996 22% 8,521,618 
1997 26 % 56,764,112 
1998 28 % 122,606,446 
1999 31% 15,471,248 
2000 30 % (11,833,075) 
2001 27 % (107,504,437) 
2002 26 % 882,692 
2003 30 % 81,889,623 
2004 36% 68,956,603 
2005 37 % 413,033,593 
2006 43 % 180,608,977 
1
 source: ASE market information, available on: www.ase.com.jo                                  
2
 Net investment is the difference between total buying and total selling 
 
The ASE is an active member in the Union of Arab Stock Exchanges, Federation of 
Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges (FEAS), and a full member of the World Federation of 
Exchanges (WFE), and an affiliate member of the International Organisation for 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
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3.2.3 Market Segmentations: 
Shares of public held companies are traded in the secondary market. This market is 
divided into: the first market and the second market. Companies’ shares are listed in the 
second market after fulfilling the required regulations and requirements of all 
subparagraphs from articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Securities law no. 76. After that, a listing 
form is submitted to the ASE board, and if the board grants permission, a copy of the 
listing form is forwarded to the JSC. 
Companies wishing to transfer from the second market to the first market must meet 
strict requirements and conditions set by the securities law no.76. These requirements 
are presented in Article 7, as follows:  
a. Being listed in the second market for at least a year. 
b. Net shareholders’ equity must not be less than 100% of the paid in capital. 
c. Achieving a pre-tax profit for at least two out three fiscal years preceding the 
transfer of listing. 
d. The free-float of subscribed shares ratio by the end of fiscal year must not be 
less than 5% (if capital is JD50 million or more) or 10% (if capital is less than 
JD50 million) of paid-in capital. 
e. Minimum number of shareholders must be 100 by the end of fiscal year. 
f. Minimum days of trading shares must not be less than 20% of the overall trading 
days during the past 12 months, and at least 10% of the free-float shares during 
the same period. 
The law explicitly defines the free-float shares in Article 2 as: “The number of company 
shares that are available for trading”. The same article also specifies what shares are 
deemed as not free-float, this includes shares owned by the company’s board of 
directors; shares owned by the mother, subsidiary or affiliate companies; shares owned 
by shareholders who own 5% or more of the company capital; shares owned by 
governments and public institutions; and finally treasury shares. 
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As mentioned above, there are strict requirements and conditions that must be met to 
remain listed in the first market and it is very possible to drop back to the second 
market. Article 8 of the securities law no.76 specified the situations in which a company 
will be removed from the first market and re-listed in the second market as the 
following: 
a. If the net shareholders' equity decreased to less than 75% of the paid-in capital.  
b. If the company reports losses in the last three fiscal years.  
c. If the company's free float ratio shares drop to less than the minimum set in 
Article 7 (d) by the end of its fiscal year.  
d. If the number of company shareholders drops to less than 75 by the end of its 
fiscal year.  
e. If the days of trading on company shares over the last twelve months drop to less 
than the minimum set in Article 7 (f).  
f. If the percentage of traded free float drops during the last twelve months to less 
than the minimum set in Article 7 (f) by the end of its fiscal year.  
Finally, the secondary market has segments besides the one’s mentioned above. The 
bond market; where the trading of corporate bonds takes place, although currently there 
are a few numbers of bonds being traded. There is also a segment specialized in 
transactions off the trading floor, such as inheritance and inter-family transactions. 
3.2.4 Market Index: 
Generally, indices measure the performance of shares in terms of return. The first index 
used was in 1980, at that time Amman Financial Market (AFM) selected a sample of 38 
shares from companies in different sectors with a base value of 100 points to calculate 
an un-weighted price index, supplemented with sub-indices for four sectors: banking & 
finance, insurance, services and industrial.  
In the early nineties, AFM started to calculate a market capitalization weighted price 
index, based on a sample of 50 companies (the sample increased to 60, 70, 100 
companies in 1994, 2001, 2007 respectively). The market established five standards to 
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select the sample: market value, number of trading days, shares turnover rate, trading 
volume and number of traded shares. 
Recently, ASE developed a new index based on the market value of the free float shares 
to reflect the true market performance. This index is better than the previous one in 
representing prices changes (movements). It also limits the effect of high value shares 
by giving more weight to the medium and small value shares. The basis used to select 
the sample of companies is similar to the one used for the Dow Jones index. 
Furthermore, the base value is increased to 1000 points instead of 100 points, which 
was used in the previous index. ASE updates the sample annually by replacing the less 
active shares by the more active ones. 
3.3 Sample and Data: 
There are three major sectors in the ASE; the financial sector which includes banks and 
insurance companies, the service sector and the industrial sector. Since the focus in this 
research is on accrual manipulation, companies from the financial and service sectors 
are excluded from the sample because of their different accounting practices. Therefore, 
the sample will only contain companies from the industrial sector that are listed in the 
first market.  
Earnings management will be observed around a specific benchmark. This research 
assumes that the overall incentive that affects the companies equally and will cause the 
same directional response is preserving their place in the first market.  
As mentioned earlier, companies listed in the first market are characterized as 
profitable, well managed businesses, and they meet the requirements of free-flow shares 
ratio, among other requirements. Investors target companies listed in the first market 
because of their profitability and lower risk. 
The biggest challenge first market companies’ face is losing their place and falling back 
to the second market. Any company reporting losses for three consecutive years will be 
dropped automatically to the second market. Such an event will harm the reputation of 
the manager as well as the company’s. Therefore, companies listed in the first market 
will have a significant incentive to report profits and avoid reporting losses. On the 
other hand, companies listed in the second market will have a similar incentive. In other 
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words, if companies report profits in two out of the last three years, then they can apply 
to be listed in the first market, but since there are other conditions that need to be 
fulfilled besides reporting profits (e.g. the minimum number of outstanding shares), 
their application will be most likely denied. Therefore, the incentive to manipulate is 
assumed to be less significant for the second market companies relative to their 
counterparts in the first market. 
There are 37 industrial companies listed in the first market. Data are collected from the 
financial statements of the companies included in the sample from the period 2002 to 
2006
3
. One company had missing observations, therefore it was excluded. The data 
collected is arranged based on a cross sectional format, leading to a total of 180 firm-
year observations from 36 companies. The reason of choosing data from this period is 
because the ASE was established in 1999 and since then the amount of investments 
from local and foreign investors has increased, managers are more motivated to 
preserve their company’s profitable image.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics: 
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample from the period 2002 to 2006. 
Companies in the sample hold a high percentage of current assets in their balance 
sheets, mostly in the form of debtors and stock. The mean value of current assets is 
roughly stable during the five years (%55). The importance of high percentage of 
current assets comes from the availability of accruals or accounting instruments that 
would make it easier for managers employing them to manipulate reported earnings. In 
other words, and other things being constant, managers of the companies included in the 
sample have the proper amount of accounting technology and instruments to manipulate 
earnings. 
The earnings to total accruals ratio during the five years shows high variation in each 
year, and there is no clear pattern from one period to another. It can be noticed in 2002 
the mean value of earnings before taxes to total accruals is (7.90) and in 2006 the mean 
is (0.455).  
                                                 
3
 Financial statements are available for free download on ASE website on the following link: 
http://www.ase.com.jo/downloads.php?path=downloads/Companies%20Guide/. Appendix A1 explains 
how data is manipulated and organised.  
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Table 3.3  
Descriptive statistics of sample
1 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Current assets 
Mean 
Median 
Variance  
Std. Deviation 
 
0.540 
0.560 
0.037 
0.193 
 
0.524 
0.520 
0.034 
0.185 
 
0.550 
0.550 
0.035 
0.186 
 
0.560 
0.560 
0.039 
0.197 
 
0.520 
0.550 
0.047 
0.216 
Current liabilities 
Mean 
Median 
Variance  
Std. Deviation 
 
0.200 
0.150 
0.014 
0.119 
 
0.200 
0.018 
0.013 
0.112 
 
0.220 
0.190 
0.020 
0.140 
 
0.220 
0.210 
0.019 
0.138 
 
0.250 
0.240 
0.025 
0.158 
ROA 
2 
Mean 
Median 
Variance  
Std. Deviation 
 
0.075 
0.069 
0.005 
0.069 
 
0.069 
0.069 
0.005 
0.067 
 
0.079 
0.082 
0.005 
0.069 
 
0.078 
0.078 
0.005 
0.069 
 
0.057 
0.047 
0.005 
0.074 
Operating cash flow 
Mean 
Median 
Variance  
Std. Deviation 
 
0.117 
0.110 
0.014 
0.120 
 
0.077 
0.084 
0.009 
0.095 
 
0.024 
0.017 
0.011 
0.104 
 
0.033 
0.042 
0.014 
0.118 
 
0.077 
0.089 
0.010 
0.103 
Total accruals 
3 
Mean 
Median 
Variance  
Std. Deviation 
 
-0.042 
-0.040 
0.012 
0.111 
 
-0.007 
-0.008 
0.012 
0.108 
 
0.056 
0.050 
0.011 
0.106 
 
0.045 
0.059 
0.009 
0.097 
 
0.021 
0.009 
0.012 
0.111 
Earnings to total accruals 
Mean 
Median 
Variance 
Std. Deviation 
 
7.900   
0.200 
1081 
32.870 
 
0.38 
0.105 
18.260     
4.270 
 
0.780 
0.685 
12.500 
3.500 
 
1.960 
0.480 
127 
11.250 
 
0.455 
0.210 
10.010 
3.160 
1
All variables are displayed as percentage to total assets in period t. 
2
Earnings before tax to total assets. 
3
Total accruals = net income before taxes – operating cash flows 
Table 3.4 describes the key variables included in the model. It can be noticed that 
change in sales revenue and change in debtors are the highest in 2004 and 2005, while 
fixed assets is relatively stable suggesting there is no unusual growth in the size of firms 
during the five year period. 
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Table 3.4  
Descriptive statistics on key variables
* 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Change in Sales Revenue 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
 
0.048 
0.003 
0.164 
 
0.039 
0.045 
0.232 
 
0.117 
0.084 
0.193 
 
0.110 
0.055 
0.215 
 
0.064 
0.020 
0.262 
Fixed assets (PPE) 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
 
0.360 
0.331 
0.222 
 
0.366 
0.332 
0.223 
 
0.362 
0.325 
0.213 
 
0.440 
0.301 
0.754 
 
0.293 
0.281 
0.168 
Change in Debtors 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Deviation 
 
0.004 
0.005 
0.049 
 
0.009 
-0.001 
0.059 
 
0.019 
0.012 
0.052 
 
0.030 
0.016 
0.071 
 
-0.015 
-0.001 
0.104 
* All variables are scaled by total assets in period t-1 
             
3.5 Measurement of variables: 
In this study, earnings are measured as net income before taxes. Cash flows are 
measured as net cash flows from operating activities. Therefore, total accruals are 
measured as the difference between operating cash flows and earnings as in Healy 
(1985), DeAngelo (1986), DeFond & Jiambalvo (1994) and Subramanyam, (1996). 
Firm and time subscripts are omitted for convenience: 
                                           (eq. 3.1) 
Total accruals are decomposed into nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals: 
                                          (eq. 3.2) 
Nondiscretionary accruals relate to the normal level of the firm’s performance and are 
measured by the change in sales revenue (∆REV) and property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). In this study change in sales revenue is 
measured as the difference between net sales in period (t) minus net sales in period (t-
1): 
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∆REV = Net Salest – Net Salest-1                              (eq. 3.3) 
Property, plant and equipment are measured as net fixed assets in period (t) to control 
for the depreciation expense. Change in debtors is measured as the difference between 
net debtors in period (t) and net debtors in (t-1): 
∆DRS = DRSt – DRSt-1                                                         (eq. 3.4) 
All variables are taken directly from the financial statements of the companies. 
Financial statements are available from the Amman Stock Exchange as mentioned in the 
previous section. 
3.6 Hypothesis formulation: 
As mentioned in chapter two, the cross-sectional version of the Jones model captures 
discretionary accruals using the residuals. The residuals cannot be used as a measure for 
earnings management since they represent the stochastic error term that is normally 
distributed with mean zero.  
Using the standard Jones model as it is for this research will produce a result that will 
suggest that some companies listed in the first market manage their earnings upward 
and some manage downward simultaneously, and on average they sum to zero. This 
implies that there are two incentives driving the companies in the first market to 
manipulate in different directions. But through careful examination of the companies 
listed in the first market, the researcher found that the major incentive is to avoid 
reporting losses. Thus, it is assumed that companies reporting a loss will manipulate 
upward to report profits in the following year, so the importance of the zero benchmark 
becomes more evident for the listed companies. Hence, the main focus of this research 
is to detect and measure earnings management around this specific benchmark, and it is 
assumed that only the companies that respond to this incentive will manipulate upwards. 
As a result, the standard Jones model (with no adjustment) will not be sufficient for this 
study. 
The model proposed in this research is based on the Jones model (Jones, 1991), but 
extended to include a single accrual account, which is change in debtors, to capture the 
discretionary accrual manipulation. The justification of choosing the change in debtors 
as the single accrual to manipulate is because it serves two purposes; the first is that it 
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captures early sales recognition, the other is it captures bad debt expense manipulation. 
Early sales recognition will be most likely in the form of credit sales, and it will be 
reflected directly in the sales and debtors accounts, thus increasing the operating profit 
in a given year. Additionally, managers can re-estimate the percentage of bad debts 
expense by reducing it to decrease expenses, which in turn, will increase the profits as 
well. However, bad debt expense manipulation will probably be small and insufficient 
to achieve required target of manipulation. Moreover, this modified version of the Jones 
model explicitly assumes that only firms with the same incentive will manipulate 
upwards, while other firms that do not share the same incentive might not manage their 
earnings at all. Therefore, a dummy variable representing the incentive is included to 
the model and multiplied with change in debtors. The dummy variable equals one if a 
company reports a loss in the previous year and zero otherwise. The product of the 
dummy variable and change in debtors is the measurement for discretionary accruals, 
rather than the residual term. This research assumes that the major incentive for 
companies listed in the first market in ASE is reporting a profit in order to remain listed. 
As a result, a company that reports a loss in any period between 2002 and 2006 will 
manage their earnings upwards to report a profit. 
Although a company will be removed from the first market if it reports losses for three 
consecutive years. However, the assumption here is that managers will manipulate their 
earnings in the year following a loss. Managers will not wait for two successive loss 
years and manage their earnings in the third year; doing so might attract unwanted 
attention and could even be easier for the auditors to prevent such manipulation. 
Moreover, these companies report a loss because by the time they realize this result, it 
will be too late for them to manipulate. Thus, the underlying assumption is managers 
will take no risks and simply manipulate in the year following a loss. 
The null hypothesis tested in this research is: 
Ho: companies reporting a loss will not manage their earnings in the following year 
using debtors. 
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The proposed model of this research is:  
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Where: 
TA it: total accruals for firm і in year t. 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t. 
PPE it: property, plant and equipment for firm і in year t. 
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t. 
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous year, 0 
otherwise. 
A t-1: total assets for firm i in year t, is the scale variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
Change in sales revenue and fixed assets captures nondiscretionary (normal) accruals 
including the normal level of change in debtors. The unexplained (extra) amount of total 
accruals is explained by discretionary (abnormal) accruals. Therefore, earnings 
management is captured by the change in debtors for companies reporting a loss in the 
previous period, and companies that do not report a loss will not manage their earnings. 
3.7 Results of earnings management: 
The regression results are displayed in Table 3.5; all variables appear statistically 
significant at a 1% significance level. The change in revenue coefficient is 0.226 and the 
fixed assets coefficient is -0.047 and negative, which is the expected sign since PPE 
controls for the depreciation expense.  
The dummy variable (D) equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous year is 
multiplied with the change in debtors; and the product represents the discretionary 
accruals. The results show that the coefficient for the discretionary accrual is 2.318, 
which indicates that companies reporting a loss in the previous year manage their 
earnings in the following year to report profits. Thus, by reporting a profit the company 
needs to worry less for next period’s earnings, since they will be removed from the first 
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market if they report losses for three years in a row. Reporting a profit in the year 
following a loss breaks the pattern and reduces the pressure on the management in 
following periods.  
Table 3.5   
Results for one year loss 
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 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it D*∆DRS it 
 
Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
126872.2 0.226 -0.047 2.318 21.49% 
t value
 
 (2.558)
*
 (6.244)
**
 (-2.795)
**
 (3.321)
**
  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in (t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity.
 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no earnings management is rejected. The results 
support the assumption that earnings management is taking place in first market for 
companies reporting a loss in the previous year. The change in sales revenue represents 
the nondiscretionary component of sales revenue that companies recognise. In other 
words, this amount is the normal level of sales. The abnormal level of sales comes in 
the form of abnormal credit sales; therefore the debtors account will be abnormally 
large (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004). The change in debtors for the manipulators is 
significant which indicates that these companies recognised early sales in order to boost 
revenues and as a result increase net income. Managers manipulate revenues by 
accelerating the recognition of sales through speeding up the shipment and delivery of 
goods sold and pushing down unwanted in goods to retailers or in other words “channel 
stuffing” (Caylor, 2010). Change in debtors can also be used as a tool to manage bad 
debt expense downward to increase profits. Managers can deflate bad debt expense in 
periods where earnings need a boost (Jackson & Liu, 2009). Hence, having change in 
debtors significant means that companies reporting a loss in the previous period can 
manage earnings upward through revenue manipulation and through expense 
manipulation. The main importance of these results is providing evidence for using a 
single accrual account to achieve the required manipulation and by using a variable 
representing an incentive that sets a benchmark for earnings management for companies 
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listed in the first market in the ASE. This benchmark can be used to identity 
manipulating companies and makes it easier to detect earnings management behaviour 
in the future.  
The above results indicate that any company that reports a loss in the previous year will 
manipulate to report a profit. Thus, the dummy variable points out those companies that 
report a loss in the previous year regardless whether they report a profit or not in the 
year following the loss. In other words, the dummy variable (D) does not separate 
between companies that reverse their losses and companies that do not reverse losses in 
the year of manipulation (i.e. period after the loss year). Therefore, two dummies are 
constructed to separate between companies that manipulate to report profits and 
companies that report losses for the second year. The two dummies are based on the 
general condition set by the original dummy variable (D). The first dummy (DP) equals 
one if the company reports a loss in the previous period and a profit in the current 
period, in other words (DP) indicates companies that manipulate successfully to report a 
profit. The second dummy (DL) equals one if the company reports a loss in the previous 
period and a loss in the current period, this dummy variable represents those companies 
that are unsuccessful. Table 3.6 displays results for these two conditions. 
Table 3.6  
Results for successful and unsuccessful companies 
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 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DP*∆DRSit DL*∆DRSit  Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
122392.4 0.228 -0.047 2.464 1.720 21.12% 
t value
  
(2.407) (6.236) (-2.786) (3.155) (1.087)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
DP: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous period AND a profit in current 
period, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in previous period, AND a loss in current period, 
0 otherwise. 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in period (t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
The results show the discretionary accruals for successful companies (DP*∆DRSit) is 
significant which means that these companies manipulate following a loss to report 
profits and as a result decrease the probability of being delisted. The interesting result is 
the insignificance of the discretionary accruals measure for unsuccessful companies. 
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This probably suggests that these companies decided not to manipulate and place real 
effort to report profits, but they still reported losses. If these companies report losses 
again in the following year then they will be delisted from the first market.  However, 
since the sample of this research shows no change in the listed companies for the first 
market, it indicates that these companies reported profits after two years of consecutive 
losses and remained listed. Based on that, a new dummy must be added to the model to 
examine the discretionary accruals for companies that report profits after two-year 
losses. The model will show the discretionary accruals for three cases; companies that 
manipulate after a loss and report a profit; companies that report a loss in previous year 
and do not manipulate in current year and still report a loss (as in Table 3.6); and 
companies that report a profit after two consecutive losses. Results are shown in Table 
3.7.  
Table 3.7  
Results for successful and unsuccessful companies and companies reporting a profit after two 
losses 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DP*∆DRSi DL*∆DRSit DLL*∆DRSit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 122044 0.228 -0.047 2.464 1.717 0.0141 20.67% 
t value (2.318)
*
 (6.21)
**
 (-2.77)
**
 (3.145)
**
 (1.080) (0.026)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
DP: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous period AND a profit in current 
period, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in previous period, AND a loss in current period, 0 
otherwise. 
DLL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports two consecutive losses, AND a profit in current period, 
0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in period (t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
The results are the same as before for successful and unsuccessful companies, but with 
further explanation for unsuccessful companies. The companies that did not manipulate 
in the period following a loss and still reported a loss will be delisted if they report a 
third loss. However, these companies reported a profit after two-year losses and 
preserved there place in the first market. The discretionary accruals for these companies 
(DLL*∆DRSit) is not significant which means that they did not manipulate to report 
profits even after two consecutive losses. Taken all together, these results show that 
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most companies listed in the first market manipulate directly after a loss year to report 
profits. However, some companies do not manipulate after a loss and still report a loss. 
Eventually these few companies report profits after two consecutive losses and remain 
listed in the first market. The results suggest that the profits are not a product of 
manipulation, which means that the company placed real efforts by selling more goods 
to new customers.  Another possible explanation is real earnings management, which 
differs from accrual manipulation. Real earnings management is taking actual steps to 
increase profits. For example, providing favourable credit terms, lowering credit 
restrictions, lowering prices and offering discounts; as a result actual sales will increase 
(Caylor, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). However, real earnings management is beyond 
the scope of the model applied in this research, which only models accrual 
manipulation. 
3.8 Tests for “Big Bath” and “Accrual reversal”: 
From the previous results, companies that report a loss manipulate directly to report 
profits. The main tool of manipulation is through early credit sales recognition. 
However, the above results do not explain from which period the company shifted the 
sales, since earnings management is basically shifting revenues and expenses between 
periods. Sales could have been deferred from the loss period to current period or sales 
taken from the following period could have been recognised early in the current period 
(the current period being the event period or the manipulation year). The two cases 
cannot take place simultaneously since it will be more costly in terms of cash flows. 
Therefore, sales are either taken from the loss year, which would result in a big bath in 
the loss year or taken from the year following the manipulation period, which would 
result in accrual reversal in that year. 
Basically, a big bath technique is maximising the loss in a particular year, either by 
accelerating bad debt expenses (e.g. write-offs) and/or deferring revenues, to increase 
the probability of reporting a profit in subsequent periods. Deferring sales is 
accomplished when cash is received but the goods are not yet shipped or delivered to 
buyers. Hence, managers can postpone the delivery of goods and recognise the sales 
revenue in the following year. Managers use this technique when they will report a loss 
despite the amount of upward manipulation. Companies’ reporting a loss means that it 
is too late to manipulate and/or the manipulation will not be sufficient or successful for 
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companies to turn themselves around. Therefore, companies undergo reporting losses 
but maximising the amount of losses by managing their earnings downward. This will 
make it easier to report profits in the following period. In other words, the companies 
are hypothesised to take a big bath in the loss year. The alternative case is not taking a 
big bath and reporting the normal level of losses but recognising sales earlier during the 
period following the loss year. This becomes the case if the company decides not to take 
a big bath in the loss year, or they realised they will report a loss and it’s too late for 
them to manipulate or take a big bath. Therefore, the company in this case will 
recognise sales early by shifting them from the following period. In other words, the 
company will report a loss taking no action and manipulate in the period following the 
loss through early sales recognition.  
The effect of a big bath will be shown in an abnormally low debtors account because 
sales are deferred to the next period. For companies that report a loss, the change in 
debtors in the loss year is expected to be negative. On the other hand, early sales 
recognition will have a significant effect on the sales account from the period following 
the manipulation year and the sign of change in sales for companies that manipulate in 
current period is expected to be negative. 
First, companies are tested for big bath by constructing a new dummy variable to 
indicate the loss year. The dummy variable (DBB) will equal 1 if the company reports a 
loss in the current period and 0 otherwise. The tool of manipulation is the change in 
debtors; the debtors account will be abnormally low in the loss year because a large 
portion of credit sales are deferred to the following period. Based on that, the sign of the 
coefficient of the discretionary accrual measure (the product of the dummy variable and 
change in debtors) is expected to be negative, as a result of deferring sales to the next 
period. The sign will also be negative if the company accelerates bad debts expenses as 
well. The model will include two dummy variables; (DP) to indicate companies that 
report a profit after a loss and (DBB) to indicate the loss year. Results are shown in the 
following table. 
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Table 3.8   
Results for big bath in the loss period 
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Coefficient 
 
110420.3 0.230 -0.046 2.465 2.492 21.00% 
t value
  
(2.234)
*
 (6.287)
**
 (-2.718)
**
 (3.154)
**
 (0.944)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
DP: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in previous year and profits in current year, 0 
otherwise. 
DBB: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in current period, 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in period (t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (DBB*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for big bath for firm i in year t. 
The results show no indication of big bath. The discretionary accruals for the companies 
in the loss year are neither significant nor negative. This indicates that the companies 
did not take any action during the loss year, either because companies realized they will 
report losses in a late stage during the year and there is no time to manipulate either 
upward or downward or they simply postponed the manipulation for next year. Results 
in Table 3.5 and Table 3.7 support the latter explanation that all manipulation takes 
place in the period following the loss year through early recognition of sales. In order to 
test this, a different dummy variable will be added to the model instead of (DBB). The 
new dummy will indicate the period after the manipulation year to detect any reversal of 
accruals as a consequence of manipulation. The dummy variable (DR) will indicate the 
period in which companies report a profit after the manipulation period. In other words, 
this condition holds “True” for companies that report a loss then a profit then another 
profit. The tool used to detect any reversal is the change in sales revenue because early 
sales recognition means that companies shifted sales from next year to the current year 
(i.e. year of manipulation). Therefore, the change in sales revenue in the following year 
will be abnormally low (negative). Results are displayed in the following table. 
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Table 3.9  
Results for Accruals reversal 
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Coefficient 
 
101250.6 0.266 -0.0515 2.575 -0.259 23.14% 
t value
  
(2.073)
*
 (6.829)
**
 (-3.082)
**
 (3.334)
**
 (-2.411)
**
  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
DP: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in previous year and profits in current year, 0 
otherwise. 
DR: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a profit for the second year after a loss, 0 otherwise. 
(DR = 1 if the condition is Loss, Profit, Profit) 
All variables are scaled by total assets in period (t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (DR*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for accrual reversal for firm i in year t. 
As expected, the manipulation that took place after a loss year is achieved through early 
recognition of sales. The discretionary accruals measure for companies that manipulated 
in the previous year is significantly negative as a consequence of having a negative 
change in sales. 
To summarise, companies manipulate directly after reporting a loss; however, a few 
companies did not manipulate after reporting a loss and as a result they reported a 
second loss. Eventually, they did report profits and remained listed in the first market 
although the profits are not a result of accrual manipulation. Most companies did report 
profits through earnings management after reporting losses, the manipulation is mainly 
achieved through early recognition of sales and as a result the sales account in the next 
period is abnormally low. 
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3.9 Simulation tests: 
In previous studies, any modification to the Jones model is evaluated in terms of the 
specification and power (i.e. type I and type II error) of the model against other versions 
of the Jones model or other models, using statistical simulation procedures (Dechow et 
al., (1995); Kothari et al., (2005); Ibrahim (2009)). 
The simulations are mainly based on selecting a sample of firm-years observations 
under the assumption that it contains no earnings management. The following step is 
randomly introducing a fixed amount (e.g. 5% of total assets) that represents the 
manipulation. This set of data is used for each model to assess its specification and 
power in order to find out the best model that detects earnings management. 
The introduced amount is randomly spread into the data, and the model is applied to 
measure or control for the nondiscretionary accruals. The residuals from the applied 
model are then regressed on a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms where earnings 
management is introduced by the researcher. The coefficient on the dummy variable is 
expected to be significant for firms with earnings management, and roughly equal to the 
amount of the inserted manipulation. However, in this research the main argument is the 
residuals from the Jones model are not the proper measure for discretionary accruals. 
The simulation tests in previous studies did not take into consideration the behaviour of 
residuals before and after introducing a fixed amount (the manipulation) into the 
dataset. In other words, the simulation tests did not compare between the old residuals 
(before the insertion) and the new residuals (after the insertion). Moreover, the tests did 
not examine the regression line to see whether adding a fixed amount will cause the line 
to shift or change its slope. 
To illustrate the effect of the added amount on the regression line, the following figure 
demonstrates regressing total accruals on nondiscretionary accruals (change in sales and 
fixed assets).  
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Figure (3.1) 
 
The straight line represents the regression line before adding a fixed amount as earnings 
management. As noticed from the figure, some residuals (square shape) are above the 
line and some residuals are below the line. These residuals do not represent the 
manipulation and are assumed to have equal variance (i.e. homoscedastic) across the 
line. The dashed line represents the new regression line after adding a fixed amount that 
represents earnings management. The circle shapes are the new residuals that result 
from the added manipulation. The regression line shifts upwards to meet with the added 
amount, and the new residuals are now assumed to contain earnings management. 
However, the distance between the old residuals above the line is roughly equal to the 
new residuals above the second line, in other words, both set of residuals are the same. 
Therefore, when regressing the new residuals on the dummy variable (e.g. PART in 
previous studies), it will be picking up the same residuals as before adding in the 
manipulation. Moreover, the old residuals below the line becomes even smaller (more 
negative) after the regression line shifts upwards. 
The whole regression line in the above illustration shifted up because the added 
manipulation is inserted randomly across the sample. If the added amount is inserted in 
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the first 10
th
 percentile of total accruals for example, then the whole line will not shift 
but the slope of the line will change. However, there is no reason to assume that the 
manipulation will be random across the sample; it might be confined to a certain group 
of companies. Therefore, in order to take the change of the slope into consideration, a 
simulation is designed where it is assumed that the standard Jones model is the perfect 
fit (i.e. R
2
 is 1). The data used in this simulation are the firm-years observations for 
listed companies in the first market that did not report a loss in the previous year. The 
firms that report a profit after a loss year in order to remain listed in the first market are 
removed. Thus, the assumption is that this dataset contains no earnings management. 
The next step is assigning the coefficients a fixed value, so that when total accruals is 
regressed on change in sales and fixed assets, the R
2
 will equal 1 and there will be no 
residuals. This regression will show that there are no discretionary accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals explain all the variation in total accruals. Results for this 
regression are displayed in the following table: 
Table 3.10  
Results for standard Jones model as perfect fit 
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Coefficient 
 
224124 0.244 -0.037 100.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
The following step is inserting 5% of total assets to the first 25
th
 percentile of total 
accruals. This amount will represent the discretionary accruals or the manipulation. By 
doing so, the slope of the regression line will change, but it will not shift. The model is 
applied again and the resulting residuals will be used in the following step. 
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Table 3.11  
Results for standard Jones model after adding 5% of total assets 
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Coefficient 
 
183540.56 0.195 -0.026 87.63% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
After that, a dummy variable (consistent with previous studies, it is labelled PART) is 
constructed and equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by the 
researcher. The residuals from the previous step is regressed on PART, results are 
displayed in the following table. 
Table 3.12  
Results for regressing residuals on PART 
ititit PART
  α β Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
-0.008 0.034 67.28% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000)  
ε it is residuals taken from the Standard Jones model for firm і in year t, after adding 5% of assets. 
PART it: dummy variable that equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by researcher, 0 
otherwise.  
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
Although the coefficient on PART is significant, it still did not capture the entire 
manipulation amount. The expected value of the coefficient is expected to be 5%, which 
equals the exact same amount inserted to total accruals. 
In order to evaluate the Jones model as it is extended in this research, the dummy 
variable should only represent earnings management without any error. Following the 
same procedures above, except the dummy variable (PART) is added to the original 
model as an additional regressor. Any resulting residuals will represent only white noise 
and not manipulation. The model will be: 
 
 Chapter 3: Accrual management in ASE 
 
78 
 
 
Where: 
TAit: total accruals for firm i in year t. 
∆REVit: change in sales revenue for firm i in year t. 
PPEit: fixed assets for firm i in year t. 
PART: dummy variable equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by 
researcher. 
A t-1: total assets for firm i in year t, is the scale variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
µit: error term. 
In Table 3.11 above, results show the coefficients for the standard Jones model and the 
R
2
 is 87.63%. This is the outcome of adding manipulation to a dataset where there is no 
earnings management and nondiscretionary accruals explain all of the variation in total 
accruals. The modified model is applied on this dataset, where 5% of assets are added to 
the first 25
th
 percentile of total accruals. Results are shown the following table. 
Table 3.13  
Results for the extended version of the Jones model 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it PART Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
224124 0.244 -0.037 0.050 100.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
PART: dummy variable equals 1 for firms where earnings management is added by the researcher, 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
As expected, the dummy variable (PART) picked up all the manipulation. The 
coefficient is 5% which is equal to the added amount that represents earnings 
management. Additionally, the R
2
 is 1 again, and there are no residuals. Therefore, by 
adding (PART) as an additional regressor, the model explains all the variation in total 
accruals. Change in sales and fixed assets explain the nondiscretionary accruals and 
(PART) explains the discretionary accruals. 
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To examine the change in the slope from a different perspective, the amount of 
manipulation is added to the upper percentile of total accruals. That is, 5% of total 
assets are added to the 75
th
 percentile of total accruals. Same as before, the standard 
Jones model is applied and the resulting residuals are regressed on the dummy variable 
(PART).  The following table shows the results for regressing the residuals on (PART): 
Table 3.14  
Results for regressing residuals on PART 
ititit PART
  α β Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
-0.005 0.022 43.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000)  
ε it is residuals taken from the Standard Jones model for firm і in year t, after adding 5% of assets to the 75
th
 
percentile of total accruals. 
PART it: dummy variable that equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by researcher, 0 
otherwise.  
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
Now, the dummy variable (PART) is added as an additional regressor to the model. The 
following model displays the results: 
Table 3.15  
Results for the extended version of the Jones model 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it PART Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
224124 0.244 -0.037 0.050 100.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
PART: dummy variable equals 1 for firms where earnings management is added by the researcher, 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
 
The residuals did not pick up all the inserted manipulation; it only detects roughly 2%. 
On the other hand, when using (PART) in the model it detects all the added earnings 
management (coefficient is equal to 5%). 
Up to this point, the inserted earnings management is added in a systematic way (either 
to the 25
th
 or the 75
th
 percentiles of total accruals). The next step is to evaluate the 
model where earnings management is inserted randomly to total accruals. The 
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evaluation is based on two levels of randomly added manipulation to a dataset where 
there is no earnings management (i.e. the Jones model is a perfect fit). The first level is 
adding 5% of total assets randomly to 4% of the data. The following table shows results 
for regressing the residuals on (PART) in panel (A) and using (PART) as additional 
regressor in panel (B): 
Table 3.16  
Results for the two models when inserting manipulation randomly 
Panel (A) 
Results for regressing residuals on PART 
 
ititit PART
  α β Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
-0.002 0.049 99.70% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000)  
ε it is residuals taken from the Standard  Jones model for firm і in year t, after adding 5% of assets randomly 
to 4% of total accruals. 
PART it: dummy variable that equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by researcher,  
0 otherwise.  
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
 
Panel (B) Results for the extended model 
 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it PART Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
224124 0.244 -0.037 0.050 100.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
PART: dummy variable equals 1 for firms where earnings management is added by the researcher,  
0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
 
 
The coefficient on (PART) is 4.98% which is close in value to the added amount. 
However, when adding (PART) as an additional regressor it detects the exact same 
amount. Therefore, the detection process is different when adding earnings management 
in a particular method from adding it randomly. Similar results are obtained when 
adding 5% of assets to 25% of total accruals. 
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In order to evaluate the Jones model as modified in this research, 25% of change in 
debtors is added to total accruals. The procedures are the same as above, except adding 
a fixed percentage of change in debtors to total accruals instead of adding a fixed 
percentage of total assets. By doing so, the amount added will be much smaller than 
before because total assets are much larger than debtors. This will assist in evaluating 
the model of this research in detecting smaller amounts of earnings management. 
Again as before, a dummy variable (PART) is constructed that equals 1 for firms where 
the manipulation is added by the researcher. The added amount of change in debtors 
represents revenue manipulation through early sales recognition. The standard Jones 
model’s coefficients are set using fixed amounts so that the model will be a perfect fit 
(same as Table 3.10 and R
2
 equals 1). After adding 25% of change in debtors to total 
accruals, the R
2
 will decrease because the nondiscretionary accruals no longer explain 
all the variation in total accruals; the results are shown in Table 3.17. 
Table 3.17  
Results for standard Jones model after adding 25% of change in debtors 
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Coefficient 
 
228188.435 0.264 -0.037 97.68% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
 
The R
2
 decreased by a small amount compared to the decrease in R
2
 when 5% of total 
assets is added (87.63% in Table 3.11 compared to 97.68%). This shows that the added 
manipulation is much smaller in this case and represents a strong challenge to the model 
to detect small amounts of earnings management. 
The residuals from the standard Jones model in Table 3.17 are regressed on the dummy 
variable (PART). If the residuals are detecting the manipulation, then the coefficient on 
(PART) should be (0.25), which is the added amount. Results for regression of the 
residuals on (PART) are shown in the following table. 
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Table 3.18  
Results for regressing residuals on PART 
ititit PART
  α β Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
-0.006 0.010 28.24% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000)  
ε it is residuals taken from the Jones model for firm і in year t, after adding 25% of change in debtors. 
PART it: dummy variable that equals 1 for firms where earnings management is inserted by researcher, 0 
otherwise.  
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
The dummy variable is significant but the coefficient does not equal the added amount. 
This is additional evidence that the residuals are poor measures for discretionary 
accruals. Therefore, discretionary accruals will be measured by multiplying the dummy 
variable with change in debtors (PART*∆Debtors). This composite variable will be 
added as an additional regressor to the standard Jones model. Thus, total accruals will 
equal nondiscretionary accruals plus discretionary accruals, and any remaining residuals 
will only represent white noise. Results for this model are displayed in the following 
table. 
Table 3.19  
Results for the model with measure of discretionary accruals as additional regressor 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it PART*∆DRS it Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
224124 0.244 -0.037 0.250 100.00% 
p value
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
∆DRS: change in debtors for firms i in year t, 
PART: dummy variable equals 1 for firms where earnings management is added by the researcher, 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
p values are set at 1% significance level. 
The coefficient on the discretionary accruals measure is the exact amount of 
manipulation added (25%). Additionally, the R
2
 is 1 again, which indicates that this 
composite variable picked up all the added earnings management.   
In conclusion, the results show that when the inserted manipulation does not disturb the 
Jones regression slope line, then the residuals are a fair proxy for the inserted 
manipulation. On the other hand, when the inserted manipulation is not well dispersed 
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across the sample, the Jones regression slope line is disturbed and the residuals become 
a poor proxy for the manipulation. When the inserted manipulation are well dispersed 
but numerous, then the Jones regression line shifts upward and although the ranking of 
the residuals reflects the inserted manipulation, the actual values of the residuals do not. 
However, there is no reason to assume that the manipulation will be spread randomly 
across the sample and that all companies will manipulate earnings in the same amount. 
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3.10 Conclusion: 
Earnings management is one of the most popular research areas in financial accounting. 
The method of utilizing the accrual system to manipulate the reported earnings is quite 
interesting and fascinating for researchers. The main objective of the accrual system is 
to produce accurate measures and reports about the firm’s performance. 
Many methods and models are used in the literature to detect earnings management. The 
noticeable thing from previous studies is all papers examine the reason or the motive to 
understand the source of earnings management. Therefore, most studies look first for 
the motives and incentives and then try to detect earnings management.  
The Jones model is one of the most models used in literature, because its underlying 
concept is very logical; control for normal accruals and any unexplained levels of 
accruals are attributed to earnings management. The problem with the Jones model is its 
application on cross-sectional data. Using the residual term, which will average to zero, 
as the measure for discretionary accruals is not a reliable method, because the model 
does not control for all levels of nondiscretionary accruals, and as a result, it is not the 
best fit model (i.e. does not produce a R
2
 equal to 1). Therefore, the residuals from this 
model might capture noise while trying to measure the discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, the assumption that some companies are manipulating upwards and some 
companies are manipulating downwards simultaneously, is neither a justified nor a 
reasonable assumption. Companies in the same industry usually follow each other as a 
herding reaction, if an opportunity to manipulate for one company is available, then 
what will stop other companies to follow (see Fields et al., 2001, pp. 289).  
To assume, for the sake of argument, that the residuals are a good proxy for 
discretionary accruals, it still does not tell the whole story of how earnings management 
takes place. In other words, it will not give any indications on the instrument(s) 
managers use for the purpose of manipulation. More information is needed at this stage 
of earnings management literature to specify the accrual accounts managers use 
frequently to manipulate, and to determine whether they use one or a number of 
accruals.  
In this research, the Jones model is extended to contain an accrual account and an 
incentive that will replace the residuals as a measure for earnings management. By 
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doing so, the instrument used to manipulate earnings can be examined. The model 
further contains a variable that represents the incentive that drives earnings 
management, which narrows down the detection for only companies that share equal 
motives. Thus, the model used in this research is assumed to tell the whole story; it 
shows the variables for the normal level of accruals, it specifies the extra (abnormal) 
level of accruals and it determines the incentive that is motivating managers to 
manipulate. 
The model is applied using cross-sectional data from listed companies in the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE). The main market is the first market and it contains the most 
profitable companies, but companies that report losses three years in a row will be 
removed from the first market and listed in the second market. If that occurs, it can 
damage the firm’s profitable image as well as the reputation of the manager. Thus, this 
represents a major incentive, and managers will do everything and anything to report a 
profit, even if the profit figure is above zero by 1 JD.  
The results support the earnings management hypothesis, and shows that companies 
listed in the first market manage their earnings immediately in the year following a loss 
using debtors as the instrument for this purpose. Debtors capture revenue manipulation 
by early sales recognition and/or deflating bad debt expenses. The manipulation is 
mainly achieved through early recognition of sales and as a result the sales account in 
the next period is abnormally low. However, some companies did not manipulate after 
reporting a loss and as a result they reported a second loss. Eventually they did report 
profits and remained listed in the first market although the profits are not a result of 
accrual manipulation. Simulation tests show that the model of this research detects and 
measures earnings management better than the standard Jones model. The tests show 
that using a variable to measure discretionary accruals as an additional regressor in the 
model detects all the manipulation in comparison to residuals. These tests also provide 
additional evidence that the residuals are poor measures of discretionary accruals. The 
residuals become a good proxy for the discretionary accruals only if the manipulation is 
spread randomly across the sample. However, there is no reason to assume that 
manipulation is spread across the sample; it could be confined to a certain group of 
companies. 
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An important finding one can conclude from the previous research in earnings 
management is that there is no “best” model. Any approach or model has weaknesses as 
well as strengths, and any one of them can be used. But what is more important is the 
need to understand the accounting practices of the industry under examination. 
Researchers must familiarize themselves with the specific accruals that distinguish the 
sample to define the instruments that managers of that industry can use to manipulate 
earnings. For example, in intense fixed assets companies, working capital accruals are 
small and immaterial, so one would expect that manipulation might take place in 
accounts related to fixed assets, such as profits and losses when replacing an asset. On 
the other hand, in retailing companies the debtor’s turnover rate is less than three days 
because their sales are mostly in cash, so one might place more emphasis on the change 
in stock. 
Earnings management is manipulating the accruals and the economic events; accruals 
can be manipulated by over/under estimating them, for example, through changes in 
allowances or accounting choices, whereas the economic events can be manipulated by 
deferring transactions and/or recognising other transaction prematurely. Based on that, 
researchers must allocate enough time and effort to carefully examine the business and 
accounting environment of the industry under examination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4: Pricing discretionary accruals 
 
87 
 
Chapter Four 
Pricing Discretionary Accruals in Amman Stock Market 
4.1 Introduction: 
In chapter two, the Jones model is extended to estimate discretionary accruals using an 
explicit variable rather than using the residuals. Chapter three provides evidence that 
companies listed in the first market are managing their earnings directly after reporting 
a loss. In this chapter, the results found in chapter three are extended. The purpose is to 
examine and determine whether the market attaches a value to and prices the 
discretionary accruals. 
Net income is decomposed into three main components; cash flows from operations, 
nondiscretionary accruals, and discretionary accruals. Each component adds or 
contributes information relating to the economic value of the company. However, since 
discretionary accruals are an outcome of earnings management, then they should add no 
information about firms’ performance. Furthermore, discretionary accruals might distort 
the value relevance and information content of the income figure. Additionally, net 
income can be presented in different forms using its components. Adding operating cash 
flows to nondiscretionary accruals gives nondiscretionary income, which is the net 
income before the manager manipulates earnings. Net income can also be expressed as 
nondiscretionary income plus discretionary accruals. This form shows the two parts of 
earnings that is classified according to managerial discretion and control. 
The chapter’s main objective is to examine the extent to which the market understands 
the different components of net income, and that net income can be expressed in 
different forms. If the market actually understands this, then they will treat discretionary 
accruals as empty information shells, even if they do not understand that they are a 
product of manipulation. On the other hand, if the market prices discretionary accruals, 
then it could suggest that the manipulation taking place in the first market is indeed 
misleading investors. This will also suggest that the market cannot differentiate between 
the components of net income.  
Thus, if the market prices discretionary accruals, it indicates that the manipulation is 
successful on two levels; they remain listed in the first market, and they present an 
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optimistic image of the company’s value. Moreover, pricing discretionary accruals will 
indicate the irrationality the market follows to price the components of net income. The 
discretionary accruals are only a result of manipulation and contain no information 
relevant to the true value of the company. Therefore, pricing the discretionary accruals 
for listed companies in the ASE is evidence of an inefficient market. 
Results show that the market is pricing the discretionary accruals as a component of net 
income. The discretionary accruals are a result of earnings management for firms 
reversing to profits in order to remain listed in the first market. Results show that not 
only the market prices these discretionary accruals but also attaches a higher weight to 
them compared to nondiscretionary accruals and operating cash flow. This suggests that 
the market is overacting to discretionary accruals.  
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4.2 Literature review: 
Dechow (1994) examines the importance of earnings as the summary measure of firm 
performance relative to realized cash flows (or net cash flow), which is an alternative 
performance measure. The paper argues that since realized cash flows suffer from 
timing and matching problems makes it less informative. Earnings however, are the 
product of the recognition and matching principles. These two principles give rise to 
accruals; hence, earnings through accruals mitigate timing and matching problems and 
are a better measure than realized cash flows.    
Managers, through discretionary accruals, signal private information that can reduce the 
information asymmetry between the firm and other contracting parties which improves 
earnings to become a better measure. However, managers can also opportunistically 
manipulate accruals for private gains. As a result, to the extent earnings suffer from 
manipulation makes earnings less reliable as a performance measure, thus realized cash 
flows becomes a better measure. Accruals are required to be both objective and reliable 
to reduce the probability of managers providing false information, but by doing so, it 
could also reduce the usefulness of reported earnings in circumstances where 
management have private information. The usefulness of earnings will depend on this 
issue. 
Dechow (1994) evaluates and compares the two performance measures against stock 
price performance, because it encompasses information in realized cash flows and 
earnings relating to firm performance: 
 
 
The results of the paper shows that over short time intervals, earnings suffer less than 
realized cash flows from timing and matching problems and as the time interval 
increase differences between earnings and realized cash flows becomes smaller. An 
important issue here is as time interval increases, the contemporaneous association 
between stock prices and realized cash flows becomes stronger, but so will the 
contemporaneous association between stock price and earnings. Thus, earnings will be 
superior to cash flows over shorter and longer time intervals. The differences between 
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realized cash flows and earnings results from the level of credit sales and the level of 
cash collections from previous years credit sales. 
Another important result Dechow (1994) documents is the larger the magnitude of total 
accruals in absolute value the lower the contemporaneous association between realized 
cash flows and stock returns, and the longer the operating cycle the lower the 
contemporaneous association between realized cash flows and stock price performance. 
Since earnings is a superior measure to cash flows over short and long periods, the 
paper further investigates the reason of this superiority, and finds that accruals are the 
underlying reason. Operating accruals are decomposed into change in working capital 
accruals and long term operating accruals.  Results show that as the absolute value of 
long term accruals increase there is no decline in the association between stock returns 
and cash flow from operations. However, as the absolute magnitude of working capital 
accruals increase the association between cash flow from operations and stocks returns 
declines. This result shows that long term operating accruals play a less important role 
in mitigating timing and matching problems relative to working capital accruals. 
Subramanyam (1996) investigates the pricing of discretionary accruals by the market. 
Accruals are decomposed into nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals using cross-
sectional versions of the Jones and modified Jones models.  
Univariate regressions are conducted to determine which of the performance measures 
explain stock returns the most. Three univariate regressions of returns on earnings and 
earnings components are carried out; earnings are decomposed into cash flows from 
operations, nondiscretionary earnings and discretionary earnings. This test is to assess 
the relative information content of the three measures (firm and time subscripts are 
omitted for convenience):  
 
 
 
If accruals are increasing value relevance then by moving from operating cash flows to 
net income should increase the explanatory power of the model. However, if 
discretionary accruals are noise then no increase should be observed when moving from 
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nondiscretionary income to net income. Results show that nondiscretionary income is 
more value relevant than operating cash flows but less value relevant than net income, 
this confirms that both discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals contributes value 
relevance to earnings. The three models are assessed in terms of the increase in 
explanatory power and in the coefficients values. 
Subramanyam (1996) also examines the incremental information content of the 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components of earnings by regressing stock returns 
on earnings’ components in multivariate models. This test examines the incremental 
information content of net income components; also it shows the weight attached to 
each component (firm and time subscripts are omitted for convenience): 
 
 
 
 
Where CFO is operating cash flows, TA is total accruals, NDA is nondiscretionary 
accruals, NDNI is nondiscretionary income, and DA is discretionary accruals. 
Results indicate that nondiscretionary accruals have incremental information content 
over operating cash flow, and discretionary accruals have incremental explanatory 
power over nondiscretionary income. Subramanyam (1996) conducts further tests to 
discriminate between whether the pricing of discretionary accruals is due to market 
efficiency and therefore prices discretionary accruals because it improves the ability of 
earnings to reflect firm performance, or whether discretionary accruals distort earnings 
because of earnings management. The results support the first explanation that 
discretionary accruals are improving the earnings persistence and predictability through 
income smoothing.  
Sloan (1996) examines the nature of the information contained in accruals and cash 
flows as the two components of earnings, and how this information is reflected in stock 
prices. The main argument of the paper is to determine if the market fully incorporates 
available information in the stock price.  
 Chapter 4: Pricing discretionary accruals 
 
92 
 
The reasoning of the underlying argument of Sloan (1996) is that the accrual and cash 
flow components of current earnings have different implications to evaluate future 
earnings. In other words, current earnings performance is less likely to persist when it is 
attributable to the accrual component of earnings, while current earnings are more likely 
to persist if they are attributable to the cash flow component of earnings. The paper tests 
this by applying the following model: 
 
Sloan (1996) employs a naïve earnings expectations model to test the efficiency of the 
market, and argues that investors fixate on earnings and fail to distinguish between the 
two components of earnings. The paper assumes if investors fixate on earnings, then 
they will tend to overprice stocks when the accrual component is higher than the cash 
flow component, and vice versa. This mispricing is because the accrual component is 
not fully anticipated by the market. To exploit this mispricing, the paper implements a 
trading strategy taking a long position in stocks of firms with low levels of accruals and 
a short position in stocks of firms with high levels of accruals to generate abnormal 
stock returns. Results indicates that earnings performance attributable to the accrual 
component shows lower persistence than earnings performance attributable to the cash 
flow component, and that investors fail to distinguish fully between the two components 
of earnings. Furthermore, the study finds that firms with relatively high levels of 
accruals experience negative future abnormal returns that are concentrated around future 
earnings announcements. The opposite is also true, firms with low levels experience 
positive future abnormal returns. The results of this paper are inconsistent with the 
efficient market view that all publicly available information is incorporated in stock 
prices. 
Collins and Hribar (2000) compares two prominent accounting based market anomalies, 
the post earnings announcement drift and the accrual anomaly, to determine whether 
they capture the same market inefficiency or whether they represent different anomalies. 
If the latter is the case, then both anomalies reveal more market mispricing than has 
been documented. 
The post earnings announcement drift literature suggests that the market under reacts to 
earnings surprises. On the other hand, the accrual anomaly suggests that the market 
overreacts to earnings that contain large accruals component for both extreme negative 
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and positive accruals. Results show that abnormal returns are associated with both a 
quarterly accruals strategy and an unexpected earnings-based strategy, and both 
strategies appear to capture different types of mispricing. Additionally, results show that 
by combining both strategies, abnormal returns increases significantly with no 
additional risk in terms of magnitude or frequency of loss. Moreover, the study shows 
that the drift is substantially greater when the level of accruals is in the opposite 
direction of earnings surprises. Conversely, the drift mitigates or disappears all together 
if the accruals are in same direction as the earnings surprises. 
Xie (2001) examines the mispricing of abnormal accruals in general conditions 
regardless whether the abnormality results from earnings management or not. The paper 
uses two methods to test the rational pricing of abnormal accruals with respect to their 
one-year-ahead earnings implications.  
The first method is the Mishkin test to compare statistically the valuation coefficient 
with the forecasting coefficient of the abnormal accruals. The decision rule of this test is 
if the valuation coefficient is larger (smaller) than the forecasting coefficient then the 
market overprices (under prices) the abnormal accruals, and by using the forecasting 
coefficient, the author measures the persistence of abnormal accruals. The second 
method is the hedge-portfolio test to form a portfolio long in firms in the most negative 
decile and short in firms in the most positive decile of current abnormal accruals.  
The results of both tests provide evidence that the market overprices abnormal accruals 
relative to their association with one-year-ahead earnings, but does not materially 
misprice normal accruals. An important issue this paper addresses is the error captured 
along with managerial discretion in the Jones model, and by conducting sensitivity 
analysis, the paper controls for major unusual accruals and non-articulation events to 
reduce the error in the discretionary accruals measure. 
DeFond and Park (2001) investigate the role of accruals in pricing securities by testing 
whether the market’s pricing of earnings surprises anticipates the reversing implications 
of abnormal accruals. The study argues that the reversing of abnormal accruals should 
be priced differentially by the market since they will have little or no effect on life time 
earnings.  
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DeFond & Park (2001) expects the reported magnitude of earnings surprises, that 
contain abnormal accruals, to differ from the underlying magnitude that the market 
prices. This is because the market perception of the earnings surprises depends on the 
effect of abnormal accruals and the sign of earnings surprises. 
Income increasing abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of good news earnings 
(positive surprise) and the market infers that the underlying surprise is actually smaller 
than reported. Additionally, income decreasing abnormal accruals suppresses the 
magnitude of good news earnings surprise, and therefore the market infers that the 
underlying surprise is larger than reported. This is tested by examining the size of the 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for good news firms with income-increasing 
abnormal accruals and income-decreasing abnormal accruals.  On the other hand, the 
market prices firms suppressing the magnitude of bad news earnings (negative 
surprises) higher than firms exaggerating the magnitude of bad news through income 
decreasing abnormal accruals. Thus, the ERCs for firms suppressing negative surprises 
through income-increasing abnormal accruals should be smaller than for firms 
exaggerating negative surprises.  
Results are consistent with the paper’s predictions; the ERC is significantly larger for 
good news firms reporting income-decreasing abnormal accruals than for firms 
reporting income-increasing abnormal accruals. As for bad news firms, the ERC is 
significantly higher for firms reporting income-increasing abnormal accruals than for 
firms reporting income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Evidence show that, to a limited 
degree, the market anticipates the reversing implications of abnormal accruals, which is 
consistent with prior evidence that the market does not fully adjust for other 
implications of accruals based earnings. DeFond & Park (2001) concludes that market 
participants (at least) partially adjust for suspected earnings management, if the 
abnormal accruals reflect intentional misstatements. 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) build on the results found in Sloan (1996). The paper aims to 
identify the components of the accrual measure used by Sloan (1996) that explains the 
market inefficiency. The paper finds that changes in stock levels (inventory) exhibit a 
consistent and substantial relation with future returns, and tries to explain the link 
between stock changes and abnormal returns.   
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Thomas & Zhang (2002) finds firms with stock increases (decreases) have higher 
(lower) profitability, growth and returns over the past five years, but these trends 
reverse after extreme changes in the stock levels. Moreover, firms with stock increases 
(decreases) experience stock decreases (increases) in the past year although profitability 
increases (decreases) in both years.  
Additionally, results show that the observed abnormal returns following the changes in 
stock are concentrated at subsequent quarterly earnings announcements and are related 
to predictable earnings surprises reported at those announcements. Thomas & Zhang 
(2002) decomposes stock into its components (raw material, finished goods and work in 
process) and finds a higher relation between abnormal returns and changes in raw 
material stock. 
Thomas & Zhang (2002) main conclusion is both profitability reversal and stock 
changes are caused by demand shifts. The paper suggests two main reasons for the 
masking of profitability shift through contemporaneous reported profitability; one 
reason is due to earnings manipulation through misstating stock balances. 
Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate the information content of insider trading about 
earnings quality. The paper examines whether firm-periods in which the direction of the 
accruals contradicts the direction of the insider trading have lower earnings quality.  
Additionally, Beneish & Vargus (2002) examines whether firm-periods have higher 
earnings quality if the direction of the accruals confirms the direction of the insider 
trading. Finally, the paper investigates if the market misprices high vs. low quality 
accruals. The paper also looks for a link between low earnings quality and earnings 
management. 
Results show that income increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms 
with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal 
insider selling, relative to firms with no abnormal insider trading. This suggests that 
insider trading information is useful in ex ante identifying high or low quality for 
income-increasing accrual firms. 
Pricing tests reveal that the accrual mispricing is mostly due to the mispricing of 
income-increasing accruals, where they appear to be overpriced when managers engage 
in abnormal selling or do not trade at all. On the other hand, they are rationally priced 
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when managers engage in abnormal buying. Overall, the market prices all income 
increasing accruals believing they are of high quality.  
Finally, Beneish & Vargus (2002) shows that the lower persistence of income 
increasing accruals accompanied by abnormal insider selling is partly attributable to 
earnings management, other explanations could rise from economic changes 
surrounding the firm, making accruals less informative about one year ahead earnings. 
Collins et al. (2003) examines the role of investor sophistication in assessing the 
valuation implications of accruals. The paper is based on the extended functional 
fixation hypothesis (EFFH) which states that a firm’s stock is sometimes set by 
marginal investors who are relatively sophisticated in their interpretation of accounting 
data, while other times prices are set by unsophisticated marginal investors who are less 
knowledgeable about the properties of accounting data.  
Based on that, there is a greater likelihood of mispricing a security when an earnings 
signal comprised of accruals and cash flows is intercepted by an unsophisticated 
investor. Likewise, mispricing is less if a sophisticated investor sets the prices.  
Collins et al. (2003) uses institutional investors as a proxy for sophisticated investors, 
because they have greater resources and knowledge for gathering and interpreting 
information contained in the financial reports, especially when compared to individual 
investors. Consistent with previous research, the paper uses the Mishkin test and the 
hedge portfolio test to examine the mispricing anomaly.  
Results from both tests show that the degree of accrual mispricing is substantially less 
for firms with high institutional ownership relative to firms with low institutional 
ownership. Furthermore, the accrual based hedge portfolio tests show that the one-year-
ahead hedge returns are significantly smaller for firms with high institutional ownership 
relative to low institutional ownership. However, the hedge returns for high institutional 
ownership firms are still significant and positive, which suggests the existence of some 
mispricing, even in the presence of sophisticated investors.  
Desai et al. (2004) investigates the relation between the value glamour anomaly 
documented in the finance literature and the accruals anomaly documented in the 
accounting literature. The paper aims at presenting simple explanations of the two 
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anomalies because they appear to be associated with the market’s inability to process 
related accounting information. 
Desai et al. (2004) documents an association between accruals and future returns after 
controlling for four proxies for value glamour: past sales growth, book to market, 
earnings to price and cash flow to price. However, the paper uses a different measure of 
operating cash flows in the cash flow to price ratio than the one used in past finance 
literature.  
Cash flow from operations is measured in finance literature as earnings plus 
depreciation and thereby assumes that deprecation is the only significant accrual that 
needs to be added back. This measurement ignores working capital accruals because the 
paper considers it to be an incorrect measure. Alternatively, operating cash flows are 
measured as earnings plus depreciation minus working capital accruals, and create a 
new variable labelled operating cash flow to price. Desai et al. (2004) assumes that this 
new variable is more powerful and comprehensive and subsumes the mispricing 
attributed to all other value glamour proxies related to future returns. 
The results support the notion that the accruals mispricing is in fact the value glamour 
anomaly. In other words, the accrual anomaly and the value glamour anomaly are two 
sides for the same coin. But this interpretation differs according to the measure of 
operating cash flows in the operating cash flow to price ratio. If operating cash flows are 
measured as earnings plus depreciation (as measured in finance literature), then the 
results will suggest that both anomalies captures different sources of mispricing. On the 
other hand, if operating cash flows are measured as in this paper, then results will 
support the interpretation that both anomalies are in fact the same anomaly. 
Callen and Segal (2004) investigate the relative impact of accrual news, cash flow news 
and expected-return news on unexpected changes in current period stock returns. The 
focus on changes rather than levels is to form an understanding of the relative 
importance of the three factors in driving current stock returns.  
Callen & Segal (2004) looks into expected return news (i.e. expected future discount 
rates) because it affects changes of equity returns, similar to the affect caused by 
accruals and cash flows. The study analyse the value relevance of accruals to determine 
the effect, if any, of the expected accruals reversal on current stock returns, and to 
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determine the proportion of total variance in current unexpected returns that can be 
explained by accruals news relative to other factors. Additionally, the paper develops a 
variance decomposition framework to include accruals by incorporating the Feltham-
Ohlson clean surplus model to compute the relative impact of accruals news and 
expected returns news on unexpected changes in current returns. 
Results from the Feltham-Ohlson model highlight the importance of accruals news and 
dominates expected-return news in driving stock returns. Furthermore, operating 
income news significantly dominates both expected-return news and free cash flow 
news in driving returns. Results also reveal that both accrual earnings news and cash 
flow earnings news are equally significant drivers of stock returns. However, when 
disaggregating the variance decomposition by control variables (e.g. firm size), results 
show that accruals earnings news is a more important factor than cash flow earnings 
news in driving current returns. 
Richardson et al. (2005) investigates the relation between accrual reliability and 
earnings persistence. The paper builds on the evidence found in Sloan (1996) that the 
accrual component is less persistent than the cash flow component and attributes this 
difference to the greater subjectivity of accruals. The paper draws a link between 
Sloan’s (1996) notion of subjectivity and the accounting concept of reliability. 
Richardson et al. (2005) models the implications of reliability for earnings persistence 
to predict whether less reliable accruals result in lower earnings persistence. Empirical 
tests employ a comprehensive categorization of accounting accruals in which each 
accrual category is rated according to its reliability. 
Results show that less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence, and stock 
prices act as if investors do not anticipate the lower persistence of less reliable accruals 
which results in significant security mispricing. Overall, the results suggest that there 
are significant costs associated with incorporating less reliable accrual information in 
financial statements.  
Core et al. (2006) examines the manager’s trading decisions correlation with trading 
strategies suggested by the operating accruals and the post-earnings announcement drift 
(SUE) anomalies. Managers are in the best position to observe pricing deviations from 
fundamental value, because of the role they play in the financial reporting process. 
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Investor’s inability to recognise the differential persistence of accruals and cash flows 
gives rise to the accrual anomaly. On the other hand, managers (as insiders) have the 
advantage of better understanding the firm’s accrual process.  
Core et al. (2006) is based on empirical evidence that shows managers are well 
informed about their firm’s future expected cash flows and the cost of capital, and by 
using this information they make decisions about share repurchase and individual 
trading. The main focus of this paper is the correlation between the information 
managers uses to generate abnormal returns and the anomalous public information used 
to form trading strategies according to the accruals and SUE anomalies. 
Results show corroborative evidence for the accruals anomaly; repurchase and insider 
trading behaviour of managers’ varies consistently with the information underlying 
trading strategy. Particularly, low (high) accruals firms repurchase more (less) shares, 
and managers of low (high) accruals firms buy more (less) shares on their personal 
accounts. However, the study did not find any evidence for the SUE anomaly. 
Chan et al. (2006) examines the level of earnings quality as a predictive measure for 
future movements in stock prices. Earnings quality is affected by the level of accruals, 
thus the paper explores several hypotheses to explain the association between accruals 
and subsequent stock returns. Managerial manipulation gives rise to accruals and since 
the market is fixated on the bottom line income, investors can be fooled. On the other 
hand, high accruals could be a result of past high growth in sales, and managers build 
up stock and other working capital items. As a consequence, the market overprices 
firms with high accruals estimating (overoptimistically) future growth rates. Another 
explanation the paper explores is the slow reaction to the information content of 
accruals, which results in a subsequent negative stock prices reaction.  
Chan et al. (2006) findings show that accruals are related negatively to future returns. 
Furthermore, by examining the time series behaviour of accruals and operating 
performance for high accrual firms, the paper documents evidence of earnings 
management. Additionally, they find that the nondiscretionary accruals do not predict 
future stock returns, a similar result found in Xie (2001). This result is not consistent 
with the hypothesis of market overpricing firms with past future sales growth. 
Therefore, the discretionary accruals are the main contributor to the predictability of 
stock returns.  
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Furthermore, Chan et al. (2006) document that accruals are the leading indicator of the 
firm’s performance, in the absence of manipulation, and the market tends to under react 
to these indicators. To provide robustness to the results, the paper compares 
homogenous sets of firms within an industry, and finds the higher the accruals, the 
lower the returns. A similar result is obtained from UK stocks as well. 
Mashruwala et al. (2006) examines the barriers that prevent arbitrageurs from taking 
trading positions to eliminate the effect of accruals mispricing. The paper examines two 
explanations; the first is the lack of similar substitutes. These substitutes’ shares have 
returns that are highly correlated with returns of shares that are subject to accruals 
mispricing. The second explanation is whether shares suffering from the accrual 
anomaly have higher transaction costs.  
Mashruwala et al. (2006) uses idiosyncratic portion of a stock’s volatility that cannot be 
limited by holding offsetting positions in other stocks and indexes as a proxy for the 
absence of similar or close substitutes. Results show that future abnormal returns 
stemming from accrual based trading positions are higher in stocks that lack close 
substitutes (using stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility). Furthermore, the study 
finds that higher returns from the accrual spread portfolios are found in stocks with 
lower stock prices and lower trading volume. Therefore, transaction costs places further 
limitations on arbitrage. The paper does not impose a different interpretation to the 
findings of Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), that the market is actually fooled by accrual 
manipulation; it however, suggests that even if the market understands the 
consequences of manipulating accruals on future earnings, abolishing the mispricing 
will be very difficult.  
Lev and Nissim (2006) examines the timeliness and the magnitude of institutional 
investors’ reaction to accruals information using quarterly institutional ownership data 
compared with monthly returns patterns. The paper distinguishes between institutions 
that trade frequently in an attempt to profit from short term price changes (transient 
institutions) and all other institutions (non-transient institutions), in order to determine 
whether institutional trading lead or lag the accruals related price changes.  
Evidence shows a negative relation between the level of accruals in a given year and the 
change in ownership transient institution held during the last quarter of that year, as well 
as in each of the subsequent three quarters. Therefore, transient institutions investment’s 
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is related to accruals information, a portion by quarterly reports information and the rest 
by annual accrual information. Additionally, when comparing the intensity of accruals 
related investment between two periods (i.e. between the 1980’s and 1990’s); results 
show that transient institutions, over time, enhance the sophistication of their trading on 
accruals information. On the other hand, non-transient institutions accruals related 
investments is not existent in the 1980’s and concentrated in the first quarter of the 
following year during the 1990’s. Furthermore, Lev & Nissim (2006) documents an 
actively and expeditiously trade by institutions on the information in accruals, rather 
than a reaction to the subsequent stock price changes as documented by Sloan (1996). 
The paper concludes that arbitraging away the accruals anomaly is hindered by various 
structural and cost factors, which are unlikely to fade away in the near future. 
Dechow and Ge (2006) argues that the applicable accounting rules reflected in accruals 
differ for firms increasing or reducing their asset basis and that this has implications for 
earnings persistence. They use this argument to examine the accrual anomaly 
documented by Sloan (1996). Basically, the paper investigates the implications of 
balance sheet adjustments relating to special items to explain the accrual anomaly. 
Dechow & Ge (2006) finds that low accrual firms with large negative special items 
consistently earn higher positive returns than other low accrual firms. Moreover, when 
splitting the lowest decile of accruals into those firms reporting special items and those 
that are not, the study finds that special-item firms earn a size adjusted return of 11.7% 
over the following year. On the other hand, firms with no special items earn a size 
adjusted return of only 1.4%. The paper also finds that over 11 of the 15 years 
examined, special-item firms with low accruals outperform other low accrual firms. 
Overall, Dechow & Ge (2006) main findings suggest that firms recording special items 
help to identify the end of the negative price momentum cycle. These firms have 
performed poorly and the recording of special items is an indicative of management 
taking action to turn the firm’s performance around. As a consequence, investors 
overweight the probability that the firm will be unsuccessful. Although special-item 
firms with low accruals end up turning themselves around at higher rates than expected, 
accompanied with improved stock price performance. 
Kraft et al. (2006) aims at highlighting and quantifying the impact of robustness tests on 
causal inference drawn from trading strategies based on accrual related information. The 
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paper argues that robustness tests are not typically performed in prior papers on the 
accrual anomaly.  
Kraft et al. (2006) also argues that researchers should be careful about deleting 
observations that result from unusual events or errors when testing a trading strategy. 
This could lead to biased measures of portfolio return performance and incorrect 
inference about market efficiency.  
Kraft et al. (2006) tests the robustness of the results in the accrual mispricing literature 
by using the least trimmed squares (LTS) procedure and also by using standard 
robustness tests that are commonly applied in the accounting literature. Both tests 
produce similar results. The paper performs additional robustness tests by excluding a 
small number of firm-year observations, and finds that there is a U-shape relation 
between buy-and-hold abnormal returns and total accruals. This U-shape relation is 
inconsistent with the functional fixation hypothesis found in Sloan’s (1996) study as 
well as in other accrual anomaly studies.  
Kraft et al. (2006) concludes, based on these results, that the accrual anomaly is unlikely 
to be investors’ inability to process accounting information, as suggested by the 
functional fixation hypothesis.  
Pincus et al. (2007) examines the accrual anomaly across 20 countries and whether its 
occurrence is associated with country level accounting and institutions structures. The 
study conducts the Mishkin test to document the mispricing of accruals outside the U.S 
and according to legal tradition (i.e. common law vs. code law). The study also uses 
country level data to test a set of conjectures relating the mispricing of accruals to cross-
country differences in accounting and institutional structures. Countries are categorised 
according to three characteristics: legal tradition and the extent of constraint on insider 
trading; extent of accrual accounting permitted and the strength of shareholders 
protections to mitigate earnings management; characteristics of equity markets. 
Results show that the accrual anomaly is more likely to occur in common law legal 
tradition countries and where more extensive use of accrual accounting is permitted. 
Additionally, the accrual anomaly occurs more in countries where there is lower 
concentration of share ownership and where there are weaker outside shareholders 
rights. Furthermore, results suggest that the accrual anomaly is due to the use of 
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accruals to manage earnings. The reason it persists is because the absence of close 
substitutes for mispriced stocks, which imposes a barrier to arbitrage. 
Zhang (2007) investigates the accruals ability to capture fundamental investment and 
growth in working capital. The paper examines different implications of persistence and 
investment in the context of the accrual anomaly. In other words, the paper provides an 
in-depth understanding of the underlying cause of the accrual anomaly by examining 
cross-sectional variation in the anomaly based on a firm’s business model.  
Zhang (2007) focuses on the different information content of accruals across 
industries/firms to generate different cross-sectional implications based on two 
competing views: the investment view and the persistence view. A key difference in the 
paper’s approach from previous research is examining employee growth, which is not 
an accounting variable, thus it is not related to the accounting based persistence 
argument.  
Under the investment view, accruals capture fundamental investment in working capital 
accruals, which co-varies with employee growth as well as other growth attributes. On 
the other hand, the persistence argument views accruals as a component of earnings and 
are less persistent than cash flows and therefore investors misestimate accruals 
persistence. 
Zhang (2007) provides empirical evidence supporting the investment argument. In other 
words, the accrual anomaly varies across industries/firms in a predictable way based on 
the co-variation between accruals and employee growth. Hence, when accruals co-vary 
highly with employee growth, accruals can predict future stock returns. Conversely, 
when the accruals do not co-vary with employee growth, the accrual anomaly is weaker. 
On the other hand, the results do not support the persistence argument and shows that 
the magnitude of the accrual anomaly increases with the persistence of accrual relative 
to cash flows. Therefore, these results support the notion that the accrual anomaly is 
mostly attributable to the fundamental investment information contained in accruals 
rather than to the lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows. 
Kraft et al. (2007) illustrates how the omitted variables problem affects inference drawn 
from the Mishkin test in accounting settings, which probably leads to incorrect 
inference about the mispricing of accruals documented in past literature. The paper 
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compares results obtained from the Mishkin test to those obtained from applying 
conventional regression tests (i.e. OLS). 
Kraft et al. (2007) argues that although the Mishkin test has been used widely in 
accounting literature, certain aspects of the test appear to be not understood completely 
by accounting researchers, and thus incorrect inferences has been drawn in prior 
research. One aspect of the Mishkin test that has been misunderstood is whether or not 
omitting variables from the forecasting equation biases test of market efficiency.  
Kraft et al. (2007) shows that the coefficients of the Mishkin test’s forecasting and 
pricing equations are sensitive to the exclusion of other explanatory variables. In other 
words, the paper shows how the accrual anomaly disappears by adding additional 
explanatory variables to the forecasting model in the Mishkin test. The paper 
recommends accounting researchers to demonstrate explicitly the advantages of using 
the Mishkin test over OLS in their research settings, or otherwise they should simply 
use the OLS. The paper favours using OLS over the Mishkin test in accounting 
research, especially in market efficiency tests (e.g. pricing accruals rationally). This is 
because of the several advantages of the OLS over the Mishkin test, such as the ease of 
implementation and straightforwardness of including additional explanatory variables, 
also because the OLS is better understood. 
Khan (2008) suggests that mispricing low and high accrual stocks can be explained 
mostly by risk. The paper uses a four factor model motivated by the intertemporal 
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) to measure the risk factors causing the accrual 
anomaly. 
Khan (2008) also uses a two-pass cross sectional regression methodology that produces 
a statistic test to check whether the aggregate pricing error generated by the four factor 
model is different from zero. Moreover, the paper conducts several tests to examine 
whether hedge portfolios can be formed to exploit any individual pricing errors in the 
extreme accrual portfolios. Results show that a considerable portion of the cross-
sectional variation in average returns to high and low accrual firms is due to risk. 
Additionally, results from examining the economic and financial characteristics of 
accrual portfolios provide additional evidence for a risk based explanation for the 
accrual anomaly. The paper’s bottom line conclusion is firms with high low accruals 
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causes’ cross-sectional variation in returns due to higher risk in these firms, but not due 
to the market’s misunderstanding the abnormal accrual effect on earnings.  
4.3 Hypothesis Development: 
This chapter is based on the results presented in the previous chapter. The Jones model 
is extended to include an additional variable to represent the discretionary accruals 
instead of the residuals. The results shows that companies listed in the first market 
manipulate their earnings directly in the period following a loss year.  
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the results reported in the previous chapter to 
examine whether the market prices discretionary accruals. If that is the case, then the 
market is not seeing through the manipulation and is therefore pricing discretionary 
accruals as a component of earnings. In other words, the market is misled by the 
manipulation of earnings. On the other hand, if the discretionary accruals are not priced, 
then it could mean that the market attaches no weight or disregards the discretionary 
accruals. As a result, the market does actually see through the manipulation and 
understands that it is not a component of reported earnings and represents only 
management’s own discretion. If this is the case, then the market rationally prices the 
components of earnings. 
The approach applied here is similar to the one used by Subramanyam (1996), which is 
regressing stock returns on earnings and its components. The only difference here is 
using stock prices as the dependent variable instead of stock returns.  Price models are 
better than return models because they reject more frequently tests for 
heteroskedasticity and model misspecification (Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995). 
Moreover, price models are sufficient to identify and incorporate the effect of historical 
and current accounting information (Darnell & Skerratt, 1989). Therefore, stock prices 
at end of the third month of the fiscal year are regressed on earnings and its 
components. By this time all firms’ financial statements and related information are 
publicly available and will be incorporated in stock prices. Following Subramanyam 
(1996), the tests are designed to evaluate which component of earnings has the most 
incremental information content. Earnings are decomposed into operating cash flows, 
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Each component is priced by the 
market according to its information content. Thus, each component contributes in 
explaining the variation in stock prices in different weights.  
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Two sets of analysis are carried out; the first set is running univariate analysis by using 
three alternative firm performance measures to assess the relative information content of 
each measure: operating cash flows, nondiscretionary income and net income. The first 
model is regressing stock prices on operating cash flows, then in second model stock 
prices are regressed on nondiscretionary income and finally stock prices are regressed 
on net income in the third model. The purpose of this analysis is to examine the 
incremental information of each measure of firm performance. If the market sees 
through the manipulation, then there will be no difference between net income and 
nondiscretionary income (nondiscretionary income= operating cash flows + 
nondiscretionary accruals). That is, if discretionary accruals are noise then no increase 
will be observed when moving from nondiscretionary income to net income. The 
explanatory power of net income will be higher if the market prices discretionary 
accruals as a component of earnings, which leads to irrational pricing. The second set of 
analysis is running multivariate analysis by regressing prices on different components of 
net income. Basically, there are three components of earnings, which are used to form 
four multivariate models. This analysis provides an examination of the incremental 
information continent of the components of net income on how the market attaches a 
weight to each component. Therefore, if the market does not price discretionary accruals 
then the explanatory power of nondiscretionary accruals will be the highest and it will 
explain the variation in stock prices the most.  Subramanyam (1996) assumes that the 
market is efficient in the sense that the investors behave towards discretionary accruals 
as manager’s private information signalled through net income. However, the 
assumption here is the same as in the previous chapter, which is considering 
discretionary accruals as managers’ effort to manipulate reported earnings to achieve 
specific goals (i.e. remain listed in the first market). Therefore, this chapter does not 
examine market efficiency directly, but if the discretionary accruals are not priced then 
a conclusion of market efficiency can be drawn. 
The models in both sets of the analysis are set up to compete as non-nested models to 
examine which model is favourable (better) in explaining stock prices (Subramanyam, 
1996; Dechow, 1994). In past literature, papers implemented the Mishkin test to 
examine if the market rationally prices the accounting numbers. Sloan (1996) 
documents investors’ failure to fully reflect information in the accrual component and 
cash flow component of earnings. The tests used in Sloan (1996) and in Xie (2001) 
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focus more on the issue of market efficiency. However, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method is better understood and easier to implement in accounting settings than 
the Mishkin Test. Moreover, in (OLS) it is easier to include additional explanatory 
variables. The main problem with the Mishkin is the omitted variables problem, which 
is the case when excluding variables from the Mishkin test forecasting and pricing 
equations. This affects the inference drawn from the test in accounting settings (Kraft et 
al., 2007). For non-nested model selection, the J-test suggested by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) can be used to compare between two models. The problem with this 
test is it might lead to accept or reject both models. Moreover, the test lacks power in 
small samples and it tends to reject the null hypothesise, that either model is true, more 
frequently. An alternative test is the likelihood ratio test suggested by Vuong (1989). 
This test is more powerful because it can reject one model in favour of another in 
circumstances where the J-test cannot (Dechow, 1994). Therefore, the competing 
models are compared to each other firstly using general goodness-of-fit criteria such as 
the R
2
 or adjusted R
2
 and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). These criterions do not 
provide statistical tests of hypothesis; therefore the models are compared using the 
Vuong test to indicate which model is better in explaining the variation in the stock 
prices. Another important issue this chapter considers is the scaling issue. Accounting 
variables are usually scaled using total assets (in period t or period t-1), stock prices and 
market value. The scaling is used to reduce heteroskedasticity. The problem with this 
issue is that it follows the researcher’s judgment in choosing the correct deflator, and 
the choice of the deflator is a source of potential misspecification (Christie, 1987). In 
previous return studies, the left hand side is deflated with stock prices in period t-1, 
while the right hand side is deflated using a different variable (e.g. total assets), thus the 
“equation” is deflated with two different variables. Therefore, and since the models are 
basically regression equations, then both sides of the equation should have the same 
deflator. The correct deflator for return models and price models is the market value of 
equity (Easton & Sommers, 2003; Christie, 1987). 
4.4 Measurement of variables
4
: 
Since price models are equivalent to return models for reasons mentioned in section 4.3, 
stock prices reported at the end of March of the fiscal year are multiplied with number 
                                                 
4
 All variables are taken from the financial statements of the companies, same as in chapter 3. Financial 
statements are available for free download from the Amman Stock Exchange website: www.ase.com.jo  
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of shares issued as they appear in the financial statements at the end of March, to 
compute market capitalization or market value of equity: 
                               (eq. 4.1) 
Prices at the end of March will contain all available accounting data, since the fiscal 
year for all listed companies in the ASE ends by December. The nondiscretionary 
accruals and discretionary accruals are estimated using the model developed in the 
previous chapter. The total accruals are computed as the difference between earnings 
before taxes and operating cash flows: 
                                                  (eq. 4.2) 
Total accruals are decomposed into nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals: 
                                               (eq. 4.3) 
Nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals are estimated using the extended 
Jones model developed in chapter two: 
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Where: 
TA it: total accruals for firm і in year t. 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t. 
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t. 
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t. 
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous year, 0 
otherwise. 
A t-1: total assets for firm i in year t, is the scale variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
The analysis in this study is based on the explanatory power of each level of earnings to 
examine whether the market rationally prices the various components of earnings. 
Therefore, net income measured as net income before taxes, is decomposed as the 
following (firm and time subscripts are omitted for convenience): 
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                                               (eq. 4.4) 
Where NI is net income before taxes and CFO is operating cash flows and TA is total 
accruals. Since total accruals can be decomposed into nondiscretionary and 
discretionary accruals, net income is expressed as: 
                                             (eq. 4.5) 
NDA is the nondiscretionary accruals and are estimated as the following: 
                                (eq. 4.6) 
DA is discretionary accruals and is estimated as the product of the change in debtors and 
the dummy variable that represents the incentive: 
                                                       (eq. 4.7) 
Nondiscretionary income is computed as: 
                                                 (eq. 4.8) 
Therefore, if the market does not attach a value to discretionary accruals, i.e. does not 
price DA because they see through the manipulation, then DA and its coefficient will 
equal zero, and there will be no difference in the explanatory power between the 
nondiscretionary income model and the net income model: 
                                    (eq. 4.9) 
                                                    (eq. 4.10) 
To summarise, there are three components of earnings that each contributes differently 
in explaining the variation in stock prices. Furthermore, there are three alternative firms’ 
performance measures: 
First measure:                                                                                          (eq. 4.11) 
Second measure:                                                                                   (eq. 4.12) 
Third measure:                                                  (eq. 4.13) 
The analysis will be based on the components of net income and the three measures of 
performance. Overall, there are three estimated models to compete as non-nested 
 Chapter 4: Pricing discretionary accruals 
 
110 
 
models in the univariate analysis, and four models in the multivariate analysis. Models 
are favoured based on the Vuong test. 
4.5 Hypothesis formulation: 
Companies listed in the first market in the Amman Stock Exchange are motivated to 
report profits and avoid reporting losses. If a company report losses for three 
consecutive years it will be removed from the first market and re-listed in the second 
market. Therefore, companies will manipulate their earnings to report profits. Results 
from the previous chapter reveal that manipulation takes places in the period following 
a loss year immediately.  
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the market understands this motive, 
and considers the manipulation as the outcome of companies’ effort to remain listed in 
the first market. The market in this case will only attach a value to or price the 
components of earnings that contain information relating to the firm’s ability to 
generate cash flows in the future. Hence, the market will exclude discretionary accruals 
component from earnings and will not price them at all. Thus, the main hypothesis to be 
tested in this study is: 
H0: The market understands the manipulation and as result does not attach value to or 
price discretionary accruals. 
The tests applied in this chapter are similar to the tests used in Subramanyam (1996). 
The first set of tests is running univariate analysis, the market value of stocks are 
regressed on operating cash flows, then on nondiscretionary income, and finally on net 
income. The explanatory power of each model is examined to determine which of the 
three performance measures explain the most of the variation in stock prices. Therefore, 
there will be three univariate models: 
Model 1:  
Model 2:  
Model 3:  
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Where 
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price 
with number of issued shares. 
CFOit: operating cash flows for firm i in year t. 
NDINit: nondiscretionary income for firm i in year t, and is the sum of operating cash 
flows and nondiscretionary accruals. 
NIit: net income (earnings) before taxes for firm i in year t. 
Mvit-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce 
heteroskedasticity. 
The explanatory power (i.e. R
2
) and the slope coefficients of these univariate models are 
compared in order to examine the information content of each level of earnings. If the 
nondiscretionary income contains more information through nondiscretionary accruals, 
then the slope coefficient and the explanatory power nondiscretionary income will be 
higher than operating cash flows. Moreover, if the market prices discretionary accruals 
the slope coefficient and the explanatory power of net income will be the highest. 
However, if the market does not price discretionary accruals, then there should be no 
difference between net income and nondiscretionary income, and both slope coefficients 
should be equal. 
The second set of tests is running a multivariate analysis to examine the incremental 
information content of operating cash flows, nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary 
accruals, which are the components of net income. Four models are applied as 
multivariate models; in each model market value is regressed on different components 
of net income. In other words, net income is expressed differently in each model 
according to the components: 
              Model 4:   
              Model 5:   
              Model 6:   
              Model 7:   
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Where; 
NDAit: nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
DAit: discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
TAit: total accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
The slope coefficients of each variable in the same model are compared to each other to 
examine which component of earnings is priced the highest. This examination will 
indicate which component has the highest incremental information content and the 
value weight attached to each component. 
If the market does not price discretionary accruals, then model 7 will be the same as 
model 5. The purpose of running model 4 is to examine whether the market overprices 
total accruals in comparison with operating cash flows. If the market does not price 
discretionary accruals then model 4 will be the same as model 5 and model 7.  
The models from both sets of analysis are set up as competing non-nested models. 
These models are compared based on two criteria; the adjusted R
2
 and AIC (Akaike’s 
Information Criterion) but comparing based on these two criteria does not provide a 
statistic test of the hypothesis. Therefore, the models are compared based on Vuong’s 
likelihood ratio test (Vuong, 1989). The null hypothesis tested using Vuong’s test for 
each comparison is two models are equally close to explaining the variation in stock 
prices, if the null is rejected then the alternative hypothesis that one model is better than 
the other is accepted. 
4.6 Sample and data: 
In the previous chapter, data is collected from a sample of 36 companies from the 
industrial sector from the period 2002 to 2006. Data is arranged based on a cross section 
format producing 180 firm-year observations. All variables are taken directly from the 
financial statements downloaded from the Amman Stock Exchange website. 
The same data is used in this chapter to build on the results found in the previous 
chapter. Stock prices at the end of March are multiplied with the number of outstanding 
shares to compute the market value of equity. The price taken at the end of March 
allows for all available accounting data to be incorporated, since the fiscal year ends in 
December for all firms in the sample.  
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4.7 Descriptive statistics: 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in this study. It can be 
noticed that operating cash flows (median = 0.060) constitutes the highest percentage of 
net income (median= 0.074), and it forms approximately 81% of earnings. Moreover, 
the discretionary accruals (mean= 0.006) is higher than nondiscretionary accruals 
(mean= 0.003), and it is roughly twice as high. Comparing nondiscretionary accruals to 
net income reveals that it forms 86%; the remaining percentage represents discretionary 
accruals. Based on that, it would be expected that the market will place more weight on 
nondiscretionary income than on discretionary accruals, or even disregard them if the 
market does not price discretionary accruals at all. 
Table 4.1   
Descriptive results for key variables 
         
 P 
 
MV 
 
CFO NDIN TA NDAC DA NI 
         
         
 Mean  3.820  1.310  0.078  0.081 -0.004  0.003  0.006  0.085 
 Median  2.380  1.160  0.061  0.064  0.001 -0.003  0.000  0.074 
 Maximum  23.00  6.055  1.770  2.300  1.400  0.650  1.850  1.730 
 Minimum  0.180  0.250 -0.566 -0.605 -1.337 -0.400 -0.619 -0.250 
 Std. Dev.  3.640  0.670  0.197  0.225  0.206  0.097  0.145  0.148 
P: stock prices at end of March for firm i at time t. 
MV: market value computed as prices at end of March multiplied with number of shares issued for firm i at time t. 
CFO is operating cash flows for firm i at time t. 
NDIN: nondiscretionary income for firm i at time t. 
TA: total accruals (net income-CFO) for firm i at time t. 
NDAC: nondiscretionary accruals for firm i at time t. 
DA: discretionary accruals (estimated from modified model in chapter 3) for firm i at time t. 
NI: net income for firm i at time t. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix of the components of net income. Net income 
has the highest correlation with market value (r =80%), whereas nondiscretionary 
income is correlated by 73.4% with market value and operating cash flows and market 
value have 70% correlation. These correlation values give a preliminary indication 
about the importance of each level of earnings.  Discretionary accruals have a higher 
correlation with market value than nondiscretionary accruals (29.7% and 8.9% 
respectively), and this highlights the importance of discretionary accruals. Hence, net 
income, which includes discretionary accruals, has the strongest correlation with market 
value. 
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Table 4.2   
Correlation matrix for key variables 
                  MV DA NDACC NDIN NI TA CFO 
MV  1.000  0.298  0.089  0.734  0.802 -0.279  0.703 
DA  0.299  1.00  0.003  0.208  0.143 -0.154  0.211 
NDACC  0.089  0.003  1.000  0.302  0.049  0.293 -0.225 
NDIN  0.735  0.207  0.302  1.000  0.575 -0.625  0.860 
NI  0.801  0.143  0.048  0.575  1.000  0.052  0.562 
TA  -0.279 -0.154  0.290 -0.625  0.052  1.000 -0.795 
CFO  0.703  0.210 -0.224  0.861  0.562 -0.796  1.000 
MV is market value: prices at end of March multiplied with number of shares issued for firm 
i at time t. 
CFO: Operating cash flows for firm i at time t. 
NDIN: nondiscretionary income for firm i at time t. 
TA: total accruals (net income-CFO) for firm i at time t. 
NDAC: nondiscretionary accruals for firm i at time t. 
DA: discretionary accruals (estimated from modified model in chapter 3) for firm i at time t. 
NI: net income for firm i at time t. 
 
4.8 Results: 
The first set of tests is running univariate analysis, for each measure of performance. 
The test begins by comparing the slope coefficient of each level, then by comparing the 
explanatory power of each model. Results of each model are displayed below. 
Table 4.3  
Univariate results for model 1: Operating cash flows 
  
 
 R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC
 
0.558
 
0.052 0.041 2.010 
(2.230)
* 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
CFOit: operating cash flows for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
: Slope coefficient of operating cash flows. 
 
AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
 
*
t values at a 5% significance level. 
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The slope coefficient of operating cash flow is (0.560), significant at a 5% confidence 
level, which is the first measure of performance. The second measure of performance is 
nondiscretionary income, and has a slope coefficient of (0.670); significant at a 1% 
confidence level. This means that nondiscretionary income have more information 
content than operating cash flows. The net income coefficient is the highest (2.820); 
significant at a 1% confidence level. These results show the importance of total accruals 
generally and discretionary accruals particularly, since net income contains both 
nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals.  
The explanatory power of each model is examined through the adjusted R
2
 and Akaike 
information Criterion (AIC). The adjusted R
2
 and AIC for the first model is 4% and 
2.014 respectively, the nondiscretionary income has a higher adjusted R
2
 (6.5%) and a 
Table 4.4  
Univariate results for model 2: Nondiscretionary income 
  
 
 R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
 
0.674
 
0.076 0.065 1.980 
(3.110)
** 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
NDINit: nondiscretionary income for firm i in year t, and is the sum of operating cash flows and 
nondiscretionary accruals. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
α2: Slope coefficient of nondiscretionary income. 
AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
**
 t values at a 1% significance level. 
Table 4.5  
Univariate results for model 3: Net income 
  
 
 R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
 
2.820
 
0.402 0.395 1.550 
(10.568)
** 
   
 MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
NIit: net income (earnings) for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
: Slope coefficient of net income. 
 
AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
**
 t values at a 1% significance level. 
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lower AIC (1.980)
5
, which indicates that market prices nondiscretionary accruals more 
(slightly) than operating cash flows. The third model has the highest adjusted R
2
 
(39.5%) and the lowest AIC (1.550) which indicates that the market prices total accruals 
higher than both operating cash flows and nondiscretionary accruals. 
The following table summarises the coefficient slope and explanatory power for each 
model. 
Table 4.6  
Summary of the three univariate models 
  Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
Model 1: CFO 0.558 4.0% 2.014 
Model 2: NDIN 0.670 6.5% 1.980 
Model 3: NI 2.820 39.5% 1.550 
CFO: Operating cash flows. 
NDIN: nondiscretionary income. 
NI: net income. 
AIC is Akaike information Criterion, the lower the score the better the model. 
Thus, the market attaches a slightly higher value for nondiscretionary income than for 
operating cash flows, but attaches a much higher value for net income. This indicates 
that the market treats nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals as 
contributing factors to the value relevance of net income. 
The second group of results relate to the multivariate analysis. The purpose of this test 
is to examine the pricing of each component of net income. First, net income is 
decomposed into operating cash flows and total accruals, results are displayed in Table 
4.7. The slope coefficient for total accruals (2.920) is higher than the coefficient of 
operating cash flows (2.870), which indicates that the market attaches a higher value on 
total accruals than on cash flows; this result is consistent with Subramanyam (1996) and 
Dechow (1994). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 When comparing models using Akaike Information Criterion, the lowest score indicates a better model 
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Table 4.7  
Multivariate results for model 4 
  
 
  R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
 
2.870 2.920
 
39.78% 38.76% 1.57 
(9.430)
** 
(10.100)
** 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
CFOit: net income (earnings) for firm i in year t. 
TAit: total accruals for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
 Slope coefficient of operating cash flows. 
 Slope coefficient for total accruals. 
 AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score 
**
 t values at a 1% significance level. 
 
 
Table 4.8  
Multivariate results for model 5 
  
 
  R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
 
0.519 1.260
 
8.450% 6.890% 1.980 
(2.100)
* 
(2.500)
* 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
CFOit: net income (earnings) for firm i in year t. 
NDAit: nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
 Slope coefficient of operating cash flows. 
 Slope coefficient for nondiscretionary accruals. 
AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
*
 t values at a 5% significance level. 
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Table 4.9  
Multivariate results for model 6 
  
 
  R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC
 
0.895 2.290
 
32.380% 31.230% 1.680 
(4.770)
** 
(8.030)
** 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
NDINit: nondiscretionary income (earnings) for firm i in year t. 
DAit: discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
 Slope coefficient of nondiscretionary income. 
 Slope coefficient for discretionary accruals. 
AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
**
 t values at a 1% significance level. 
 
Table 4.10  
Multivariate results for model 7 
  
 
    R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
 
0.789 1.290 2.280 32.770% 31.240% 1.690 
(3.679) 
** 
(2.979) 
** 
(7.960) 
** 
   
MVit: is market value for firm i in year t, and is the product of multiplying share price with number of 
issued shares. 
CFOit: net income (earnings) for firm i in year t. 
NDAit: nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
DAit: discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Mvt-1: market value from period t-1, and is the deflator (scale) variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
 Slope coefficient of operating cash flows. 
 Slope coefficient for nondiscretionary accruals. 
 Slope coefficient for discretionary accruals. 
 
 AIC is Akaike Information Criteria score. 
**
 t values at a 1% significance level. 
  
The next step is decomposing nondiscretionary income into operating cash flows and 
nondiscretionary accruals; this step is an extension for the model 2, where market value 
is regressed on nondiscretionary income. Results in Table 4.8 show that the coefficient 
for nondiscretionary accruals (1.260) is higher than the coefficient for operating cash 
flow (0.519). Therefore, the market is attaching a higher value for nondiscretionary 
accruals than cash flows. The importance of nondiscretionary income (in model 2) is 
because nondiscretionary accruals have more information content. 
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In model 6, market value is regressed on nondiscretionary income and discretionary 
accruals, which is another form of earnings decomposition. The results in Table 4.9 
show that the market attaches a much higher value on the discretionary accruals than on 
nondiscretionary income, bearing in mind that the discretionary accruals are a product 
of earnings manipulation to remain listed in the first market. Thus, if the market is 
efficient, the discretionary accruals will be regarded as useless from an earnings value-
relevance perspective. Consequently, it will not be priced and the slope coefficient will 
not be significant. But the results show that discretionary accruals have more value 
attached by the market than nondiscretionary income. 
Model 7 extends the previous model by decomposing nondiscretionary income into its 
basic components, nondiscretionary accruals and operating cash flows. Market value is 
regressed on both of them, in addition to discretionary accruals. The results of the 
model are shown in Table 4.10. Results show, as before, that the market attaches a 
higher value on discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and operating cash 
flows. The results in this model are an extension for model 3, where market value is 
regressed on net income, and slope coefficient for net income was higher than 
nondiscretionary income and operating cash flows. The results for model 7 can also be 
compared with model 4, where total accruals have a higher slope coefficient than cash 
flows. Hence, total accruals have a higher coefficient because the market is pricing 
discretionary accruals higher than nondiscretionary accruals. The adjusted R
2
 and the 
(AIC) scores for the four models in the multivariate analysis are presented in the 
following table: 
Table 4.11  
Summary comparisons for the multivariate models 
Model R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 AIC 
Model 4: CFO+TA 39.70% 38.70% 1.57 
Model 5: CFO+NDA 8.45% 6.89% 1.98 
Model 6: NDIN+DA 32.38% 31.23% 1.69 
Model 7: CFO+NDA+DA 32.77% 31.24% 1.69 
Discretionary accruals have more incremental information content than 
nondiscretionary accruals; when comparing model 7 and model 6 with model 5, results 
show that the adjusted R
2
 is higher and the AIC is lower for models 7 and 6.  
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4.8.1 Tests for competing non-nested models: 
To compare the models with each other as competing non-nested models, the R
2
 is not 
the proper statistical test. Therefore, the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) is applied to 
examine which model better explains the market value and has more relative 
explanatory power (Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996). The Vuong test (Vuong, 
1989) is based on the Maximum Likelihood method (ML). This method produces 
estimates of the coefficients that are identical to the ones estimated by the Least Squares 
method (LS). The only difference between the two methods is estimating the squared 
residuals (ê
2
). The (LS) method estimates sum of squared residuals (RSS) as: 
 
Where: 
µi
2
 is the squared residuals from derived as µi= Yi – α Xi using the (LS) method 
n is the sample size. 
k is the number of regressors in the model. 
The estimation of RSS by the (ML) method is: 
 
Where: 
ζi
2 
is the squared residuals derived as ζi= Yi – β Xi using the (ML) method 
n is the sample size. 
Thus, the (ML) estimator of RSS is biased. 
To illustrate the Vuong test procedure, the following two models are set as competing 
non-nested models: 
Model1:  
Model 2:  
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Where, Mvit is market value of shares, CFOit is operating cash flows, NIit is net income, 
µi is residuals from the cash flow model and ζi is residuals from the second model. 
The first model is regressing market value on operating cash flows, and the second 
model is regressing market value on net income. This is to determine which of the two 
regressors explains the variation in the shares market value the best. The two models are 
set to compete to determine which model explains the market value of shares the best. 
The null hypothesis being tested is neither model is best in explaining the dependent 
variable. The alternative hypothesis is one model is closer than the other one in 
explaining the dependent variable. 
The first step is to estimate the residuals sum of squares (RSS) using the Maximum 
likelihood (ML) method, as shown above. The next step is to estimate the log likelihood 
function [ln L(Mv)] for both models as follows: 
 
 
 
Where µi
2 
is the (RSS) from the cash flow model and ζi
2 
is the (RSS) from the net 
income model and π is a mathematical constant. MVNI is model 2 and MVCFO is model 
1. 
 After that, the likelihood ratio is computed as the following: 
 
This can be expressed as: 
 
Where ε CFO = Mvit – α1– α2 CFOit and ε NI = Mvit – β1– β2 NIit. 
Vuong (1989) estimates a variance (ώ2) for the above likelihood ratio (LR). 
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Finally, the Vuong statistic test is: 
 
The decision rule for this test is if the Z-score is positively significant, then model 2 (or 
the income model) is the best model of explaining the phenomenon. On the other hand, 
if the Z-score is negatively significant, then model 1 (cash flow model) is the better 
model. 
Following the same procedure illustrated above, the models from the two analysis sets 
(univariate and multivariate) are set up as competing non-nested models. The results for 
the Vuong test for the competing models are presented in following table: 
Table 4.12  
Relative explanatory power (Vuong Z-scores) 
 Model3 
vs. 
Model 1 
Model 2 
vs. 
Model 1 
Model 3 
vs. 
Model 2 
Model 4 
vs. 
Model 1 
Model 5 
vs. 
Model 1 
Model 6 
vs. 
Model 2 
Model 7 
vs. 
Model 5 
* 
Incremental 
R
2 
35.50% 2.50% 33.00% 34.70% 0.39% 24.73 0.01% 
 Z-statistic 4.45 1.00 4.31 4.41 1.17 3.60 3.58 
* incremental R
2
 is the difference between the R
2
 of the two models 
 
The test are based on the null hypothesis that both models are the same or equal in 
explaining the market value, if the null is rejected then the alternative is accepted that 
one model is better than the other in explaining the market value. At a level of 
significance of 5%, if the Vuong score is higher than (1.96), then the null is rejected in 
favour that the first model is better than the second, and if the Vuong score is less than 
(-1.96) then the second model is better than the first. Generally, if the absolute value of 
the Vuong score is less than (1.96) then both models are explaining the dependent 
variable equally (i.e. there is no best model). 
The first test is competing model 3 with model 1 to examine the relative explanatory 
power of net income compared to operating cash flows. The results show that net 
income is the better model because it contains total accruals. When comparing between 
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model 2 and model 1, the Vuong Z-statistic is less than (1.96), thus there is no 
difference between the two models in explaining the market value. Although in the 
univariate analysis model 2 had a higher R
2
 and a higher coefficient. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Vuong test is more powerful and provides statistical evidence that 
both models are equal. Model 3 is better than model 2 (v = 4.31), this means that net 
income has the highest explanatory power in the univariate analysis set. 
Model 4 is contrasted with model 1 to examine whether total accruals are in fact the 
factor contribution to value relevance of net income. Results show that model 4 is better 
than model 1 in explaining the variation in the market value, and total accruals contains 
higher incremental information than operating cash flows alone. The results also show 
that there is no difference between model 5 and model 1, and both models are equal or 
the same in explaining market value, the same result is obtained when comparing 
nondiscretionary income in model 2 with operating cash flows in model 1. Hence, both 
operating cash flows and nondiscretionary accruals have the similar explanatory power. 
To examine the incremental information content of discretionary accruals, model 6 is 
compared with model 2. The difference between the two models is the presence of 
discretionary accruals, and if discretionary accruals are not priced, the explanatory 
power of both models must be equal. The Vuong statistic shows that model 6 is better 
than model 2 and the market value is explained more by discretionary accruals.  
Similarly, model 7 is compared with model 5 to examine the incremental information 
content of discretionary accruals. If the market does not price discretionary accruals and 
understands that they are an outcome of management’s manipulation, then both models 
will have similar explanatory power. The results proves the opposite (v = 3.58), because 
the market prices discretionary accruals, model 7 has more explanatory power than 
model 6. 
To summarise, results show that discretionary accruals are priced by the market, and 
receives the highest value among the components of income. The slope coefficient of 
discretionary accruals is higher than both operating cash flows and nondiscretionary 
accruals combined. The best models explaining the market value are the ones that 
contain discretionary accruals. In the univariate analysis, results show that net income is 
the best regressor, because it contains discretionary accruals while the two other 
regressors do not contain this component, the same conclusion is drawn through the R
2
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and the AIC as well as Vuong’s Z statistic. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis shows 
that total accruals are priced higher than operating cash flows because of the 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, when using discretionary accruals as an explicit 
regressor in a model, its slope coefficient is the highest and that model is the best one in 
explaining the variation in stock prices according Vuong’s Z statistic. Thus, 
discretionary accruals are not only priced by the market, but receive the highest value 
among all components of net income. This suggests that the market does not see 
through the manipulation. 
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4.9 Conclusion: 
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether the market prices discretionary 
accruals. The discretionary accruals are the product of manager’s manipulation to inflate 
earnings in order to report profits and avoid being removed from the first market. 
Therefore, the discretionary accruals carry no real information relating to the 
performance of the company.  
Results obtained from the tests conducted in this research shows that the market 
considers discretionary accruals as a real component of net income; this indicates that 
the market cannot differentiate between the three components of earnings.  
Subramanyam (1996) argues that discretionary accruals reflect management private 
information signalled to the market relating to the true economic value of the company, 
and accordingly the market attaches the proper price or value to it and the market is 
therefore, efficient. Subramanyam (1996) estimates the discretionary accruals using a 
cross sectional version of the Jones model (i.e. the residuals) and acknowledges that 
they contain measurement errors, and that on average earnings manipulation does not 
occur and is not widespread.  
The residuals are not the proper estimates for discretionary accruals for reasons 
mentioned in the previous chapter. However, Subramanyam (1996) also acknowledges 
that the research design is not suited to identify discretionary accruals motivated by 
opportunistic earnings management. Discretionary accruals are estimated in this study 
using the extended version of the Jones model as developed in chapter two and applied 
in chapter three. This model overcomes the problems in the original model by Jones 
(1991) by estimating the discretionary accruals using an incentive and an accrual 
account and having the residuals representing white noise. 
This chapter is designed based on opportunistic earnings management that takes place 
in the first market. The results not only show that the market prices discretionary 
accruals but also attaches a higher value to it than the other two components. The slope 
coefficient for discretionary accruals is the highest in model 6 when compared to 
nondiscretionary income and in model 7 when compared to operating cash flows and 
nondiscretionary accruals. This means that either the market cannot, at least, tell the 
difference between what is discretionary and what is not, or they are misled to the extent 
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that made them overreact and consider the discretionary accruals as the most important 
component of earnings that contains the true economic value of the company. The latter 
explanation is more likely since the slope coefficient is priced the highest.  
The results support the notion that discretionary accruals are causing distortion to the 
value relevance of net income. Managers are signalling an optimistic view of the 
performance for their companies, when in fact it is pure manipulation. The market 
intercepts this signal and translates it into information for decision making. Thus, 
earnings management is distorting the relevance and reliability of accounting 
information.  
To comment on Subramanyam (1996) conclusion that discretionary accruals are priced 
because they represent management private information. This is invalid for firms listed 
in the first market in Amman Stock Exchange. The discretionary accruals are likely to 
be a product of, and only of, management effort to remain listed in the first market. 
Therefore, at the time of the manipulation the discretionary accruals should not be 
priced. However, they might contain information value in situations where there is no 
earnings management. Moreover, if the market cleverly decomposes discretionary 
accruals into an information content component and earnings management component, 
then the slope coefficient for the discretionary accruals will be less than both operating 
cash flows and nondiscretionary accruals. However, the results show that discretionary 
accruals receive a higher value than both operating cash flows and nondiscretionary 
accruals. 
Market efficiency theory states that all available accounting information as well as 
private information is incorporated in the stock price. Moreover, the market understands 
the different accounting methods used and how it affects the net income figure, and that 
the market can differentiate between real and nominal revenues and expenses. For 
example, if a company changes its depreciation method from a fixed rate to a declining 
rate, the depreciation expense will decrease as the life of the asset expires, resulting in a 
higher income figure. 
The results of this chapter suggest the opposite to this theory. The Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) is not an efficient market. The investors price all components of 
income but prices discretionary accruals the most. This indicates that the market 
overreacts to the loss reversal. In other words, companies that are reporting profits will 
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be priced normally. But when a company reverse losses, the market attaches a higher 
value to the discretionary accruals component. Profit firms, and based on the model of 
this research, will have no discretionary accruals because they have no incentive to 
manipulate. As a result, discretionary accruals for these firms equals zero. On the other 
hand, for firms that reverse losses, the model will estimate the discretionary accruals for 
these firms. The market overreacts and attaches a higher value to these discretionary 
accruals thinking that they represent private information signalled to the market by 
managers. Daniel et al. (1998) state that the market overreacts to private information 
and under reacts to public signals. In this case, operating cash flows and 
nondiscretionary accruals are public information, whereas discretionary accruals are 
private information. However, the discretionary accruals are a product of earnings 
management based on the results in chapter three. Another possible explanation is the 
market reaction to the high quality management style for firms that reverse their losses. 
The market could be interpreting the loss reversal as excellent crisis management and as 
a result, the market places more confident in the firm’s management  
In conclusion, the manipulation taking place in the first market is considered effective. 
Companies are managing earnings to remain listed in the first market, and the market is 
attaching value for this manipulation, perceiving it as a genuine component of earnings 
with incremental information content about the economic value of the company. 
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Chapter Five 
Detecting Earnings Management in Loss Reversal Firms 
5.1 Introduction: 
In chapter two, the Jones model (Jones, 1991) is modified and extended to measure 
discretionary accruals with an added variable instead of using the residuals. The 
underlying assumption for this model is it detects earnings manipulation only in the 
firms that respond to an event that represents a motivation for earnings management. 
Jones (1991) restricted the sample to include only firms that applied for import relief 
grants, which is an event that applies on all the firms in the sample. Studies conducted 
later, applied the Jones model cross-sectionally on a whole sample of firms without 
separating between firms based on whether they share a similar inventive. As a result, 
the residuals (the measure of discretionary accruals) of the Jones model indicate that 
some firms are manipulating upward and some firms are manipulating downward. 
Therefore, the extended Jones model includes an accrual variable that represents the 
manipulation tool and an indicator variable that cluster the firms based on the incentive. 
In other words, firms that share the same incentive will manipulate using a specific 
accrual and they will probably use the same approach (tool) to manipulate. 
In this chapter, the model is applied on loss reversal firms. The incentive for these firms 
is to reverse back to profitability and signal to the market that losses are temporary and 
are generated due to some unusual or nonrecurring operations or due to activities that 
will increase the firm’s future value. The assumption in this chapter is firms that report 
losses in the previous year and undertake R&D activities will manipulate their earnings 
in the current year in order reverse to profitability. The model will measure the 
nondiscretionary accruals for the all firms in the sample, but it will measure 
discretionary accruals only for loss firms with the same incentive to reverse. Profit firms 
are assumed not to manipulate due to the absence of the specific incentive (i.e. 
reversing). This chapter applies the model on a sample from the UK and a sample from 
the US for two reasons. The first reason is the increasing frequency of firms reporting 
losses in the last three decades in these countries due to more conservative standards 
which leads to more timely loss recognition. The second reason is comparing the 
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manipulation for loss reversal firms under two different accounting and institutional 
frameworks. 
The results of this chapter suggest that not all loss firms manipulate to reverse their 
losses. Loss firms that undertake R&D activities and are investing in these projects at a 
changing level are manipulating to reverse back to profits. This suggests that the R&D 
loss firms’ wants to provide some evidence to the market by reversing their losses that 
benefits of previous R&D activities are paying in. Previous studies show that the market 
values R&D as assets with potential future benefits. The managers of loss firms that 
undertake R&D projects will want to maintain the market’s confidence in their firms.  
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5.2 Literature Review: 
The literature review is grouped into five subsections based on the general aim of the 
studies. The past literature examined loss firms and components of losses and how the 
market values loss making firms. 
5.2.1 Studies examining the effect of losses on the value relevance of earnings: 
Hayn (1995) study measures the effect of reporting losses on the return-earnings 
relation and its cross sectional and inter-temporal variation. The paper examines the 
effect of losses on the association of returns with earnings as the accumulated period 
increases, and whether this affect evoke the market to adopt an abandonment 
(liquidation) option. The paper examines the returns-earnings association for two 
subsamples; the profit firms’ sample and the loss firms’ sample. Results show that stock 
price movements are more strongly linked to current period earnings for the profit 
firms’ sample. While for the loss firms’ sample, reported losses are not correlated with 
contemporaneous stock prices.  The paper also finds that by excluding the loss firms 
from the sample, the one-year earnings response coefficient (ERC) and the explanatory 
power of annual earnings with respect to contemporaneous returns increases drastically. 
Similar results are obtained when using either changes in earnings or levels of earnings. 
The findings of the paper indicate that pooling profitable and loss observations in one 
sample to estimate the information content of earnings, leads to downward bias in the 
(ERC). And as a consequence, it leads to downward bias in the association between 
returns and earnings.  
Martikainen (1997) investigates the effect of losses on the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) in different financial leverage and growth opportunities categories. The paper 
argues that the (ERC) differs in firms with high financial leverage compared to firms 
with low leverage. Similarly, the (ERC) are compared for firms with high growth 
opportunities and with low growth opportunities. 
Results indicate that losses impact on the earnings response coefficient is the highest in 
firms with high growth opportunities and in firms with low financial leverage.  On the 
other hand, results show no impact of losses on (ERC) in firms with high financial 
leverage or low growth opportunities. The overall result indicates that the impact of 
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growth opportunities and financial leverage on the earnings response coefficient 
becomes more apparent when losses and profits are separately analyzed. 
Collins et al. (1999) investigate the unusual negative coefficient on earnings in the 
simple earnings capitalization model for loss firms. This means that as the firm’s 
earnings per share becomes more negative, higher becomes its stock price.  
The paper’s main assumption is the omission of book value of equity from the simple 
earnings capitalization model makes the model misspecified and explains the 
anomalous negative earnings coefficient. The findings show that when adding the book 
value of equity to the simple earnings capitalization model, the coefficient on earnings 
becomes either significantly positive or insignificantly different from zero. The results 
also show that by omitting the book value of equity from the model induces a negative 
bias in the earnings coefficient for loss firms; it also introduces a positive bias for profit 
firms. Overall, the findings of the paper suggest that in the presence of losses, the 
market rely on book value of equity as a proxy for expected future earnings and/or a 
proxy for abandonment value. Based on that, the market is able to assess the firm’s 
ability to reverse to profitability. 
5.2.2 Studies examining the relation between accounting conservatism and losses: 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) explore the relation between earnings and cash flows in order 
to spot any structural changes in the accounting reporting system. The study examines 
the changes in the time series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals and 
whether these changes are consistent with the increased conservatism in financial 
reporting. 
The paper finds a decline in the reported earnings over time and this decline is not 
accompanied by a similar decline in cash flows. Their results show a large accumulation 
of non-operating accruals over the time period under investigation. Moreover, the study 
shows evidence of a negative skew in the distribution of earnings relative of cash flows. 
The results also show more timely recognition of losses than profits. This indicates, as 
well as the overall results, an increase in the conservatism of financial reporting over 
time. The evidence of this paper suggests that the increase in reporting conservatism is 
one of the underlying reasons for the increase in the frequency of reported losses over 
time. 
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Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine timely loss recognition for private and public 
firms in the UK. The study posits that timely loss recognition is an important attribute 
of financial reporting quality. The paper assumes that the market demand for higher 
quality of financial statements differs significantly between private and public 
companies.  
The results show that loss recognition is not as widespread in private companies as in 
public companies. This suggests that the market demands higher quality reporting from 
public companies, hence more timely loss recognition. Based on that, the paper 
examines further why public firms recognise loss more frequently than private firms. 
The paper argues that since public firms incorporate more negative transitory 
components in the earnings than private firms, could suggest that managers are taking 
big baths to increase the probability of reporting profits in later periods. Hence, this 
would suggest earnings management rather than timely loss recognition. They test this 
argument by examining if earnings and change in earnings can predict future cash 
flows. Because timely loss recognition would make earnings more informative about 
firms ability to generate future cash flows. However, results show no evidence of 
earnings management, which suggests that the presence of more negative transitory 
components in earnings is due to timely loss recognition. 
Klein and Marquardt (2006) examine the non-accounting factors and their role in 
generating losses. Consistent with Givoly and Hayn (2000), the paper shows a 
significantly positive temporal association between accounting losses and accounting 
conservatism. Building on that, the paper adds firm size, real performance as measured 
with operating cash flows and business cycle effects to investigate the incremental roles 
of these factors in explaining accounting losses. 
The paper finds that the frequency of losses is positively related to small firms and 
negatively related to operating cash flows and to macroeconomic productivity. These 
results indicate that non-accounting factors tend be more influential than accounting 
factors (i.e. accounting conservatism) in explaining how accounting losses are 
generated. The paper extends these findings to explain why small firms tend to report 
more profits. Their evidence shows that small firm’s economic characteristics, such as 
higher idiosyncratic risk and lower diversification, contribute to their likelihood of 
realizing accounting losses over time. 
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5.2.3 Studies examining loss reversal: 
Joos and Plesko (2005) examine how investors evaluate loss reporting firms given the 
increase in the frequency of firms reporting losses over the last three decades. The paper 
posits that investors assess the probability of loss reversal and price earnings based on 
that probability.  
The study rearranges the sample into two groups of firms based on their likelihood of 
reversal: the persistent loss group, which has the lowest probability of reversal, and the 
transitory group with the highest probability of reversal.  
Joos and Plesko (2005) finds that the annual earnings response coefficient (ERC) in the 
transitory group is significantly positive, while the (ERC) in the persistent group is 
insignificant. Furthermore, time-series analysis show that the (ERC) in the persistent 
group becomes significantly negative, indicating that larger persistent losses correspond 
to higher returns over time. This result is inconsistent with the abandonment option 
suggested by Hayn (1995). The paper examines thoroughly this pattern and documents a 
large negative cash flow component of earnings in the persistent group and contributes 
that to the presence of a large and increasing R&D component. Accordingly, the paper 
examines the effect of the R&D component to explain the change in persistent losses 
valuation.  The persistent group is partitioned into two subgroups based on the presence 
of R&D in the losses.  
Results show that investors price the R&D component as an asset and consider the non-
R&D component as a transitory loss and price it positively. That is, the investor 
understands the different components of earnings and has the ability and sufficient 
sophistication to properly decompose the earnings and evaluate the company based on 
whether it reports losses as a signal of financial distress or a signal for future growth 
and development. 
Jiang and Stark (2006) examine the loss reversal firms in the UK context. They find that 
the UK is very similar to the US with respect to the increasing number of firms 
reporting losses since the early 1990’s. The study examines the determinants of loss 
reversal in order to investigate the predictive ability of the loss reversal models. 
Jiang and Stark (2006) apply the same loss reversal models as in Joos & Plesko (2005) 
but with two key differences. The paper uses less number of years prior to the loss year 
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to increase the number of observation included in the sample. Joss and Plesko (2005) 
only included observations with available data of five years prior to the loss year. 
Applying same requirement on the UK sample will result in fewer observations 
included in the sample making the loss reversal models less useful. Furthermore, the 
paper decomposes the earnings variable into three components; earnings before R&D 
and extraordinary items, R&D expenses, and extraordinary items.  The paper argues that 
this decomposition is better because companies frequently classify transitory items as 
extraordinary when facing losses. The paper argues that transitory items might distort 
the nature of losses. 
Using a sample of loss observations from 1991 to 2004 Jiang & Stark (2006) apply the 
loss reversal models. The paper finds that accounting information from current and past 
years is helpful in explaining the likelihood of one-year-ahead loss reversals in the UK. 
Generally, their results confirm the findings of Joos & Plesko (2005) by showing 
similar patterns for loss reversal in the UK to the US. 
5.2.4 Studies examining earnings management in loss firms: 
Barua et al. (2006) examine the association between earnings management and firm 
profitability to meet with analysts’ forecast and exceeding prior year earnings. The 
paper investigates these two benchmarks for firms with pre-managed profits versus 
firms with pre-managed losses. 
The paper uses pre-managed earnings rather than reported earnings as the measure for 
profitability. Pre-managed earnings are computed as reported earnings minus abnormal 
accruals. In other words, the paper examines accrual behaviour (earnings management) 
to meet with analysts’ forecast and prior period earnings between firms with pre-
managed profits and firms with pre-managed losses. 
Results show that firms with pre-managed profits are more likely to manipulate accruals 
to meet with earnings benchmarks than firms with pre-managed losses. The paper 
findings suggest that profitable firms have greater incentives to manipulate than loss 
firms to meet with analysts’ forecasts and prior period earnings. 
Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) examine whether reporting losses acts as a heuristic to divest 
unproductive investments due to the resolution of agency problems. The paper aims to 
show that the binary classification of firms into profit and losses is a powerful heuristic 
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that can have real economic consequences other than creating incentives for earnings 
managements.  
The paper argues that the loss heuristic acts as a major disciplinary event that resolves 
agency problems and results in the managers’ incentives being realigned with 
shareholders.  The losses act as a trigger to exercise the abandonment option and divest 
factors of production, divisions and projects with negative net present value. The paper 
uses employees as the proxy for investment because they represent a major cost, and in 
the event of reporting losses, they will be the first investment to be cut. Additionally, 
investments in employees are both liquid and reversible; this allows observing a 
continuum of divestment. 
Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) document a discontinuity at the zero earnings threshold in the 
level investment between small profits firms and small loss firms, which is attributable 
to small loss firms having lower than expected investments in employees. Evidence 
shows that the discontinuity is due to small loss firms reporting a significantly greater 
percentage of discontinued operations than small profit firms. This is consistent with a 
regime shift at the zero earnings threshold in the decision to discontinue operations. 
Moreover, evidence shows that when firms first moves from reporting profits to 
reporting losses, the zero earnings threshold acts as a catalyst for a decline in investment 
in employees that is greater than the expected fundamental demand impact for such a 
change.  
This result adds additional explanation for the kink in the earnings distribution around 
the zero benchmark, because the variability in the earnings of loss firms is greater in the 
event that once-off restructuring charges incurs and as a result more firms are likely to 
lie in the extremes of the earnings distribution. Furthermore, the paper provides 
additional evidence that the impact of loss heuristic on the incentive to divest employees 
is stronger for large firms. The divestment of employees is greater for firms with a high 
(ERC) and high share turnover. The overall result of the paper is loss reporting acts as a 
decision cue to divest employees and discontinue operations. The loss heuristic is a 
major disciplinary event that reduces agency conflicts and changes managers’ incentives 
toward taking real actions to improve performance. 
Callen et al. (2008) investigate how the past and expected future losses and negative 
cash flows’ of a firm motivate managers to overstate revenues and debtors in order to 
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induce a higher market valuation. The paper argues that the market substitutes revenues 
and revenue growth for earnings and earnings growth for loss firms because the losses 
or negative cash flows do not provide any value relevant information. 
The results show that for loss firms’ revenues are value relevant in explaining their 
market value whereas earnings and operating cash flows are not significantly associated 
with the market value. The study documents a positive relation between the number of 
years that a firm exhibits and/or anticipates losses or negative cash flows and its 
investment in debtors. 
These results are consistent with loss firms being more likely to manipulate revenues 
than profit firms. Additionally, the paper provides evidence that there is a positive 
relation between the ex ante probability of revenue  manipulation and the number of 
years that a firm exhibits and/or anticipates losses or negative cash flows. This relation 
becomes more significant for negative cash flows than for earnings. An important 
finding the paper documents is revenue manipulation is associated with the history of 
losses or negative cash flows for firms with different age, size and growth. This 
contradicts the intuition that only young small firms are more likely to manipulate 
revenues. 
Mosebach and Simko (2009) investigate the role of discretionary accruals in firms that 
reverse to profitability after a persistent loss state. The primary objective of the paper is 
to test whether firms sustain profitability for at least four quarters after the loss periods. 
The paper argues that managers are motivated to use accounting discretion to sustain 
profitability after reversing from a long period of losses. Based on that, firms sustain 
profitability through income decreasing accruals (e.g. reserves) in periods leading up to 
an initial profitable period. The paper finds in all loss firms a consistent pattern of 
income decreasing discretionary accruals in their preceding loss quarters. This pattern 
however, is different for firms sustaining profitability from firms that are unable to 
sustain.  
For firms that are unable to sustain profitability, results show that they use less income 
decreasing accruals than firms sustaining profitability in the quarters preceding and 
including the initial reported period. Moreover, results reveal a strong negative relation 
between past discretionary accruals and firms’ ability to sustain profitability, which is 
consistent with firms sustaining profitability employing a wider use of conservatism 
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accounting discretion during their loss quarters. Overall, the paper concludes that firms 
remaining profitable after periods of consistent losses are distinguishable by their use of 
prior negative accounting discretion through building reserves. This mechanism allows 
the firm to build an accrual component of earnings that will be used in future periods. In 
other words, these decreasing discretionary accruals are used as insurance against future 
losses when the firm once again becomes profitable. 
5.2.5 Studies examining components of losses: 
Darrough and Ye (2007) examine the stereotype of loss firms portrayed in previous 
studies of being suffering from financial distress and facing bankruptcy, liquidation or 
any other extreme transformations. The paper argues that many loss firms do not fit this 
stereotype. Because, for example, some firms record write-offs due to organizational 
restructures, and hence reports a loss, but are not operationally or financially distressed. 
Moreover, the paper shows that many firms suffer from persistent losses but remain in 
business for many periods.  
The focus of this paper is to examine in detail the value drivers of loss firms. 
Specifically, the paper explains that the probability of loss firms staying in business for 
many years is because they are engaged in operations with future benefits that will 
increase their value. The paper examines four potential value drivers; particularly, 
nonrecurring changes, R&D, growth strategy (measured by sales growth) and 
sustainability.  These value drivers give rise to future hidden assets for loss firms that 
will probably generate benefits. 
Empirical analysis shows that only R&D and sustainability are able to explain the 
negative relation between market value and earnings. On the other hand, the other two 
value drivers do not explain this negative relation, although sales growth reduces the 
negative relation by only a small fraction. The paper provides evidence that R&D is the 
major driver that explains the negative relation. This is due to increase in R&D 
activities which has become a salient feature of a knowledge-based economy. Results 
also show that sustainability links to R&D intensity. In other words, loss firms that are 
characterised of having R&D intensive activities report losses for many years, but 
sustain themselves with external funding. This suggests that the market views these 
firms of having favourable future perspective. 
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Schleicher et al. (2007) examine whether the relation between annual report narratives 
and share price anticipation of earnings varies between loss firms and profit firms. The 
importance of narratives for loss firms comes from the investors’ need of additional 
information to explain the reasons generating losses for these firms.  
Results show that for loss firms the ability of stock returns to anticipate the change in 
next period’s earnings is significantly greater if the firm provides a large number of 
earnings predictions in the annual report narratives. Moreover, results show no similar 
pattern for profit firms. This suggests that the market responds more to the non-earnings 
information disclosed in the narratives for loss firms, since they cannot rely on negative 
earnings to value the firm. 
Oswald and Zarowin (2007) study the effect of accounting choices on the 
informativeness of stock prices. They examine the information content of stock prices in 
cases where R&D is capitalized rather than expensed. They use a UK sample of the 
largest three R&D industries during the 1990s (before the adoption of IFRS) because 
under the UK GAAP, companies had the choice to either treat R&D as an expenditure 
or to capitalise it. 
The paper regress stock returns against current and future earnings for R&D capitalizers 
and expensers and compare the coefficients on the future earnings. The results show that 
capitalising R&D expense is associated with a higher future earnings response 
coefficient and conclude that capitalization of R&D is informative than expensing them. 
The results also provide evidence that accounting choice may affect the amount of 
information about future earnings. 
Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009) examine the role of R&D expense and its valuation 
multiplier using a residual-income based valuation model in loss firms and profit firms. 
The study argues that for profit firms, current earnings are more likely to provide 
information on potential future earnings due to R&D activities. Accordingly, expected 
abnormal earnings are more likely to be a linear function of current abnormal earnings. 
However, the study assumes that there is no linear information dynamics for loss firms 
that carry out R&D activities. This indicates that expected abnormal earnings for loss 
firms are not a linear function of current year’s negative earnings. 
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The analytical results suggest, for profit firms, that the valuation multiplier on both 
earnings before R&D and R&D expense are a function of the discount rate and the 
growth in R&D investment. In contrast, for loss firms, the valuation multiplier on R&D 
expense is a function discount rate, growth in R&D and the productivity of R&D 
investment. Furthermore, the results show that R&D expense are positively associated 
with stock prices for loss firms, and negatively associated with stock prices for profit 
firms. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate on R&D is smaller for profit firms than 
for loss firms. The reason is because the productivity of R&D investment is not fully 
contained in earnings. 
Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009) also compare the value relevance of earnings and 
R&D changes for firms that revert to profits. The findings show that the coefficient 
estimate on R&D is significantly positive in the loss year but insignificantly different 
from zero in the reversal year. However, if the firm reports another profit year after the 
reversal, the coefficient estimate on R&D becomes insignificantly negative. Thus, as 
firms reverse to reporting profits and continue to do so in the future, earnings becomes 
more valued but R&D does not. 
Osma and Young (2009) examine whether firms adjust R&D spending in response to 
short term earnings pressure. Using a large sample of UK firms that invest heavily in 
R&D activities, the paper examines the association between R&D spending and 
earnings targets. 
The results show that the probability of cutting R&D expenditure increases when firms 
fail to report negative earnings. In other words, firms reporting a loss will cut or at least 
adjust the R&D expenditure in the following period in order to report positive earnings. 
The results also show that managers targeting specific levels of earnings will shave 
R&D expenses in an attempt to reach the earnings target. Although R&D is a real 
activity not a discretionary accrual component, managers still have discretion over it 
and can adjust this expenditure in order to avoid negative earnings or to achieve specific 
earnings targets. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Development: 
The purpose of this chapter is to detect earning management in loss firms. Specifically, 
the focus is to examine whether loss firms manage their earnings to reverse back to 
profitability.  
In this chapter, loss reversal is defined as firms reporting profits immediately after a 
loss, regardless the loss history of the firm. In other words, this study does not take into 
consideration the number of loss years before the period in which the firm reports a 
profit. The argument is loss reversal through earnings management is not affected by 
the loss history of the firm. Loss reversal cases are considered interesting since the 
status quo is reporting profits; therefore reporting losses places the firm in a temporary 
position (Joos & Plesko, 2005). It also presents an important incentive, and motivates 
firms to manipulate in order to report profits again. 
Previous studies, as mentioned in chapter two, document firms engaging in earnings 
management to avoid reporting negative earnings. This is evident in the earnings 
distribution where a discontinuity in the distribution appears around zero; more than 
expected observations above zero and less than expected observations below zero 
(Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). Specifically, 
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) document a discontinuity around the zero benchmark for 
observations reporting a profit following negative earnings. Based on that, they 
conclude that firms are highly motivated to manipulate their earnings to report profits in 
the period following a loss. The frequency of firms reporting losses has increased in 
recent years and has become a phenomenon (Klein & Marquardt, 2006). Managers of 
loss firms will always want to signal that losses are temporary or the loss sequence will 
be brief, for example, loss firms continue to pay dividends as a sign that they will 
recover very soon (Joss & Plesko, 2005).  
The literature review in the previous section sheds the light on the fundamentals of 
losses. Firms report losses due to the presence of temporary component(s) in earnings 
(e.g. R&D expenses, restructuring costs). However, these components have potential 
future benefits, not like other reasons for reporting losses such as financial and 
operational distress. Research and development expenses (R&D) relate to the firm’s 
continuous efforts to develop the products and business methods in order to increase 
market share and hence increase its sales revenue. Therefore, R&D expenses represent 
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hidden assets with potential benefits that will generate and/or increase value in the very 
near future (Darrough & Ye, 2007). In most cases R&D expenses are considered one of 
the largest expenses that affect the period’s earnings negatively. The negative earnings 
figure will contain components relating to the normal level of performance and other 
components relating to the potential future performance of the firm. The market 
therefore cannot rely on negative earnings alone to value the firm, so they classify 
losses into temporary and persistent according to the component(s) that caused the loss. 
Based on that, the managers signal to the market that losses are in fact temporary, so 
they manipulate earnings to reverse back to profits as soon as possible.  In other words, 
the managers have a clear motive to report profits in the period immediately following a 
loss year to meet with market’s expectation. The incentive for reversing to profitability 
becomes more evident for loss firms investing in R&D activities. These firms despite 
their losses are viewed as having favourable future outcomes (Darrough & Ye, 2007). 
Therefore, reversing to profitability will even add more value to firm, because the 
market will think that the benefits of previous R&D is starting to pay in. Thus, 
managers of loss firms that are investing in R&D activities have a higher incentive 
compared to other loss firms that do not invest in R&D to manage their earnings to 
report profits.  
Previous studies argue that accounting standards have become more conservative. 
Hence, there is an increase in timely loss recognition (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). 
Additionally, earnings management becomes less prevail, producing higher quality 
earnings in situations where more conservative reporting standards are introduced 
(Barth et al., 2008). Accordingly, loss reversal through earnings management will be 
examined in this chapter in two different accounting settings applied in the UK and the 
US. This will provide an opportunity to examine earnings management for loss reversal 
firms in two different accounting settings but with the presence of the same incentive.  
5.4 Sample and Data: 
The UK sample consists of all active firms that are publicly quoted. Data are obtained 
from (FAME) database of Bureau Van Dijk. Only manufacturing firms with code 
classification from 15 to 39 are included according to the UK SIC [2003] classification. 
The sample includes 154 firms with available data from 2001 to 2008; firms with 
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missing observations are dropped from the sample. Therefore, the total sample consists 
of 1232 firm-year observations arranged in cross-sectional format. 
Similarly, the US sample includes listed firms in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) with US SIC codes from 20 to 39, only manufacturing firms are included. Data 
are obtained from OSIRIS database of Bureau Van Dijk. The sample includes 450 firms 
with available data from 2001 to 2008. Firms with missing data are deleted; this 
generates 3582 firm-year observations arranged cross sectionally. 
The variables are measured as the following: 
Earnings (E) are measured as net income before tax and extraordinary items.  
Total accruals (TA) are computed as the difference between earnings and net operating 
cash flows (CFO): 
                                                   (eq. 5.1) 
Change in sales revenue (∆REV) is sales in period (t) minus sales in period (t-1): 
                                        (eq. 5.2) 
Net fixed assets (PPE) are used to control for depreciation, and includes all property, 
plant and equipment items in year (t).  
There are two major accrual accounts used as the measure for discretionary accruals. 
The first account is change in debtors (∆DRS) and includes net trade debtors that result 
from credit sales. It is measured as first difference between net trade debtors in period 
(t) and period (t-1): 
                                           (eq. 5.3) 
The second accrual account is change in stock (∆STK), which include work in process 
(WIP) and stock (finished products) and is measured as stock in period (t) minus stock 
in period (t-1): 
                                           (eq. 5.4) 
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5.6 Hypothesis Formulation: 
The main focus of the tests in this chapter is to examine whether loss firms manage 
earnings to reverse to profitability. Therefore, the loss reversal serves as a clear motive 
for loss making firms. The probability of reversal is highest in the year following a loss 
(Joos & Plesko, 2005). Therefore, the manipulation is expected to take place in the 
reversal year. Moreover, the incentive to manipulate is even greater if loss firms invest 
in R&D projects. The manipulation is the firm’s effort to maintain the market’s 
confidence in R&D projects and to show profits as a sign of collecting benefits from 
previous R&D activities. If the market stops valuing R&D as assets, then the firm will 
lose the access and the justification for acquiring funds to finance their operations.  
The main hypothesis tested in this chapter is: 
H0: loss firms that undertake R&D activities will not manipulate their earnings to 
reverse to profitability in the period following a loss. 
Earnings management is measured through discretionary accruals. The Jones model 
(Jones, 1991) as extended in chapter two is applied in this chapter to estimate 
discretionary accruals. As discussed in chapter two, the Jones model is extended to 
include an additional variable that controls for the discretionary accruals. The model 
controls for the nondiscretionary accruals using change in sales revenue (∆REV) and 
fixed assets (PPE); discretionary accruals are controlled by change in accrual accounts. 
The proposed model is as following: 
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Where ACCi is the change in accruals accounts and j= number of accruals manipulated 
to manage earnings. The most popular accrual accounts in manufacturing firms are the 
trade debtors’ account and the stock account, so either one or even both can be used as 
tools to manipulate. However, the model must include a variable that represents the 
incentive. This is necessary to measure earnings management in firms that share the 
same motive. The assumption here is that only firms with the same incentive will 
manipulate their earnings to achieve the same target (i.e. reversing to profitability) while 
other firms (profit firms) will not manipulate. Based on that, a dummy variable will be 
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multiplied with the accrual account. The dummy variable will equal (1) if a firm reports 
losses in the previous year and reverse to profitability in the following year. The model 
is therefore: 
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 Where: 
TA it: total accruals for firm і in year t, measured as the difference between earnings and 
operating cash flows 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t. 
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t. 
∑ACC it: Accrual accounts: ∆debtors and/or ∆Stock for firm і in year t. 
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss in the previous year 
AND profits in the current year, 0 otherwise. 
A t-1: total assets for firm i in year t, is the scale variable to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
5.7 Descriptive results: 
Descriptive statistics of key variables are displayed in Table 5.1 for the UK and the US 
sample. All variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period. Total 
accruals in both samples are negative because the size of fixed assets in manufacturing 
firms is considered large, which results in greater depreciation expense. Fixed assets, as 
a percentage of total assets, is relatively large in the UK sample, it comprises roughly 
(55%) of total assets, whereas it comprises around (27%) of total assets in the US 
sample. However, the change in sales to total assets is less in the UK than in the US 
(5.9% versus 8.7% respectively). The change in debtors is larger than change in stock in 
the UK sample, but in the US sample both change in stocks and change in debtors are 
approximately similar. The mean value of R&D expense to total assets from previous 
period is 0.032 in the UK sample, whereas the mean value for the US sample is 0.049. 
There are 88 firms out 154 firms that have R&D expense in the UK sample, which is 
approximately 57% of the total sample. The percentage of R&D firms in US sample is 
38.6% (174 firms out of 450 firms included in the sample).  
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Table 5.1  
Descriptive statistics for key variables 
1
 
  UK sample US sample 
 obs. mean st.dev min. max. obs. mean st.dev min. max. 
Total 
accruals 
1210 -0.037 0.074 -0.290 0.280 3545 -0.025 0.077 -0.480 0.436 
∆Sales 
revenue 
1210 0.059 0.274 -3.300 2.100 3545 0.087 0.220 -1.68 2.250 
Fixed 
assets 
1210 0.548 0.270 0.024 2.640 3545 0.270 0.165 0.004 2.340 
∆Stock 1210 0.008 0.044 -0.300 0.270 3545 0.010 0.039 -0.280 0.430 
∆Debtors 1210 0.011 0.046 -0.200 0.420 3545 0.010 0.043 -0.195 0.465 
R&D 
2
  275 0.032 0.038 0.0002 0.234 1311 0.049 0.043 0.0002 0.423 
1
 After removing outliers from both samples, the UK sample includes 1210 observations from 1232 total 
observations and the US includes 3545 observations from total 3582 observations.  
 
2
Percentage of R&D firms in UK sample is 57.14% (88 firms out of all 154 firms included in sample. 
  Percentage of R&D firms in US sample is 38.66% (174 firms out of all 450 firms included in sample. 
 
 all variables are scaled by total assets in period t-1 
The following Table shows the correlation matrix between the key variables for the two 
samples. In the UK sample the accrual accounts, ∆stock and ∆debtors, have the highest 
correlation with total accruals (0.310 and 0.270 respectively). This indicates the higher 
effect of these accrual accounts on the variation in total accruals.  A similar trend is 
shown for the US sample, where both change in stock and change in debtors have 
roughly the same correlation with total accruals (approximately 0.300). However, the 
change in sales revenue has a higher correlation with total accruals when compared to 
the UK sample. Change in sales is more correlated with total accruals in the US (24.7%) 
than in the UK (7.9%). This is an indication of how change in sales explains more of the 
variation in total accruals in the US sample compared to the UK sample. Therefore, it is 
expected that the nondiscretionary model will be a better fit using the US sample 
observations since the two nondiscretionary accruals variables (∆REV and PPE) are 
more correlated with total accruals than in the UK sample. 
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Table 5.2  
Correlation matrix for key variables in the UK and the US sample 
UK variables 
 TA ∆REV PPE ∆STK ∆DET 
TA 1.000     
∆REV 0.079 1.000    
PPE -0.060 0.199 1.000   
∆STK 0.312 0.342 0.250 1.000  
∆DRS 0.27 0.479 0.220 0.420 1.000 
US variables 
 TA ∆REV PPE ∆STK ∆DET 
TA 1.000     
∆REV 0.247 1.000    
PPE -0.086 0.185 1.0000   
∆STK 0.312 0.516 0.181 1.000  
∆DRS 0.295 0.541 0.108 0.555 1.000 
TA: total accruals. 
∆REV: change in sales revenue. 
PPE: fixed assets. 
∆STK: change in stock 
∆DRS: change in debtors 
The following table shows the number of loss firms in each sample. The Table also 
shows the number of firms that reversed to profitability and the number of firms that did 
not reverse their losses for each year included in the two samples. As noticed, the 
average of loss firms in all years included in both samples (2001-2008) are quite 
similar; 17.5% in the UK and 15.5% in the US. The average loss reversal firms in the 
US (49%) is slightly higher than the in the UK (45.5%). Overall, and based on these two 
samples, the loss reporting and loss reversal trends in the UK and the US are quite 
similar to each other, same conclusion reached by Jiang &Stark (2006) 
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Table 5.3 
Number of loss firms and loss reversal firms in the UK and US samples 
UK sample 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
No. of firms in 
sample 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
No. of loss 
firms 21 35 35 32 28 21 22 16 27 
Percentage 
1
 13.6% 22.7% 22.7% 20.8% 18.2% 13.6% 14.3% 10.4% 17.5% 
No. of loss 
reversal firms 
2
 
- 
7 15 18 13 17 10 11 6 
Percentage 
3
 - 33.3% 42.9% 51.4% 40.6% 60.7% 47.6% 50.0% 37.5% 
No. of loss 
firms that did 
not reverse 
4
 
 
- 14 20 17 19 11 11 11 10 
Percentage 
5
 - 66.7% 57.1% 48.6% 59.4% 39.3% 52.4% 50.0% 62.5% 
US sample 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
No. of firms in 
sample 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
No. of loss 
firms 44 92 87 69 52 45 49 53 111 
Percentage 
1
 9.8% 20.4% 19.3% 15.3% 11.6% 10.0% 10.9% 11.8% 24.7% 
No. of loss 
reversal firms 
2
 - 20 38 38 42 28 25 30 16 
Percentage 
3
 - 45.5% 41.3% 43.7% 60.9% 53.8% 55.6% 61.2% 30.2% 
No. of loss 
firms that did 
not reverse 
4
 - 24 54 49 27 24 20 19 37 
Percentage 
5
 - 54.5% 58.7% 56.3% 39.1% 46.2% 44.4% 38.8% 69.8% 
1
 the percentage of firms reporting losses to all other firms in sample. 
2
 number of firms that report profits in current year and losses in previous year. 
3
 percentage of the number of firms reversing losses in current year to number of firms reporting losses in 
previous year. 
4
 number of firms that report losses in current year and losses in previous year. 
5
 percentage of number of firms that report losses in current year to firms reporting losses in previous 
year. 
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5.8 Results on loss reversal: 
The extended Jones model is applied on a sample from the UK and a sample from US. 
Results from both samples are shown in the following sections. 
5.8.1 Results on loss reversal from the UK sample: 
The first set of results comes from the UK sample. Table 5.4 presents the results of the 
model applied on UK firms using the change in stock as the manipulation tool. The 
results show that change in sales revenue is significant. Also, the fixed assets variable is 
negatively significant, which is the expected sign since it controls for depreciation 
expenses. Both variables control for nondiscretionary accruals. The discretionary 
accrual measure is significant (t= 2.540) which indicates that loss-reversal firms are 
manipulating to report profits using change in stock. This suggests that companies are 
increasing the cost of stock through re-allocation of overhead costs between cost of 
goods sold and end of period stock. In other words, manufacturing overhead cost are 
being shifted from the P&L account (cost of goods sold) to the balance sheet (cost of 
ending stock) as means to capitalise these cost. By doing so, cost of goods sold will be 
lower which increases gross profit. This is achieved by overstating the value of end of 
period stocks; as a result the cost of goods sold will be lower. Since the sample consists 
of manufacturing firms, the cost of sales is computed as:  
                                 
(eq. 5.5) 
Manufactured products (finished products) are computed as: 
           
(eq. 5.6) 
Since ∆Stock = stock at ending of period- stock at beginning of period, then equation 
(5.5) can be computed as: 
            (eq. 5.7) 
Therefore, firms can allocate a higher portion of overhead manufacturing costs to end of 
period stock in the manipulation period which results in increasing the amount of 
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change in stock. The cost of sales will be understated and gross profits will be 
overstated, thus increasing reported earnings. (Gross profits = sales revenue- cost of 
sales).  
Table 5.4 
Results for loss reversal in UK sample with ∆STK as manipulation tool 
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Coefficient 
 
-14.160 0.025 -0.060 0.364 19.21% 
t value
  
(-0.590) (3.150)
** 
(-15.680)
** 
(2.540)
* 
 
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in the previous year and profits in the 
current year, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
(D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
However, when testing to examine whether they use debtors as the manipulation tool 
(e.g. recognising premature sales) the coefficient of the discretionary accrual measure 
becomes insignificant (t= -0.970) as shown in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5  
Results for loss reversal in UK sample with ∆DRS as manipulation tool 
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Coefficient 
 
-12.530 0.031 -0.060 - 0.170 18.84% 
t value
  
(-0.520) (3.800)
** 
(-15.780)
** 
(-0.970)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in debtors for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in the previous year and profits in the 
current year, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
(D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Based on the results, loss firms in the UK are manipulating expenses by increasing the 
value of stock. This method of manipulation is relatively easier than revenue 
manipulation, where firms must ship products earlier to distributors (buyers) in order to 
recognise them during the period of reversal. Early shipping of products to distributors 
and buyers, known as channel stuffing, is not always easily achieved due to high 
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competition between manufacturers and/or the economic situation of the buyers. On the 
other hand, expense manipulation does not require an outside party interaction and is 
accomplished within the firm. Overhead manufacturing costs are usually allocated to the 
finished products based on many different methods that managers have discretion over 
them (e.g. direct method or sequential method). Therefore, they are flexible systems that 
can be modified to reduce or inflate cost of sales. Furthermore, the firm can increase the 
number of manufactured products in order to reduce the fixed cost per unit. As the 
number of products increase the fixed costs becomes more spread and hence the 
marginal profitability will increase for each unit. Change in debtors can also capture bad 
debt expenses manipulation; however the amount of manipulation could be small and 
insufficient to achieve the required targets of manipulation. 
The incentive between loss firms to reverse losses through earnings management is not 
necessarily the same. Some activities firms undertake might generate negative earnings, 
even though that these activities could increase the value of the firm in the future. 
Research and Development (R&D) activities affects the earnings negatively in the short 
term, but on the long term could add value to the firms. As a consequence, firms that 
invest in R&D can report losses for long periods. Hence, the argument is loss firms that 
undertake R&D activities have a stronger incentive to manipulate. In order to test this 
argument, loss firms are divided into two groups; loss firms with R&D and loss firms 
without R&D. This procedure examines loss reversal through earnings management for 
firms that invest in R&D activities compared to loss firms that do not undertake R&D. 
Therefore, for loss firms with no R&D, loss is assumed to be caused by other factors 
(e.g. financial distress). As mentioned earlier, R&D expenses are viewed by the market 
as hidden assets with potential future benefits. The market analyse the components of 
losses and value R&D as assets and expects the loss to be temporarily (Joos & Plesko, 
2005). Therefore, R&D firms manipulate earnings to reverse to profitability as quickly 
as possible to signal the market that R&D benefits are paying.  For that reason, and 
following Joos and Plesko (2005) loss firms in the UK sample are partitioned into two 
subsamples based on whether they incur R&D expense. The assumption is loss firms 
with R&D will manipulate earnings to reverse to profitability in the period following a 
loss, while other loss firms will not have a similar incentive. In order to test this, a new 
dummy variable is constructed that equals one if the firm reverses back to profitability 
after a loss period and invests in R&D. Also, a similar dummy is constructed for firms 
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that do not invest in R&D. Results for R&D loss firms and non-R&D loss firms are 
shown in the following two tables; Table 5.6 for using change in stock as manipulation 
tool and Table 5.7 for using change in debtors as manipulation tool. 
Table 5.6  
Results of loss reversal for R&D and non-R&D firms in the UK with ∆STK as 
manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DR&D*∆STKit
 
Dnon*∆STKit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient -13.400 0.026 -0.060 0.854 0.284 19.28% 
t value (-0.56) (3.24)
** 
(-15.7)
** 
(2.24)
* 
(1.84)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
 ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DR&D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
Dnon: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND does not invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
Table 5.7 
Results of loss reversal for R&D and non-R&D firms in the UK with ∆DRS as 
manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DR&D*∆DRSit
 
Dnon*∆DRSit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient -10.11 0.033 -0.061 0.498 -0.321 19.00% 
t value (-0.42) (3.96)
** 
(-15.8)
** 
(1.22) (-1.65)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in debtors for firm і in year t,  
DR&D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
Dnon: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND does not invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
The results in Table 5.6 show that the nondiscretionary accruals variables (∆REV and 
PPE) are significant. Also, the discretionary accruals measure for R&D loss firms is 
significant, while the discretionary accruals measure for non-R&D loss firms is not 
significant. These results suggest that R&D loss firms are manipulating earnings to 
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reverse to profitability by using changes in stock. Loss firms that do not undertake R&D 
are not manipulating to reverse. The results here expand the explanation for the results 
shown in Table 5.4; where it shows evidence of earnings management in all loss firms. 
But this is because the percentage of R&D loss firms to all other loss firms is 57%; 
therefore, the discretionary accruals measure appears significant. On the other hand, 
results in Table 5.7 show that the discretionary accruals measure is not significant for 
R&D and non-R&D loss firms when using change in debtors as the manipulation tool, 
although the nondiscretionary accruals variables are significant. The overall results 
show that manipulation by loss firms depend on the components of losses. Since R&D 
is valued (favourably) by the market as an asset, they expect future profitability for 
these firms (Joos & Plesko, 2005). On the other hand, loss firms with no R&D are 
probably valued by the market as firms with operational or financial distress. Thus, the 
motivation to manipulate earnings is much less in these firms.  
5.8.2 Results on loss reversal from the US sample: 
The second set of results is obtained from the US sample to examine whether the same 
manipulation takes place in the reversal year. Results show that the change in sales and 
fixed assets are significant and with the expected sign. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
discretionary accrual measure when using change in stock is not significant. Similar 
results are also obtained when using change in debtors; results are displayed in the 
following two tables. Therefore, earnings management is not detected for all loss firms 
in the reversal period for the US sample.  
Table 5.8  
Results for loss reversal in US sample with ∆STK as manipulation tool 
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Coefficient 
 
1477.4 0.090 -0.111 0.024 15.87% 
t value
  
(3.510)
**
 (15.400)
**
 (-24.680)
**
 (0.190)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current 
year, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
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Table 5.9  
Results for loss reversal in US sample with ∆DRS as manipulation tool 
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Coefficient 
 
1459.85 0.089 -0.111 0.140 15.92% 
t value
  
(3.470)
**
 (15.140)
**
 (-24.640)
**
 (1.350)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current 
year, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
This suggests that there are other factors that need to be considered in addition to loss 
reversal. As in the UK sample, the loss firms in the US sample must be partitioned in 
order to detect earnings management more specifically. Therefore, loss firms will be 
divided into two groups: R&D loss firms, and non-R&D loss firms. Joos and Plesko 
(2005) divided the loss firms into two subsamples based on whether they incurred R&D 
expense. The paper shows that investors analyse the components of the loss and value 
R&D as an asset with potential future benefits. Similarly, loss firms are divided in this 
sample based on whether they incurred R&D expenses. The dummy variable (D R&D) 
equals one if the firm has R&D expenses and reverse its losses. Conversely, the dummy 
variable (D non) equals one if the firm reverse its losses and does not have R&D. Tables 
5.10 and 5.11 show the regression results for the two models; using change in stock and 
using change in debtors.  
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Table 5.10 
Results of loss reversal for R&D and non-R&D firms in the US with ∆STK as 
manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DR&D*∆STKit
 
Dnon*∆STKit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 1442.24 0.090 -0.111 0.407 -0.195 15.98% 
t value (3.43)
** 
(15.40)
** 
(-24.7)
** 
(1.95)
 
(-1.23)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DR&D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND incurs R&D expense, 0 otherwise. 
Dnon: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND does not invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
Table 5.11 
Results of loss reversal for R&D and non-R&D firms in the US with ∆DRS as 
manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DR&D*∆DRSit
 
Dnon*∆DRSit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 1435.97 0.089 -0.111 0.379 -0.258 16.11% 
t value (3.42)
** 
(15.19)
** 
(-24.6)
** 
(2.92)
** 
(-1.55)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DR&D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND incurs R&D expense, 0 otherwise. 
Dnon: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND does not invests in R&D activities, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
The results show the nondiscretionary accruals variables are both significant in the two 
models. However, there is no manipulation detected for R&D and non R&D loss firms 
when using change in stock as the manipulation tool. The discretionary accruals 
measure is not significant (although quite close to be significant t=1.95). On the other 
hand, results in Table 5.11 shows the coefficient on the discretionary accruals measure 
is significant for R&D loss firms when using change in debtors. The discretionary 
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accruals measure is not significant for non-R&D loss firms. When running the model on 
all loss firms, the results show no indication of manipulation, as shown in Table 5.8. 
This is because the percentage of R&D loss firms in the US sample is 38.66%, so when 
the model is applied on the entire sample, results show no indication of manipulation, 
since the majority of firms are non R&D firms. However, when dividing the loss firms 
based on the R&D expenses, results show that loss firms with R&D manipulate to 
reverse to profitability. The manipulation tool is change in debtors, which suggests that 
these firms recognise sales early in order to increase earnings. This suggests that 
earnings management behaviour is different among loss firms. For non-R&D loss firms, 
they simply might need to place real effort to reverse back to profitability since their 
losses are generated by poor performance or financial distress.  
Overall, these results add more explanation to the findings of Joos & Plesko (2005); 
they find that R&D persistent-loss firms are positively priced by the market. The results 
here suggest that the market price these firms favourably because they reverse quickly 
and that the R&D investment has already started to generate benefits.  
5.9 Results on loss reversal firms with changing levels in R&D activities: 
To further investigate the manipulation behaviour in the reversal period for R&D firms, 
a procedure similar to the one used by Lev and Zarowin (1999) is adopted. The R&D 
firms that reverse to profitability are categorised based on the change in R&D expense. 
The assumption thus far is that loss firms that invest in R&D manipulate earnings to 
reverse losses and report profits. The argument is since R&D expense is priced by the 
market as hidden assets with potential future benefits, managers of these firms will 
manipulate to report profits in order to signal that the R&D benefits are beginning to 
pay-in.  
However, the manipulation could be different in cases where the R&D investing 
activities are in a steady state or in a changing state. Firms that invest in R&D at fixed 
percentage from one period to another are not expected to manipulate because the 
benefits from the previous R&D activities will most likely cover the expenditures of 
current R&D activities. Also, the informativeness of earnings does not change in firms 
that have a constant (i.e. steady) rate of R&D spending (Lev & Zarowin, 1999), 
therefore the market will consider the earnings figure more than the R&D component. 
On the other hand, firms that change the amount invested in R&D activities every 
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period are expected to manipulate since the benefits coming from previous R&D 
activities will probably not be sufficient to cover the current level of R&D expenditure. 
Hence, the incentive to manipulate in order to reverse losses becomes greater in these 
firms, and the amount of manipulation is expected to be higher. 
Lev and Zarowin (1999) divided the sample into low change R&D firms and high 
change R&D firms based on the percentage of R&D expense to sales. The paper 
establishes five portfolios and examines the movement or change of the firms between 
these portfolios. The findings show that high-change firm’s earnings relation with stock 
returns have declined over time, while low-change firm’s earnings association with 
returns are larger, although not quite significant. However, the paper finds similar 
results when taking into consideration the increasing frequency of reported losses in the 
sample. The paper attributes the weak return-earnings relation over time to the failure of 
the accounting system to account fully for changes in R&D rather than the occurrence 
of losses. On the other hand, Joos and Plesko (2005) divided the sample into persistent 
loss firms and transitory loss firms based on the loss history of the firms. Furthermore, 
the paper examines the R&D activities for persistent loss firms and established two 
subsamples based on whether the persistent loss firms undertake R&D activities or not. 
After which, the paper regress returns on earnings before R&D expense and on R&D 
for the two subsamples. The findings show that the earnings response coefficient before 
R&D expense is positive for persistent loss firms which suggests that the market prices 
the R&D expenses as assets. Therefore, the market understands that the R&D is the 
underlying reason for losses, believing that in the future the company is expecting to 
receive benefits from the investment in R&D activities.  
But the question is for how long will the market continue to price these firms 
favourably? For example, if a firm is investing heavily in R&D at an increasing rate 
each period, then they will probably continue to report losses for a quite long period.  
However, the market will eventually lose trust in the justification for the increasing 
level of investment in R&D, for they will not realize any profits very soon. The market 
fixates more on the current reported profitability measures because the market has 
strong preferences for more value in the short term (Bushee, 2001; Lev et al., 2005). 
Therefore, loss firms that are in a changing state of R&D investment must report profits 
at some point of time to provide the market with evidence that they are collecting some 
of the benefits of previous R&D. Furthermore, if the firm reports profits after the 
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reversal period for more than one period (i.e. two consecutive periods of profits after the 
loss period) then the market starts to value earnings more and value R&D less (Franzen 
& Radhakrishnan, 2009). Hence, these firms are more motivated to manipulate earnings 
in order to report profits. Based on that, each of the two samples will be divided into 
two groups based on whether there is any level of change in R&D activities. There will 
be two groups: changing state and steady state in R&D levels. Changing state firms are 
the companies that reverse losses and change the amount of R&D spending from one 
period to another. Conversely, steady state firms are the companies that reverse losses 
and have a constant rate of R&D spending each period. The reason of this test is to 
examine if there is any difference in the amount of manipulation between R&D firms if 
they have changing levels in R&D activities regardless the amount of change (high or 
low). It is expected that firms in a changing state will be more motivated to reverse 
through earnings management, while steady state firms are expected to have a less 
incentive to manipulate since evidence from Lev and Zarowin (1999) show that 
earnings (or even negative earnings in this case) will not be affected by a steady or 
constant level of R&D spending.  
Moreover, the two samples will be also divided into two groups: high-change R&D loss 
firms and low-change R&D loss firms. The level of change is based on the average 
percentage of R&D to sales for all R&D firms. Loss firms that have a higher ratio of 
R&D to sales than the average score will be classified as high-change, similarly loss 
firms with a ratio less than the average score will be classified as low-change. This is to 
examine the incentive to manipulate in the changing state firms, since changing state 
firms will include high change and low change. It is expected that high change R&D 
loss firms will not be able to manipulate because it will be more difficult to reverse 
through earnings management. The amount of R&D will be very large and the amount 
of manipulation will not be sufficient to reverse losses. However, these firms can 
reverse losses through real earnings management. On the other hand, low change R&D 
firms have more ability to reverse through accrual manipulation because the change in 
R&D spending is lower. Overall, the extended Jones model will measure the 
nondiscretionary accruals for all firms in the two samples, and the composite variable 
(dummy variable multiplied with accrual account) will measure the discretionary 
accruals for the firms that have the motivation to manipulate. 
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The following two tables provide descriptive statistics for the R&D loss firms in the UK 
sample and the US sample. In the UK sample, the R&D expense is slightly lower in loss 
reversal firms compared to all R&D firms. Moreover, the percentage of R&D to sales 
and the change in this percentage is higher for R&D loss reversal firms when compared 
to all other firms. The change in R&D to sales suggests that loss reversal firms are 
increasing their R&D activities in a higher rate than other firms in the sample.  
In the US sample the R&D expense appears to be higher for loss reversal firms, but the 
R&D to sales ratio is roughly the same in both groups. The change in R&D to sales 
ratio for loss reversal firms is negative, suggesting that firms reversing to profits have a 
declining rate in R&D activities, while for other firms the ratio is increasing.  
Table 5.12  
Descriptive statistics for UK R&D firms 
 All firms
1
 R&D Loss reversal firms
2
 
  ∆    ∆  
Mean  0.032 0.037 0.011 0.030 0.029 0.012 
Std. Dev. 0.038 0.070 0.047 0.041 0.047 0.031 
Variance 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
observations 275 275 275 23 23 23 
1 
All firms include profit and loss firms together that undertake R&D activities 
2
 Loss reversal firms are firms that report a loss in previous period and profits in current period. 
 
Table 5.13  
Descriptive statistics for US R&D firms 
 All firms
1
 R&D Loss reversal firms
2
 
  ∆    ∆  
Mean  0.049 0.064 0.002 0.055 0.065 -0.016 
Std. Dev. 0.043 0.105 0.056 0.054 0.063 0.059 
Variance 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
observations 1311 1311 1311 87 87 87 
1
All firms include profit and loss firms together that undertake R&D activities 
2
Loss reversal firms are firms that report a loss in previous period and profits in current period. 
5.9.1 Loss reversal firms with changing levels in R&D for the UK sample: 
The R&D loss firms are grouped according to whether there is any change at all, 
regardless of the amount and direction of change in the R&D level between two 
consecitve periods (i.e. steady state versus changing state). The dummy varaible in this 
case will equal (1) if the loss-reversal firm has a changing percentage in R&D to sales 
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compared to the previous preiod, (0) otherwise. The results are displayed in Tables 5.14 
and 5.15.  
 
Table 5.14  
Results of loss reversal for UK firms with changing state in R&D with ∆STK as 
manipulation tool 
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2
 
Coefficient 
 
-13.140 0.029 -0.608 0.854 19.12% 
t value
  
(-0.590) (3.670)
**
 (-15.850)
**
 (2.230)
*
  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
 ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the R&D/sales changes from previous period, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
t values at 5% significance level.  
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
Table 5.15  
Results of loss reversal for UK firms with changing state in R&D with ∆DRS as 
manipulation tool 
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Adj-R
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Coefficient 
 
-13.844 0.029 -0.607 0.501 18.88% 
t value
  
(-0.580) (3.660)
**
 (-15.800)
**
 (1.230)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
 ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the R&D/sales changes from previous period, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
The change in sales revenue and fixed assets are significnat in the two models and with 
the expected sign. The discretionary accrual measure is significant when using change 
in stock, although still not signifcant when using change in debtors, suggesting that 
firms with a changing state in the R&D activities are manipulating to reverse losses 
through increasing stock value. The coefficient on the discretionary accrual measure, 
when using change in stock as the manipulation tool, is 0.854, which is similar to the 
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coefficient of the discretionary accruals in Table 5.6. This suggests that all R&D loss 
reversal firms invest in R&D at a changing rate. Therefore, the results are showing 
manipulation to reverse losses in firms that are in a changing state of R&D spending, 
and the comparison here is based on change versus no change, regardless if the change 
is high or low.  
Since the results show that changing state R&D loss firms are manipulating to reverse 
losses, the next step is to examine earnings management within the changing-state 
firms. The changing state firms are divided into high change firms and low change 
firms. High change firms are R&D firms that reverse losses and the change in the R&D 
to sales ratio is higher than the average score (0.037) for all R&D firms. Low change 
firms are R&D firms that reverse losses and change in the R&D to sales ratio is lower 
than the average score. As suggested above, it is expected that the high change firms 
will not be able to manipulate. Because firms that invest in R&D at a higher rate will 
probably find it difficult to reverse through accrual manipulation since the amount of 
R&D is large. Therefore, low change firms are expected to reverse through earnings 
management. The regression results are displayed in the following two tables for the 
UK sample.  
Table 5.16  
Results of loss reversal for UK firms with high change and low change in R&D with ∆STK 
as manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DH*∆STKit
 
DL*∆STKit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient -13.07 0.029 -0.061 0.463 0.971 19.07% 
t value (-0.55) (3.69)
** 
(-15.8)
** 
(0.58) (2.23)
* 
 
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
 ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DH: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is higher than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is lower than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
 t values at 5% significance level. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
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Table 5.17 
Results of loss reversal for UK firms with high change and low change in R&D with ∆DRS 
as manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DH*∆DRSit
 
DL*∆DRSit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient -13.73 0.029 -0.061 0.226 0.619 18.83% 
t value (-0.57) (3.66)
** 
(-15.8)
** 
(0.30) (1.27)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DH: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is higher than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is lower than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
(D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
The results are in line with expectations; R&D loss firms that have high-change 
spending levels are not manipulating to reverse losses. However, results show 
manipulation for R&D loss firms with low-change levels; the discretionary accruals 
measure is significant when using change in stock as the manipulation tool. Moreover, 
the amount of manipulation for low change firms is even higher than the amount of 
manipulation for all R&D loss firms that are in changing state (0.971 from Table 5.16 
compared to 0.854 from Table 5.14). This suggests that the R&D is large even for low 
change firms. However, low change firms have the ability to manipulate accruals to 
reverse losses compared to high change firms and the manipulation will most likely be 
sufficient enough to overcome the negative effect of R&D on earnings. When using 
change in debtors as the manipulation tool, the discretionary accruals measure for high-
change and low-change is insignificant. The nondiscretionary accruals variables in both 
models are significant. 
5.9.2 Loss reversal firms with changing levels in R&D for the US sample: 
The above tests are applied on the US sample. The results in Section 5.8.2 show no 
indication of manipulation for loss reversal firms in the US sample. However, results 
show evidence of manipulation, through debtors, for loss reversal firms that undertake 
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R&D activities. In this section, firms are divided into two groups based on whether they 
have changing levels of R&D regardless the amount of change. This test aims at 
comparing the incentive to manipulate between firms that are in changing state and 
steady state in respect to R&D spending. The argument is same as above; firms that 
have a changing level of R&D spending each period are expected to reverse losses 
through earnings management, while steady state firms are not. To compare firms with 
changing state versus steady state in R&D activities, the dummy variable will equal one 
if the loss firm undertakes R&D projects at a changing state. Similar to the UK sample, 
comparison is based on change versus no change, regardless if the change is high or 
low. Results are displayed in the following two tables. 
Table 5.18  
Results of loss reversal for US firms with changing state in R&D with ∆STK as 
manipulation tool 
it
t
it
t
it
t
it
tt
it
A
STKD
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
)
*
()()()
1
(
1
`
1111  
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it D*∆STK it 
 
Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
1457.138 0.089 -0.111 0.411 15.96% 
t value
  
(3.460)
**
 (15.360)
**
 (-24.680)
**
 (1.920)  
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the R&D/sales changes from previous period, 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
Table 5.19  
Results of loss reversal for US firms with changing state in R&D with ∆DRS as 
manipulation tool 
it
t
it
t
it
t
it
tt
it
A
DRSD
A
PPE
A
REV
AA
TA
)
*
()()()
1
(
1
`
1111  
 1/At-1 ∆REV it PPE it D*∆DRS it 
 
Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 
 
1431.969 0.088 -0.111 0.380 16.07% 
t value
  
(3.410)
**
 (15.110)
**
 (-24.600)
**
 (2.910)
** 
 
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in net debtors for firm і in year t,  
D: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the R&D/sales changes from previous period, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
 (D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
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The results show that change in sales revenue and fixed assets are significant in both 
models. The discretionary accruals measure is significant only when using change in 
debtors. This suggests that loss firms that have a changing rate of R&D spending are 
reversing through early sales recognition. Firms that have a constant rate of R&D 
spending are not manipulating since the benefits of previous R&D projects will most 
likely cover the current level of spending. Hence, loss firms that undertake R&D 
activities at a changing rate each period are more motivated to reverse through earnings 
management and to show profits to stay in line with the market expectations. 
Same as in the UK sample, since loss firms that have a changing level of R&D spending 
are reversing through earnings management, the amount of change is examined to test 
for any differences between high change and low change R&D firms. Therefore, the 
firms in the US sample are divided into high change firms and low change firms. The 
level of change is based on whether the firm’s change in R&D to sales ratio is higher or 
lower than the average score (0.064) of all R&D firms. The expectation is high change 
R&D loss firms will not have the ability to manipulate because the amount of accrual 
manipulation will not be sufficient enough to reverse because the amount of R&D 
expenses is large. On the other hand, low change R&D loss firms will have more ability 
to reverse through accrual manipulation. The regression results are shown in Table 5.20 
when using change in stock as manipulation tool and in Table 5.21 when using change 
in debtors as the manipulation tool. 
Table 5.20  
Results of loss reversal for US firms with high change and low change in R&D with ∆STK 
as manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DH*∆STKit
 
DL*∆STKit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 1452.86 0.089 -0.111 -3.955 0.416 15.95% 
t value (3.45)
** 
(15.35)
** 
(-24.6)
** 
(-0.70) (1.99)
* 
 
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔSTK it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DH: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is higher than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is lower than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
*
 t values at 5% significance level. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
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 (D*∆STK) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
 
Table 5.21 
Results of loss reversal for US firms with high change and low change in R&D with ∆DRS 
as manipulation tool 
 
 1/At-1 ∆REVit PPEit DH*∆DRSit
 
DL*∆DRSit Adj-R
2
 
Coefficient 1431.15 0.088 -0.111 -3.280 0.385 16.07% 
t value (3.40)
** 
(15.10)
** 
(-24.6)
** 
(-0.70) (2.96)
** 
 
TA it is total accruals for firm і in year t, 
ΔREV it: change in sales revenue for firm і in year t,  
PPE it: property plant and equipment for firm і in year t,  
ΔDRS it: change in stock for firm і in year t,  
DH: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is higher than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
DL: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company reports losses in previous year and profits in current year 
AND invests in R&D activities AND the change in R&D/sales is lower than industry average, 0 otherwise. 
All variables are scaled by total assets in t-1 to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
**
 t values at 1% significance level. 
(D*∆DRS) is the variable used as a measure for discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Similar to the UK sample, the results are in line with expectations. The nondiscretionary 
accruals variables are significant in both models. The discretionary accruals measure is 
significant for low change R&D loss firms and insignificant for the high change R&D 
loss firms. Moreover, the discretionary accruals measures in both models, for change in 
stock and change in debtors, are significant. This suggests that loss firms that have a 
low change in R&D are reversing losses through earnings management by increasing 
the value of stock and early recognition of sales. The low change firms are manipulating 
using two accrual accounts. A possible explanation is the amount of R&D is quite large 
even for firms with low change so they need to increase the amount of manipulation to 
reverse the losses. The sum of both discretionary accruals in the two models is 0.801 
(0.416 + 0.385) which is the aggregate amount of required manipulation to reverse 
losses. In the UK sample, the amount of manipulation is 0.971 (from Table 5.16). This 
suggests that the amount of manipulation required to reverse losses is quite high in both 
samples even for firms that have a low change rate in R&D spending. 
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5.10 General summary on the UK and the US samples: 
The results obtained from the UK and the US samples suggest that loss firms that 
undertake R&D projects reverse losses through earnings management. The level of 
manipulation varies with the changing levels in R&D spending.  
Generally, companies are expected to report a loss from time to time due to different 
reasons. To assume they reverse to profits through earnings management after one loss 
period is quite a strong assumption, because they can easily report profits once the 
reason for losses cease to exist. However, taking into consideration that the reason for 
losses can linger for more than one period, companies will still continue to report losses. 
If the reason for losses is a specific activity that will benefit the company in the future 
(e.g. R&D expenses) then the company will be motivated to report profits because they 
expect that these activities will affect the earnings figure negatively for more than one 
period. On the other hand, if the reason for losses is financial or operational distress for 
example, then reversing through earnings management will not be helpful since the 
market has already evaluated these firms as distressed companies. Another reason is the 
scrutiny these firms face from regulatory bodies and auditors. 
The results in this chapter support this argument. Loss firms that undertake R&D 
activities reverse to profits through earnings management. The R&D component is the 
underlying reason to report losses, and since the market values R&D as assets with 
potential future benefits, firms are motivated to show profits even through earnings 
management. The reason companies are motivated to show profits is to maintain the 
confidence of the market in the R&D activities, because if the company is undertaking 
R&D projects every period then they will continue to report losses. Therefore, 
companies will want to break the pattern of losses by reporting profits from time to 
time. Moreover, the market expects that benefits from previous R&D projects will pay 
in and if they do not see any profits any time soon they will price the R&D activities as 
bad investment decisions taken by company. However, if the company invests in R&D 
in equal proportions each period (i.e. steady investing level) then the benefits of 
previous R&D will most likely cover the current investment levels and they will not 
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need to reverse to profits through earnings management. The results support this 
argument; companies investing in R&D at a changing level each period reverse to 
profits through earnings management. 
In the UK sample, results show evidence of earnings management in all loss firms that 
reverse to profitability. The same results are not shown in the US sample, the reason is 
because the percentage of R&D firms in the UK sample is 57% whereas its only 38.6% 
in the US sample. In other words, the majority of loss firms in the UK sample are 
undertaking R&D activities, but the R&D firms in the US sample are less. So, if the 
percentages of R&D loss firms to all other loss firms in both samples are the same, the 
results from both samples will be similar. Therefore, the overall conclusion from both 
samples is all R&D loss firms reverse to profits through earnings management, but not 
all loss firms. The underlying reason of losses is the main determinant in motivating 
managers to manipulate earnings. 
When the firms are partitioned based on whether they have any change in R&D, results 
show evidence of earnings management for both samples.  Change in R&D is defined as 
changing the level of R&D expenses from one period to another, regardless if the 
change is high or low. Results show that firms with a steady level of R&D spending (i.e. 
do not change amount of R&D expenses) are not reversing through earnings 
management. This result supports the main argument of this chapter; R&D loss firms 
reverse to profits through earnings management in an effort to maintain the market 
confidence to continue pricing the R&D as assets. Reversing to profits provides 
evidence to the market that some benefits of the previous R&D are paying in. Firms 
with changing levels in R&D will need to show profits even through earnings 
management because the benefits of previous R&D projects might not be sufficient to 
cover current levels of R&D. On the other hand, firms in a steady level of R&D 
investment will probably cover their current R&D expenses from the payoffs of 
previous R&D projects.  
The loss firms with changing levels in R&D spending in both samples are further 
partitioned into firms with high changing levels in R&D activities and firms with low 
changing levels in R&D activities. High change is when a firm increases its R&D 
expenses in higher rate than the average R&D to sales ratio of all R&D firms. In other 
words, the model measures the discretionary accruals for loss firms that undertake R&D 
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activities at a higher changing rate than the industry’s. Results from both samples did 
not show any evidence of earnings management in firms with high change in R&D. 
However, earnings management is detected in firms with low change levels in R&D 
spending. Low change firms have more ability to manipulate earnings successfully 
because the amount of R&D spending can be offset by the amount of accrual 
manipulation. 
In the UK sample, the tool of manipulation is the stock. All significant results of the 
discretionary accruals measure is with change in stock. On the other hand, in the US 
sample the discretionary accruals measure is significant when using change in debtors. 
But for low change firms, both accruals are significant in the US sample. Change in 
stock captures overhead manufacturing costs manipulation, whereas change in debtors 
captures revenue manipulation through early sales recognition. Moreover, change in 
debtors also captures expense manipulation in the form of bad debt expense; managers 
can re-estimate the percentage of bad debt expanses each period based on their own 
discretion, however the amount manipulation could be insufficient. Overhead costs 
manipulation is relatively easy because it is achieved within the company and there is 
no need for an outside party interaction as in sales manipulation. Early sales 
recognition, or channel stuffing, is achieved through shipping goods early than usual to 
suppliers. However, it could be difficult to achieve this if the seller has less power than 
the buyer, or the economic situation of the buyer is poor. Difference in the manipulation 
tool between the two samples could be explained by which accrual account 
(manipulation tool) is most suitable in achieving the manipulation target. In the UK, it 
could be difficult, for same reason mentioned before, to ship goods early to buyers, so 
they manipulate overhead costs. In the US, there might be less restriction on shipping 
goods early to buyers, so they manipulate revenues. The overall conclusion here is any 
accrual account can be used to manipulate earnings, and the model developed in this 
research measures earnings management by specifying the accrual account used. 
Overall, the results show similar patterns in the UK and the US. This could be evidence 
that loss reversal for R&D firms is the same in the two settings. The only difference 
between the UK and the US samples is the accrual account utilized to manipulate 
earnings (i.e. the tool of manipulation). UK firms manipulate expenses and US firms 
manipulate revenues. A possible explanation for this difference is the presence of higher 
restrictions forced by auditors or regulatory bodies on sales recognition in the UK 
 Chapter 5: Earnings management in loss reversal firms 
 
168 
 
compared to the US. Another explanation is the ability to offer more discount 
promotions on early sales in the US.    
 
5.11 Conclusion: 
The focus of this chapter is to detect earnings management in loss reversal firms. The 
extended version of the cross-sectional Jones model is applied on two samples from the 
UK and the US. The model measures the normal level of accruals (nondiscretionary 
accruals) by the change in sales and fixed assets. Abnormal accruals (discretionary 
accruals) are measured only for firms that have an incentive to manipulate. The 
discretionary accruals are measured by a composite variable that consists of two 
components; the first specifies the incentive, which is loss firms that undertake R&D in 
this case, the other component specifies the accrual account that is most likely to be 
used by companies as means to manipulate. 
Results show evidence of earnings management in loss reversal firms that undertake 
R&D projects. Since the market values these projects as assets with potential future 
benefits, the managers reverse to profits in order to meet with the market expectations. 
Managers undertake R&D investments in an attempt to increase the future value of their 
companies. But adopting a strategy that concentrates on R&D suggest that these 
companies will continue to report losses for a number of periods. Therefore, managers 
will aim at preserving the market’s confidence in the R&D projects by showing profits 
from time to time, even if achieved through earnings management. If the company 
continues to report losses under the assumption that the market values R&D as assets, 
then at some point of time, the market will value R&D as bad investments decisions. 
The consequences will be severe for managers in this case because they will lose the 
justification to acquire additional funds to finance their R&D activities. Reporting 
profits will signal to the market that benefits of previous R&D investments are paying 
in, and it is a successful investment decision.  
The results show that firms investing in R&D at a steady state do not manipulate since 
the benefits of previous R&D will probably cover the current level of investments in 
these projects. Companies investing in R&D at changing state reverse losses through 
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earnings management since the benefits of previous R&D will probably not be 
sufficient to cover the current level. 
The results show that the tool of manipulation is different between the two samples. In 
the UK, the manipulation is captured by using change in stock. Firms reallocate 
overhead manufacturing costs to be capitalised rather than expensed to reduce cost of 
goods sold and therefore increasing gross profits. The manipulation of overhead 
manufacturing costs is achieved entirely within the firm and there is no need for an 
interaction with an outside party as it is required in sales manipulation. The results show 
no indication of sales manipulation through premature recognition of sales. However, 
early recognition of sales is achieved by channel stuffing and because of high 
competition between the UK manufactures it could be difficult to do so all the time. On 
the other hand, earnings management is captured mostly by change in sales in the US 
sample. Companies manipulate earnings through early recognition of sales by shipping 
goods to buyers earlier than usual.  
Having different manipulation tools in each sample adds more strength to the model of 
this research. The model allows researchers to measure the discretionary accruals in 
different samples by specifying the most common and suitable accrual account to 
manipulate. 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is the underlying reason or components of losses 
determine the reversion of losses through earnings management. Evidence from 
previous studies reveals the market interaction with the components of negative 
earnings. If that reason will increase the value of company in the near future, then the 
market will favourably value the company. Managers will want to meet this expectation 
by reporting profits, but in the case it is unlikely to do so, manager will report profits 
through earnings management. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion, Limitations and Future research 
6.1 Conclusion: 
Applying the Jones model on cross sectional data gives unclear results. The residuals 
from the model are the measure for discretionary accruals. They assume that some 
companies are manipulating upwards and some companies are manipulating 
downwards, and they all average to zero. 
6.1.1 Modifying the Jones model:  
The Jones model is modified in this research to include an additional variable that 
represents discretionary accruals. The model controls for nondiscretionary accruals and 
measures the discretionary accrual having the residual to only represent white noise. In 
chapter three, simulation tests points out the major weakness of the cross-sectional 
version of the Jones model. When inserting a fixed amount into a dataset that does not 
contain earnings management, the residuals from the model did not pick the entire 
manipulation amount. However, when adding an additional variable to the model as a 
measure for discretionary accruals, the coefficient of this variable is not only significant 
but also equals the same amount of manipulation inserted in the dataset. Thus, the 
model is straight forward. Total accruals equal nondiscretionary accruals plus 
discretionary accruals, and if any residuals results from this model will only represent 
white noise. Based on that, the modification to the model overcomes the weakness of 
the standard model when applying it on cross-sectional data. The modified model is 
applied in two different settings. The first setting is applying the model on listed 
companies in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The second setting is listed companies in 
the UK and the US. In the both settings, the incentive to manipulate is different, but 
they share a common benchmark; the zero benchmark. The general objective in the 
three samples is to reverse losses. 
6.1.2 Review of earnings management literature: 
This research conducts a comprehensive review of the earnings management literature 
in order to examine the different methods applied in previous research, also to identify 
the gaps in literature. The review of earnings management literature shows that there are 
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different methods to detect manipulation. An important issue that various studies 
consider is the motivation to manipulate. The assumption is if the company is reporting 
profits then there is no need to manipulate. However, other studies document downward 
manipulation and shows different incentives that require firms to show less profits, and 
in some cases losses. 
6.1.3 Loss reversal in ASE and market reaction: 
The (ASE) has a unique market format that makes it easier to detect earnings 
management. The market is structured into two markets; the first market and second 
market. The first market contains companies that are characterised as profitable and 
therefore relatively less risky. Any company that reports losses for three consecutive 
years will be relegated and listed on the second market. Thus, the incentive is clear and 
evident for companies listed in the first market. Companies will aim to report profits 
even through manipulation in order to preserve their place in the first market. The 
model is applied on industrial companies listed in the first market. Results provide 
evidence of earnings management for industrial companies listed in the first market that 
report a loss in the previous period.  
This research looks into the consequences of the manipulation detected in the first 
market on the investors. The manipulating company’s share price should not include 
any weight for the discretionary accruals since they are a result of manager’s 
manipulation. Additionally, they contain zero information value relating to the 
company’s performance. However, results show that the market is pricing discretionary 
accruals and they consider it as a real component of earnings. As a consequence, the 
manipulation is achieving two goals; the company remains listed in the first market and 
the investor is rewarding this manipulation under the impression that the company is 
doing well. 
6.1.4 Loss reversal in the UK and the US: 
The model is also applied to detect earnings management for loss reversal firms in the 
UK and the US. The data is obtained from two samples of manufacturing companies 
listed in the UK and in the US. The incentive for these firms is to reverse the losses 
reported in a previous period to profits in the current period.  
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Results from the UK sample provide evidence of earnings management for loss reversal 
firms that undertake R&D activities. The incentive to manipulate is higher for loss 
reversal firms that have a changing state in R&D activities compared to loss reversal 
firms with a steady state in R&D activities. In the US sample, similar results are 
obtained; loss firms that undertake R&D reverse losses though earnings management. 
Moreover, loss firms with a changeable state in R&D activities have a higher incentive 
to manipulate than firms with steady level in R&D activities.  
The overall conclusion from the UK and US samples is the underlying reason of the loss 
determines the incentive to manipulate and the amount of manipulation. R&D firms 
need to reverse their losses and show profits because the market is favourably pricing 
the R&D as assets with future benefits. The aim is to show profits to send a signal to the 
market that their R&D activities are in fact profitable. They can also justify the need to 
acquire more funds in order to finance these activities. 
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6.2 Contributions of this research: 
The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
I. I develop a new model that detects and measures earnings management more 
accurately. The new model is based on a modification to the cross-sectional 
version of the Jones model. This new model uses a variable that detects 
manipulation and measures the amount of the manipulation for companies that 
share a common motivation. 
 
II. I conduct a full review of previous research in earnings management literature. 
This review examines the main methods that are applied to detect earnings 
management. The review clusters the studies that use similar methods into three 
groups: studies that estimate discretionary accruals, studies that detect earnings 
management through earnings distribution, studies that estimate the managed 
component of a single accrual. 
 
 
III. I provide evidence of earnings management for listed companies in Amman 
Stock Exchange. Industrial companies listed in the first market manipulate in 
order to remain listed. Moreover, I show that the market does not detect this 
manipulation and overreacts to the discretionary accruals. 
 
IV. I provide evidence of earnings management for loss reversal companies that 
undertake R&D activities at a changing level in the UK and in the US. I show 
that earnings management behaviour is similar in both samples. Loss reversal 
through earnings management depends on whether the underlying reason for 
losses adds value to the company in the future. 
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6.3 Limitations of the research: 
One of the main limitations of this study is assuming that all companies use the same 
tools to manipulate. In the (ASE) sample it is assumed that the change in debtors is the 
same tool used by all companies to manipulate. In the UK and US samples, change in 
stock is used as the manipulation tool in addition to change in debtors. However, each 
company might use different accruals accounts and methods to manipulate. This 
research is constrained by assuming that all firms in the same sample use the same 
accrual account to manipulate earnings. Some companies may use other accounts that 
are not necessarily related to accruals in order to manipulate, for example companies 
might reduce some expenditures to increase profits (i.e. real earnings management). 
Applying more methods of detection on the same sample could overcome this 
limitation. 
Another limitation of this research is it did not examine explicitly the constraints that 
restrict the ability of managers to manipulate. For example, the role of the auditor is not 
taken as a factor to examine if it replaces any restrictions on the ability to manipulate. 
Although there is an implicit indication that all manipulators in the ASE sample has a 
small auditor. 
Another restriction this research did not take into consideration is the issuance of new 
standards. For example, in chapter five, the financial statements for the UK sample is 
prepared under two accounting standards; the UK GAAP before 2005 and the IFRS 
afterwards.  
In order for companies to manipulate, there should be two main factors: the incentive 
and the ability. In earnings management studies, the ability is associated with the 
availability of accounting technology (i.e. accruals). For this reason, a huge number of 
studies, as well as this research, include only manufacturing companies in the sample. 
The ability to manipulate is not necessarily associated with only accruals. Including 
more types of companies in the sample and examining their accounting systems will 
shed more light on the different methods of manipulation.  
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6.4 Future research: 
Future research in earnings management should focus more on the restrictions placed on 
managers’ ability to manipulate. Restrictions are a product of the surrounding 
environment rather than the available accounting technology. 
Restrictions on the manager’s ability to manipulate may be placed by new accounting 
standards. For example, in the UK financial statements were prepared based in the UK 
GAAP before 2005. After that year, companies prepared their financial reports based on 
the IFRS. Examining the two sets of accounting standards will provide a unique 
opportunity to compare the manipulation under two sets of standards for the same 
sample. This comparison is better than comparing two samples from different countries 
under different accounting regimes. Each sample operates in an environment that has its 
unique and distinguishable characteristics that might be unavailable or inapplicable for 
the other sample. Thus, motives or restrictions to manipulate could not be the same. As 
a consequence, the incorrect conclusion about the accounting regime is drawn, that one 
set of accounting standards restricts earnings management, while the actual restriction 
comes from a different factor. 
Future research should also focus on the different accounting tools used to manipulate 
earnings. They should keep in mind that companies will use different tools and methods 
and not just one. Moreover, each company will use a different tool than others to 
achieve the manipulation. 
A good method to apply in future research in earnings management is conducting 
interviews with the actual manipulators; the managers. This will provide an inside look 
of why managers consider manipulation as an option and how they are achieving it. Of 
course, such information might be very difficult to obtain because the underlying 
question for the manager is “how did you cheat on your financial statements!” However, 
maybe retired CEO’s and managers could provide some inside look, or at least they can 
explain the old tricks used in their days. 
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Appendix: 
A1: Manipulating the data obtained from companies listed in ASE: 
The data of the companies in the Amman Stock Exchange are obtained directly from the 
financial statements. The financial statements of each company are downloaded from 
the ASE website in Excel format. All financial statements are formatted in excel in a 
unified way; for example the cell E17 gives the accounts receivable for the year 2005. 
The cell E17 is accounts receivables in 2005 in all the Excel workbooks.  
The following is an example of a partial view for a financial statement for one 
company: 
 
To gather the data with total accuracy and speed and to avoid the cumbersome of 
copying each cell and pasting it on a new sheet, I need to write a program that can 
achieve this.  Fortunately, Excel as well as all other Microsoft office applications, gives 
the option to write a program using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA).  
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The procedure I followed is: 
First, I downloaded the financial statements from the ASE website for each company 
included in the sample into one folder. This folder contains 36 Excel worksheets for 
each company’s financial statements. 
Second, I open a new worksheet to gather all the required data for the study. Within this 
worksheet I wrote the following program: 
 
Basically, this program opens the folder that contains the Excel worksheet (each 
worksheet has the financial data for each company), then opens the first worksheet and 
copies the range I specify and paste it in the new worksheet. Then, it closes the 
worksheet and opens the second one, and so on. In this example, the range I specify is 
E17 to I17, so the program will copy the accounts receivables from 2001 to 2005 and 
paste it on the new worksheet. If I require total assets, I specify the range to be E26 to 
I26, so the program will copy the range and paste total assets from 2001 to 2005 in the 
new worksheet, and so on for all variables going through each worksheet. 
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The new worksheet will now contain all the variables required for each company and 
year included in the sample; the new worksheet will look as the following: 
 
Third, now that I got the variables required for the study in one single worksheet, I can 
get the first difference or the scaled variable and prepare the variables to be exported to 
the statistical application I use. 
In order to write this program, I needed to study the basic techniques of VBA. The 
program I wrote is applied on VBA for Excel versions from 1997 to 2003 (version 9.0 
to version 11). In the new version of Excel 2007 (version 12), the object 
“Application.Filesearch” is hidden. Therefore, the program must be updated for the new 
version of Excel in order to include a new object to loop through files in the folder.  
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A2: list of Standard Industrial Classification for the UK and the US 
The two samples for chapter five are selected from the UK and the US. The following 
provides the list for companies included in the both samples. 
For the UK sample, manufacturing companies are included in sample with Standard 
Industrial Classification code from15 to 39. 
UK SIC:  
15. Manufacture of food products and beverages 
 16. Manufacture of tobacco products 
 17. Manufacture of textiles 
 18. Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
 19. Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness 
and footwear 
 20. Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture 
of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
 21. Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 
 22. Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
 23. Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
 24. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
 25. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
 26. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
 27. Manufacture of basic metals 
 28. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
 29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 
 30. Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
 31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified 
 32. Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
 33. Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
 34. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 35. Manufacture of other transport equipment 
 36. Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere classified 
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For the US sample, manufacturing companies are included in sample with Standard 
Industrial Classification code from 20 to 39. 
US SIC: 
20. Food and kindred products  
 21. Tobacco products  
 22. Textile mill products  
 23. Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials  
 24. Lumber and wood products, except furniture  
 25. Furniture and fixtures  
 26. Paper and allied products  
 27. Printing, publishing and allied industries  
 28. Chemicals and allied products  
 29. Petroleum refining and related industries  
 30. Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products  
 31. Leather and leather products  
 32. Stone, clay, glass and concrete products  
 33. Primary metal industries  
 34. Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment  
 35. Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment  
 36. Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer equipment  
 37. Transportation equipment  
 38. Measuring, analyzing and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical 
goods; watches and clocks  
 39. Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
